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THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

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PROFESSOR  JOHN  ELOF  BOODIN 

MEMORIAL  PHILOSOPHY 

COLLECTION 


DEPARTMENT  OF  PHILOSOPHY 


C.    0 


DEPARTMENT  OF  PHILOSOPHY 


TRUTH  ON  TRIAL 


AN  EXPOSITION  OF  THE  NATURE  OF  TRUTH 


PRECEDED  BY  A  CRITIQUE  OF  PRAGMATISM 
AND  AN  APPRECIATION  OF  ITS  LEADER 


BY 

PAUL  CARUS 


Tlavruv  fiirpov  a 

aM?  av6p&7rov  ftirpov  TO  "Ev  ncuflav. 


CHICAGO 
THE  OPEN  COURT  PUBLISHING  COMPANY 

LONDON  AGENTS 

KEGAN  PAUL,  TRENCH,  TRUBNER  &  CO.,  LTD. 
1911 

DEPARTMENT  OF  PHILOSOPHY 


COPYRIGHT  BY 

THE  OPEN  COURT  PUB.  CO. 
1911 


B 

83L2, 
CV 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

PROLOGUE. 

Truth I 

PRAGMATISM. 

The  Meaning  of  the  Word 4 

The  Pragmatist's  Conception  of  Truth 5 

The  Useful  Lie 7 

Truth  Compared  to  Cash  Value 8 

The  Objective  Significance  of  Truth n 

Truth  Made  or  Found  ? 12 

Oneness  and  Reason 13 

The  Mind  of  the  Universe 15 

Time  and  Space   17 

Love  of  Facts  and  Mysticism 19 

Misunderstood 21 

Temperamental  Philosophy  25 

The  Plasticity  of  Truth 27 

Ptolemy  and  Copernicus   28 

Euclid  and  Aristotle 30 

Materialism  and  Spiritualism  31 

Religious  Problems 33 

Mr.  Charles  S.  Peirce's  Tychism 36 

The  Enemies  of  Pragmatism 37 

The  Philosophy  of  Tolerance 40 

The  Leader  of  the  Pragmatist  Movement 42 

THE   PHILOSOPHY  OF   PERSONAL   EQUATION. 

The  Importance  of  Personal  Equation 46 

Personal  Equation  at  Fault 48 

The  Elimination  of  the  Subjective  Element 49 

1821622    ; 

DEPARTMENT  OF  PHILOSOPHY 


631 


IV  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

PAOB 

The  Objectivity  of  Science 51 

The  Supremacy  of  the  Intellect 52 

Inconsistency  in  Definition   53 

Truth  as  an  Idea  that  Works  Satisfactorily 55 

A  Lie  that  Works  Satisfactorily  56 

Truth  as  Objects  Believed  In 57 

The  Fixation  of  Belief  58 

Truth  as  a  Feeling 60 

How  a  Lie  Develops  Into  a  Truth 61 

An  Old  Truth  Carried  Too  Far 63 

THE  ROCK  OF  AGES. 

A  Pluralistic  View  of  Science 65 

Method  the  Essential  Feature  of  Science 66 

Theories  and  Truths   68 

The  Law  of  Causation 70 

Points  of  Reference  72 

The  Stability  of  Truth   73 

System  the  Aim  of  Science 74 

Stating  a  Truth  and  Telling  the  Truth 76 

THE  NATURE  OF  TRUTH. 

The  Word  "Truth"  in  European  Languages 78 

The  Hebrew,  the  Egyptian  and  the  Chinese  Notions  of  Truth.  .  81 

A  Description  of  the  Nature  of  Truth 84 

The  Philosophers  of  Classical  Antiquity 86 

Christianity  and  the  Doctrine  of  Two  Truths 89 

Modern  Thinkers   92 

Truth  and  Mind  96 

Sense  Perceptions  and  Hallucinations 98 

Universals  and  Their  Correlates 100 

The  Oneness  of  All  Truths 104 

CONCLUSION no 

AN  APPENDIX  ON  PRAGMATISM. 

A  German  Critic  of  Pragmatism 113 

Pragmatism,  a  Teleological  View  115 

Utility  as  a  Criterion  of  Truth 117 

Protagoras  Redivivus 1 18 

The  Supremacy  of  the  Will  119 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS.  V 

PAGl 

Kant's  Opinion  of  Pragmatism 120 

Contrasts  Reconciled   121 

Professor  Stein  on  Pragmatism 123 

Critics  of  Pragmatism  Rebuked 126 

Science  Superseded 128 

Often  Wrong  But  Never  Dull 129 


TO  THE  MEMORY  OF 

PROFESSOR  WILLIAM  JAMES 

WHO  WITH  THE  BEST  INTENTIONS  PUT 

TRUTH  ON  TRIAL 

AND  BY  HIS  VERY  ERRORS  ADVANCED  THE  CAUSE  OF  TRUTH 

THIS  BOOK  IS  DEDICATED 

IN  FRIENDLY  REMEMBRANCE  OF  COURTESIES 

EXCHANGED  IN  SPITE  OF  RADICAL 

DIFFERENCE  OF  OPINION 


A  PROLOGUE  ON  TRUTH.* 


Hdvrwv  perpov 

d\X'  avOpu-rrov  p.irpov  rt>  "Ev  Kal  Hav. 

TRULY,  the  measure  of  all  things  is  Man  ; 
But  Man  is  measured  by  the  One  and  All. 

Man  is  a  microcosm,  and  he  grows 
Unto  the  stature  of  full  manhood,  only 
When  to  the  One  and  All  his  soul  responds. 
There  is  a  gauge  that  measures  man,  a  norm 
By  which  the  truth  that's  in  him  must  be  tested. 
'T  is  the  Eternal  in  the  change  of  time, 
It  is  the  Law,  the  Uniformity, 
It  is  the  One  in  this  great  All,  —  't  is  God  I 

Mind  you,  't  is  Man,  not  men,  that  measures  things; 
Not  I,  nor  you,  nor  any  other  being; 
Man  only,  Man  alone. 

And  what  is  Man  ? 

Man  is  the  type  of  Mankind,  —  men's  ideal; 
Yea,  men's  ideal! 

Are  ideals  sham? 

Deem  ye  that  only  things  concrete  are  true  ? 
O,  learn  to  prize  the  power  of  ideals 
Which  more  efficient  is  than  Nature's  forces 
And  stronger  far  than  footpound-energy. 

*  Reprinted  from  The  Monist,  Jan.  1910. 


TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

Ideals  are  the  factors  of  man's  life ; 
They  are  no  vain  illusions,  they  are  real, 
Nay,  super  real.    Yea,  they  are  Man's  guides ; 
And  they,  like  guardian  angels,  help  him  find 
The  pre-determined  goal  of  cosmic  life. 

Man,  the  ideal,  is  no  transient  thing : 
He  is  the  cosmic  law  assuming  flesh, 
The  norm  of  being  in  a  creature's  garb, 
An  incarnation  of  the  Deity, 

Of  that  All-One  which  shapes  and  moulds  the  world, 
Which  manifests  itself  in  motes  and  stars, 
And  thrills  through  all  their  uniformities. 
'T  is  Man,  not  men,  in  whom  the  glory  dwells 
Of  the  great  One  in  All, — the  Man  of  Truth. 

"Truth  changes,"  sayest  thou,  and  thou  art  right, 
E'en  man  himself  is  changing  with  his  truth. 
Both  change!  for  nothing  is  at  rest 
In  this  corporeal  world  of  flux.    And  yet 
Things  transient  mirror  the  Etern  which  always 
Keeps  faith  unto  itself  and  its  own  law. 

Truth  changes  as  our  knowledge  broader  grows, 
As  science  gains  in  depth  and  definition; 
But  verily  the  new  and  broader  Truth 
Will  never  call  the  older  Truth  a  lie, 
For  lo!  it  is  the  selfsame  older  Truth 
As  from  a  higher  standpoint  it  appears, 
And  all  the  truths  are  ultimately  one. 

Truth  is  beheld  by  mind,  and  not  by  sense. 
'T  is  not  a  thing  which  merchants  keep  in  store, 
'T  is  no  commodity  which  we  possess. 
Truth  is  a  superhuman  power,  and 


A  PROLOGUE  ON  TRUTH.  3 

From  generation  unto  generation 

Truth  marches  on,  unfolding  and  revealing 

The  wondrous  mysteries  of  cosmic  life. 

Truth  is  too  great  that  ever  it  be  final. 
Knowledge  expandeth,  and  the  work  of  science 
Can  never  be  completed,  never  finished. 
One  goal  attained  entails  still  further  tasks, 
And  so  before  our  raptured  vision  stretches 
The  promised  land  of  vistas  infinite. 

Truth  is  no  child  of  human  superstition; 
It  is  no  idol,  nor  an  errant  light, 
'T  is  not  an  ignis  fatuus,  no  comet. 
Truth  is  God's  clearest,  highest  revelation. 
In  life  Truth  serves  us  as  our  guiding  star, 
And  like  the  sailor's  compass  on  high  seas. 
It  draws  us  gently  onward,  step  by  step, 
With  duly  well  prescribed  approximations, 
On  its  own  path  in  definite  direction. 

Truth  is  life's  factor  and  determinant, 
And  we  are  workers  in  Truth's  noble  cause. 
We  yearn  for  Truth,  we  need  its  light ;  and  Truth 
Enters  our  Soul;  it  takes  abode  in  us, 
And  consecrates  our  lives  to  higher  service. 
Not  we  own  Truth,  't  is  Truth  that  owneth  us. 

Search  for  the  Truth !  Truth's  problems  are  not  vain. 
Love  thou  the  Truth !  trust  Truth,  and  live  the  Truth ! 
Walk  on  Truth's  path  and  Truth  will  guide  thee  right. 


PRAGMATISM.* 

THE  MEANING  OF  THE  WORD. 

PRAGMATISM  is  a  new  philosophical  movement,  but 
the  word  "pragmatic"1  from  which  the  term  is  de- 
rived has  been  in  existence  for  more  than  two  thousand 
years.  In  ancient  Greece  it  meant  "businesslike,  practical, 
or  ready  for  action"  ;  it  was  applied  to  lawyers,  statesmen 
and  soldiers.  In  Rome  the  adjective  practicus  became  a 
noun  and  denoted  an  attorney  or  legal  adviser,  and  a  man 
who  gave  points  to  orators  ;  we  might  translate  it  by  "prac- 
titioner of  law."  An  imperial  edict  was  called  pragmatica 
jussio,  and  a  decree  in  state  affairs  that  should  be  regarded 
as  inviolate,  pragmatica  sanctio.  The  best  known  prag- 
matic sanction  of  history  is  the  pact  which  Emperor 
Charles  VI  made  with  the  European  powers  to  recognize 
the  succession  of  his  daughter  Maria  Theresa  to  the  throne 
of  all  the  possessions  of  the  house  of  Hapsburg,  in  the 
absence  of  male  heirs. 

In  philosophical  language  Kant  used  the  word  "prag- 
matic" in  the  sense  of  "prudent,"  meaning  thereby  a  mode 
of  action  by  which  a  purpose  might  be  attained. 

In  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century  it  was  cus- 
tomary in  Germany  to  speak  of  pragmatic  historiography* 
by  which  term  was  meant  a  description  of  historic  events 
in  their  causal  connection,  and  under  Bismarck's  regime 

*  Republished  from  The  Monist,  July,  1908. 


1  Pragmatische  Geschichtschreibung. 


PRAGMATISM.  5 

"pragmatic  politics"  denoted  a  policy  which  was  bent  on 
success  without  regard  to  principle. 

THE  PRAGMATIST'S  CONCEPTION  OF  TRUTH. 

Pragmatism  in  philosophy  is  of  recent  date  and  what 
it  means  is  best  stated  in  the  words  of  the  late  Professor 
William  James  of  Harvard,  who  says  on  page  46  of  his 
work  on  Pragmatism:3 


"The  term  is  derived  from  the  same  Greek  word  wpay/ua,  mean- 
ing action,  from  which  our  words  'practice'  and  'practical'  come. 
It  was  first  introduced  into  philosophy  by  Mr.  Charles  Peirce  in 
1878.  In  an  article  entitled  'How  to  Make  Our  Ideas  Clear,'  in  the 
Popular  Science  Monthly  for  January  of  that  year  Mr.  Peirce, 
after  pointing  out  that  our  beliefs  are  really  rules  for  action,  said 
that,  to  develop  a  thought's  meaning,  we  need  only  determine  what 
conduct  it  is  fitted  to  produce:  that  conduct  is  for  us  its  sole  sig- 
nificance. And  the  tangible  fact  at  the  root  of  all  our  thought- 
distinctions,  however  subtle,  is  that  there  is  no  one  of  them  so  fine 
as  to  consist  in  anything  but  a  possible  difference  of  practice.  To 
attain  perfect  clearness  in  our  thoughts  of  an  object,  then,  we  need 
only  consider  what  conceivable  effects  of  a  practical  kind  the  object 
may  involve  —  what  sensations  we  are  to  expect  from  it,  and  what 
reactions  we  must  prepare.  Our  conception  of  these  effects,  whether 
immediate  or  remote,  is  then  for  us  the  whole  of  our  conception  of 
the  object,  so  far  as  that  conception  has  positive  significance  at  all." 

The  statement  of  Mr.  Charles  S.  Peirce,  "that  our 
beliefs  are  really  rules  for  action,"  is  an  explanation,  not  a 
principle,  and  the  explanation  is  made  so  that  we  may 
rightly  understand  the  nature  of  belief.  Beliefs  are  never 
held  at  random;  they  serve  a  purpose  and  the  purpose  of 
a  belief  is  ultimately  to  insure  a  definite  line  of  conduct. 
It  is  not  probable  that  any  one  would  take  exception  to 
this.  Professor  James,  however,  goes  beyond  the  original 
meaning  of  the  term  by  changing  the  statement  of  fact  into 
a  principle,  and  he  applies  it  to  his  conception  of  truth. 

'  New  York  :  Longmans,  Green  &  Co.,  19x17. 


6  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

Let  us  see  what  he  makes  of  it.    We  read  on  page  76  an 
italicized  definition  of  truth: 

"The  true  is  the  name  of  whatever  proves  itself  to  be  good 
in  the  way  of  belief,  and  good,  too,  for  definite,  assignable  reasons." 

Professor  James  seems  to  outdo  Bentham's  utilitarian- 
ism. He  continues : 

"If  there  were  no  good  for  life  in  true  ideas,  or  if  the  knowl- 
edge of  them  were  positively  disadvantageous  and  false  ideas  the 
only  useful  ones,  then  the  current  notion  that  truth  is  divine  and 
precious,  and  its  pursuit  a  duty,  could  never  have  grown  up  or  be- 
come a  dogma.  In  a  world  like  that,  our  duty  would  be  to  shun 
truth,  rather.  But  in  this  world,  just  as  certain  foods  are  not  only 
agreeable  to  our  taste,  but  good  for  our  teeth,  our  stomach,  and  our 
tissues;  so  certain  ideas  are  not  only  agreeable  to  think  about,  or 
agreeable  as  supporting  other  ideas  that  we  are  fond  of,  but  they 
are  also  helpful  in  life's  practical  struggles." 

We  grant  that  in  the  long  run  truth  will  always  be  the 
best,  but  for  that  reason  we  deem  it  rash  to  identify  "the 
true"  with  "whatever  proves  itself  to  be  good  in  the  way 
of  belief."  Certain  foods  are  agreeable  to  our  taste  and 
good  for  our  teeth,  but  obnoxious  to  our  health;  can  we 
then  identify  what  is  wholesome  with  what  is  palatable? 
So  there  may  be  certain  ideas  "good  for  definite,  assignable 
reasons,"  but  they  need  not  on  that  account  be  true. 

Professor  James's  definition  of  truth  is  reiterated  in 
various  ways.  On  page  77  we  are  told: 

"  'What  would  be  better  for  us  to  believe' !  This  sounds  very 
like  a  definition  of  truth.  It  comes  very  near  to  saying  'what  we 
ought  to  believe' :  and  in  that  definition  none  of  you  would  find  any 
oddity. 

"Ought  we  ever  not  to  believe  what  it  is  better  for  us  to  believe  ? 
And  can  we  then  keep  the  notion  of  what  is  better  for  us,  and  what 
is  true  for  us,  permanently  apart?  Pragmatism  says  no,  and  I 
fully  agree  with  her." 

In  the  chapter  entitled  "The  Action  of  Truth"  we  read 
on  p.  20 1  another  italicized  definition  of  the  same  kind: 


PRAGMATISM. 


"True  ideas  are  those  that  we  can  assimilate,  validate,  corrobo- 
rate and  verify.  False  ideas  are  those  that  we  can  not.  That  is 
the  practical  difference  it  makes  to  us  to  have  true  ideas;  that, 
therefore,  is  the  meaning  of  truth,  for  it  is  all  that  truth  is  known-as." 

THE  USEFUL  LIE. 

Science  rests  upon  the  supposition  that  a  statement  once 
actually  proved  to  be  true  remains  true,  while  utility  is  sub- 
ject to  change.  Professor  James  says  of  truth  (p.  204) : 

"You  can  say  of  it  then  either  that  'it  is  useful  because  it  is 
true'  or  that  'it  is  true  because  it  is  useful/  Both  these  phrases 
mean  exactly  the  same  thing,  namely  that  here  is  an  idea  that  gets 
fulfilled  and  can  be  verified." 

What  of  a  useful  lie  ?  It  accomplishes  its  purpose,  for 
it  will  bring  help  in  a  dilemma.  The  Cynic's  Calendar  thus 
substitutes  the  word  "lie"  in  the  familiar  proverb,  saying, 
"A  lie  in  time  saves  nine."  Perhaps  the  liar  knows  that 
a  lie  goes  only  a  little  way,  but  it  may  go  far  enough  to 
suit  his  purpose.  And  what  of  that  villainous  maxim  to 
force  a  belief  upon  people  who  are  unwilling  to  accept  it? 
Has  not  the  Inquisition  succeeded  in  keeping  Spain  under 
the  influence  of  Rome  down  to  our  own  day  ?  Was  not  the 
night  of  Bartholomew  a  success  ?  The  Huguenots  have  been 
swept  out  of  France  and  are  even  to-day  but  a  small  minor- 
ity. Was  not  the  Reformation  suppressed  by  foul  means 
in  Bohemia,  when  at  the  time  of  the  Hussite  movement 
it  seemed  to  be  lost  to  the  Church  ?  Must  we  be  reconciled 
to  a  pragmatic  policy  of  this  kind  because  it  works  within 
certain  limits  ?  It  certainly  paid  those  who  acted  upon  this 
pragmatic  conception  of  truth.  Would  not  Professor 
James  himself  demur  at  this?  At  least  I  hope  he  would 
be  sufficiently  inconsistent,  not  to  accept  the  consequences 
of  his  definitions. 

Even  as  matters  are,  judging  from  his  own  statements, 
he  goes  very  far  in  his  practical  admissions,  and  he  claims 


8  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

that  for  the  very  plasticity  of  its  view  of  truth,  pragmatism 
is  at  a  great  advantage  in  the  religious  field.  If  one  finds 
it  profitable  to  believe  in  God,  very  well,  to  him  the  exist- 
ence of  God  is  a  truth.  If  another  finds  a  scientific  satis- 
faction in  the  non-existence  of  God,  to  him  atheism  is  true. 

TRUTH  COMPARED  TO  CASH  VALUE. 

Professor  James  speaks  of  his  definitions  of  truth  as 
"the  truth's  cash  value  in  experiential  terms"  (p.  200)  ; 
and  years  ago,  in  1888,  in  an  article  entitled  "Cognition, 
Knowledge  and  Truth,"  I  used  the  very  same  expression  :4 
"Abstract  thoughts  do  not  on  the  one  hand  represent  ab- 
solute existences,  nor  on  the  other  are  they  mere  air  cas- 
tles ;  they  are  built  upon  the  solid  ground  of  reality.  The 
facts  of  nature  are  specie  and  our  abstract  thoughts  are 
bills  which  serve  to  economize  the  process  of  an  exchange 
of  thought.  We  must  know  the  exact  value  in  specie  of 
every  bill  which  is  in  our  possession.  And  if  the  values 
of  our  abstract  ideas  are  not  ultimately  founded  upon  the 
reality  of  positive  facts,  they  are  like  bills  or  drafts  for  the 
payment  of  which  there  is  no  money  in  the  bank." 

This  looks  like  an  agreement  between  his  views  and 
my  own,  but  there  seems  to  be  an  important  difference, 
for  according  to  Professor  James,  ideas  are  not  true  or 
untrue,  they  become  true.  He  says  (p.  201): 

"The  truth  of  an  idea  is  not  a  stagnant  property  inherent  in 
it.  Truth  happens  to  an  idea.  It  becomes  true,  is  made  true  by 
events.  Its  verity  is  in  fact  an  event,  a  process :  the  process  namely 
of  its  verifying  itself,  its  veri-fication.  Its  validity  is  the  process 
of  its  valid-ation." 

This  will  be  a  puzzle  to  the  reader  until  he  understands 
the  statement  in  the  light  of  another  passage.  Professor 
James  means  that  an  idea  must  be  assimilated  in  order  to 

*  First  published  in  The  Open  Court,  Vol.  II,  p.  1458,  and  reprinted  in 
Fundamental  Problems,  p.  17-18. 


PRAGMATISM.  9 

become  true  to  us.  As  a  psychologist  he  studies  the 
origin  of  a  conviction  and  identifies  conviction  with  truth. 
He  says : 

"A  new  opinion  counts  as  'true'  just  in  proportion  as  it  gratifies 
the  individual's  desire  to  assimilate  the  novel  in  his  experience  to 
his  beliefs  in  stock.  It  must  both  lean  on  old  truth  and  grasp  new 
fact;  and  its  success  (as  I  said  a  moment  ago)  in  doing  this,  is  a 
matter  for  the  individual's  appreciation.  When  old  truth  grows, 
then,  by  new  truth's  addition,  it  is  for  subjective  reasons.  We 
are  in  the  process  and  obey  the  reasons.  That  new  idea  is  truest 
which  performs  most  felicitously  its  function  of  satisfying  our  double 
urgency.  It  makes  itself  true,  gets  itself  classed  as  true,  by  the 
way  it  works;  grafting  itself  then  upon  the  ancient  body  of  truth, 
which  thus  grows  much  as  a  tree  grows  by  the  activity  of  a  new 
layer  of  cambium." 

Must  we  use  truth  to  make  truth  true?  "An  opinion" 
that  "counts  as  true"  or  a  belief  that  is  deemed  to  be  true 
and  is  practically  applied,  need  not  be  true.  To  Professor 
James  truth  is  not  the  cash  value  of  ideas,  but  their  actual  use 
when  put  into  circulation.  But  truth  remains  truth  even  if 
not  exploited.  The  cash  value  of  a  bank  deposit  remains  the 
same  even  when  we  do  not  invest  it  in  profitable  enterprises, 
and  it  would  certainly  be  a  mistake  to  identify  the  nature  of 
money  with  the  interest  it  will  bring  if  invested.  What 
is  commonly  understood  by  "truth,"  Professor  James  calls 
"a  static  relation  of  'correspondence'  "  and  denounces  it 
as  "inert."  In  our  opinion  truth  may  indeed  be  inert, 
just  as  money  may  lie  unutilized,  but  pragmatism  shuts 
its  eyes  to  the  fact  and  denounces  the  old  view  as  an  inert 
conception  of  truth : 

"It  converts  the  absolutely  empty  notion  of  a  static  relation  of 
'correspondence'  between  our  minds  and  reality,  into  that  of  a  rich 
and  active  commerce  (that  any  one  may  follow  in  detail  and  under- 
stand) between  particular  thoughts  of  ours,  and  the  great  universe 
of  other  experiences  in  which  they  play  their  parts  and  have  their 
uses." 


IO  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

My  own  conception  of  truth  is  neither  "empty"  nor 
"inert,"  for  I  believe  that  the  truth  is  exceedingly  prac- 
tical, and  (like  many  others  before  me)  I  have  most 
vigorously  insisted  upon  the  maxim  that  truth  must  be 
sought  and  found,  not  to  keep  it  in  cold  storage  but  that 
we  may  apply  it  in  our  own  lives.  The  truth  must  be 
lived. 

I  have  gone  further;  I  have  emphatically  insisted  on 
the  principle  that  science,  knowledge,  truth,  do  not  exist 
for  their  own  sake  but  must  prove  helpful  to  us.  I  would 
not  endorse  the  maxim  "science  for  science's  sake,"  as 
I  said  in  The  Soul  of  Man,  page  361 :  "The  purpose  of 
thinking  is  adaptation  to  surrounding  conditions.  Thought, 
you  may  object,  sometimes  does  not  end  in  action,  but  in 
the  suppression  of  action.  Inhibition,  however,  is  an  ac- 
tion also.  Thought  should  always  end  in  the  regulation 
or  adjustment  of  our  behavior  toward  our  surroundings. 
If  it  does  not,  it  is  not  the  right  kind  of  thought.  Thought 
for  its  own  sake  is  a  disease.  If  muscles  contract  neither 
for  a  special  purpose  nor  for  the  general  purpose  of  exer- 
cise, we  call  the  contraction  'a  cramp.'  Thought  for  its 
own  sake  is  a  spasm  of  the  brain." 

While  I  regard  a  scientific  inquiry  into  irrelevant  truths 
as  useless,  and  while  scientists  can  gauge  the  importance 
of  a  truth  by  its  practical  significance,  I  deem  it  a  very 
slipshod  method  of  philosophizing  to  identify  the  utility 
of  an  idea  with  its  truth.  Yet  this  is  actually  the  meaning 
of  pragmatism  according  to  Professor  James  (p.  75)  who 
says: 

"An  idea  is  'true'  so  long  as  to  believe  it  is  profitable  to  our 
lives." 

If  pragmatism  means  that  our  philosophy  must  be 
tested  by  its  practical  application,  we  are  all  pragmatists, 
and  for  myself  I  would  claim  to  be  a  better  pragmatist 
than  Professor  James. 


PRAGMATISM.  II 

THE  OBJECTIVE  SIGNIFICANCE  OF  TRUTH. 

Professor  James  is  right  when  he  means  to  say  that 
truth  is  not  an  object,  not  a  thing  outside  of  us,  and  that 
we  must  distinguish  between  facts  and  truths.  Facts  are 
real,  they  are  in  themselves  neither  untrue  nor  true.  Truth 
resides  in  ideas  only,  viz.,  in  representations  or  conceptions 
of  facts.  In  this  sense,  therefore,  I  also  say  that  truth 
originates  in  us,  exactly  because  truth  is  a  relation,  which, 
strange  to  say,  is  denied  by  Professor  James.  Truth  orig- 
inates and  exists  through  an  agreement  between  the  idea 
and  the  reality  represented. 

I  will  quote  what  I  said  on  the  subject  years  ago  in  an 
article  on  "The  Origin  of  Mind"5 :  "Truth  exists  in  think- 
ing subjects  only.  Truth  affirms  that  certain  subjective 
representations  of  the  objective  world  can  be  relied  upon, 
that  they  are  deduced  from  facts  and  agree  with  facts. 
Based  upon  past  experience,  they  can  be  used  as  guides  for 
future  experience.  If  there  were  no  subjective  beings,  no 
feeling  and  comprehending  minds,  there  would  be  no  truth. 
Facts  in  themselves,  whether  they  are  or  are  not  repre- 
sented in  the  mind  of  a  feeling  and  thinking  subject,  are 
real,  yet  representations  alone,  supposing  they  agree  with 
facts,  are  true." 

While  truth  can  exist  in  thinking  beings  only,  while 
it  is  subjective  in  its  nature,  we  must  bear  in  mind  that 
it  has  an  objective  significance.  The  several  truths  are 
not  arbitrary  statements,  but  their  character  is  predeter- 
mined. If  we  are  confronted  with  a  scientific  problem,  we 
seek  a  solution,  and  if  the  problem  is  genuine  and  legiti- 
mate, there  will  be  but  one  solution  of  it  that  is  right,  all 
others  are  either  false  or  perhaps  at  best  approximations. 
The  solution  that  is  predetermined,  at  which  all  inquirers 
that  do  not  go  astray  must  arrive,  is  the  ideal  of  truth, 

*  The  Monist,  I,  69 ;  reprinted  in  The  Soul  of  Man,  p.  42. 


12  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

and  this  ideal  must  be  discovered.  Nor  do  I  hesitate  to 
say  that  although  truth  is  an  idea  and  not  a  concrete  thing, 
not  a  material  existence,  not  a  fact,  the  ideal  of  truth, 
viz.,  its  predetermination  of  the  solution  to  be  obtained,  is 
the  most  significant  presence  in  the  world. 

The  identification  of  truth  with  mere  workable  belief 
is  positively  injurious.  In  limiting  truth  to  its  pragmatic 
significance,  Professor  James  obliterates  the  most  signifi- 
cant feature  of  truth.  Charles  S.  Peirce,  in  the  article 
referred  to,  describes  most  clearly  the  origin  of  belief  and 
how  an  idea  becomes  accepted  as  true  in  the  proportion 
in  which  it  gratifies  the  individual's  desire  to  assimilate 
it;  it  is  accepted  for  subjective  reasons  and  it  affects  our 
conduct  in  life.  But  in  the  name  of  logic  how  can  we  call 
an  idea  true,  simply  when  or  because  it  is  held  to  be  true? 
We  grant  that  it  appears  true  to  those  who  hold  it ;  let  us 
even  go  so  far  as  to  say  that  it  is  true  to  them ;  but  it  need 
not  for  that  reason  be  as  yet  really  true.  With  all  due 
respect  for  psychology  we  do  not  see  why  logic  must  needs 
be  sacrificed  in  order  to  leave  the  field  solely  to  psychology. 
The  test  of  truth  is  its  agreement  with  experience,  not  with 
one  isolated  fact  or  set  of  facts,  but  with  all  the  facts  of 
experience,  and  the  ultimate  agreement  of  all  truths  is  the 
ideal  of  science.8 

TRUTH  MADE  OR  FOUND? 

In  spite  of  Professor  James  we  insist  that  truth  is  not 
made  by  man,  but  must  be  discovered,  for  as  we  said  above, 
the  nature  of  truth  is  predetermined.  Truth  must  be 
found;  it  is  rigid  and  not  plastic,  it  is  independent  of  our 
likes  and  dislikes,  and  there  is  a  pre-established  harmony 
of  all  truths.  Professor  James  does  not  brook  truth  in  the 
singular.  His  "account  of  truth  is  an  account  of  truths 

"This  idea  has  been  developed  in  an  editorial  article  entitled  "The  Cri- 
terion of  Truth,"  published  in  The  Monist,  Vol.  I,  No.  2,  p.  229. 


PRAGMATISM.  13 

in  the  plural"  (p.  218),  and  he  denounces  truth  in  any 
other  sense  except  his  limited  use  of  it.  He  says  (pp. 
64-65) : 

"The  trail  of  the  human  serpent  is  thus  over  everything.  Truth 
independent;  truth  that  we  find  merely;  truth  no  longer  malleable 
to  human  need;  truth  incorrigible,  in  a  word;  such  truth  exists 
indeed  superabundantly — or  is  supposed  to  exist  by  rationalistically 
minded  thinkers;  but  then  it  means  only  the  dead  heart  of  the 
living  tree,  and  its  being  there  means  only  that  truth  also  has  its 
paleontology,  and  its  'prescription,'  and  may  grow  stiff  with  years 
of  veteran  service  and  petrified  in  men's  regard  by  sheer  an- 
tiquity." 

Do  scientists,  inventors,  and  generally  all  who  recog- 
nize the  objective  significance  of  truth,  follow  an  ignis 
fatuus?  Is  it  true  that  the  laws  established  by  science 
"are  only  a  man-made  language"  (p.  57)  ?  Professor 
James  says: 

"As  the  sciences  have  developed  farther,  the  notion  has  gained 
ground  that  most,  perhaps  all,  of  our  laws  are  only  approximations. 
The  laws  themselves,  moreover,  have  grown  so  numerous  that  there 
is  no  counting  them;  and  so  many  rival  formulations  are  proposed 
in  all  the  branches  of  science  that  investigators  have  become  ac- 
customed to  the  notion  that  no  theory  is  absolutely  a  transcript  of 
reality,  but  that  any  one  of  them  may  from  some  point  of  view  be 
useful." 

In  common  parlance  the  word  truth  contains  not  only 
the  idea  of  the  correctness  of  our  subjective  notion  but  also 
the  objective  condition  itself.  We  speak  for  instance  of 
the  eternality  of  truth,  meaning  thereby  not  the  man-made 
formulas  but  the  laws  of  nature,  theorems  of  mathematics 
etc.,  and  I  have  on  former  occasions  proposed  to  call  the 
latter  "verities,"  so  as  to  enable  us  to  distinguish  between 
the  subjective  and  objective  elements  of  truth. 

ONENESS  AND  REASON. 

In  the  chapter  "The  One  and  the  Many"  I  had  hoped 
to  find  a  refutation  of  monism,  and  a  justification  of  plural- 


14  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

ism,  but  Professor  James  remains  on  the  surface  in  his 
discussion  of  this  contrast.  Nowhere  does  he  discover  the 
ultimate  reason  of  the  unity  which  is  such  a  powerful  de- 
mand in  the  human  mind.  He  seems  to  think  that  it  is  a 
question  of  number,  not  (as  it  actually  is)  of  unity  or  con- 
sistency, and  suggests  that  the  oneness  of  the  universe 
would  exclude  variety  and  multiplicity.  He  says: 

"The  world  is  One  just  so  far  as  its  parts  hang  together  by  any 
definite  connection.  It  is  many  just  so  far  as  any  definite  connec- 
tion fails  to  obtain." 

The  human  mind  which  naturally  and  necessarily  views 
the  world  as  one,  is  viewed  by  him  psychologically  in  its 
complex  elements  as  a  plurality.  He  says: 

"Our  minds  thus  grow  in  spots ;  and  like  grease-spots,  the  spots 
spread." 

Apparently  he  has  never  become  acquainted  with  a 
justification  of  the  monistic  tendency  that  pervades  science. 
He  overlooks  the  fact  that  reason  is  a  unity,  and  that  in 
its  gradual  evolution  it  has  developed  under  the  influence 
of  the  principle  of  oneness.  An  explanation  of  the  nature 
of  reason  is  no  easy  task  and  would  take  more  space  than 
can  be  justified  here,  but  I  will  try  to  state  it  in  as  few 
words  as  possible. 

The  problem  of  reason  is  the  problem  of  formal  thought. 
We  distinguish  between  the  sense  element  in  our  experience 
and  the  relational  or  formal.  The  pure  form  of  actual 
succession  in  motion  is  time.  The  pure  form  of  thought 
is  logic.  The  general  rules  which  we  derive  from  pure 
forms  can  be  formulated  in  general  statements  which  we 
find  to  be  reliable  norms  not  only  for  the  subjective  sphere 
of  reasoning,  but  also  in  the  objective  domain  of  existence. 
The  norms  of  the  purely  formal  are  the  same  throughout, 
which  appears  first  of  all  in  the  fact  that  for  all  of  us  there 
is  but  one  space,  one  time,  one  reason.  Though  meta- 


PRAGMATISM.  15 

geometricians  have  tampered  with  the  conception  of  space, 
the  philosophers  have  not  dared  as  yet  to  touch  time  or  to 
doubt  the  sameness,  oneness  and  harmonious  unity  and 
the  uniqueness  of  reason.  I  have  been  hoping  from  year 
to  year  that  some  one  would  invent  a  two-dimensional 
time,'or  some  supra-,  infra-  or  extra-temporal  chronometry, 
or  that  a  metalogician  would  publish  a  book  on  curved 
reason,  or  propound  a  pluralistic  logic  that  would  stand 
in  contradiction  to  the  Aristotelian  logic  in  which  the 
categories  would  not  hold  good,  and  where  the  law  of 
contradiction  would  have  no  application. 

Here  is  a  task  worthy  the  efforts  of  the  pragmatist. 
Perhaps  Mr.  Charles  S.  Peirce  can  offer  additional  sug- 
gestions. What  glorious  vistas  for  the  philosopher  of  the 
future !  In  the  meantime  we  venture  to  think  that  so  long 
as  the  unity  of  reason  stands  unchallenged,  the  pragmatist 
has  no  right  to  doubt  the  ultimate  unity  of  the  world. 

THE  MIND  AND  THE  UNIVERSE. 

The  best  justification  of  monism  is  the  constitution  of 
the  human  mind.  Professor  James  himself  recognizes  our 
craving  for  consistency,  for  unity,  for  a  harmony  of  all 
truths;  and  is  not  the  human  mind  a  product  of  the  uni- 
verse? Is  not  its  unity  as  well  as  its  need  of  tracing  the 
unity  of  things,  an  echo  of  the  unity  (i.  e.,  the  harmonious- 
ness,  or  consistency)  in  the  constitution  of  the  world? 

Lotze  said  somewhere  about  the  mind  and  its  relation 
to  reality,  "May  not  previous  reality  itself  be  there  (viz., 
in  the  mind)  ?",  and  the  passage  is  quoted  by  Professor 
James  with  approval.  I  would  indeed  say  that  some  fea- 
ture of  reality  exists  in  the  mind,  and  it  is  exactly  that 
principle  of  oneness  which  appears  in  reason.  It  is  founded 
upon  our  conception  of  form,  and  the  conception  of  form 
arises  from  our  becoming  conscious  of  the  uniformities 
which  are  inseparably  connected  with  all  reality,  objective 


l6  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

as  well  as  subjective.  We  reproduce  the  oneness,  or  let 
us  rather  say  the  universal  sameness,  of  all  form  in  our 
formulations  of  the  norms  of  form  and  of  the  natural  laws, 
and  this  is  the  condition  of  the  oneness  of  reason,  and  of 
the  principle  of  consistency  so  important  in  science  and 
philosophy.  This  principle  of  oneness  otherwise  called 
"reason"  is  a  feature  of  reality  which  has  been  developed 
in  the  mind  and  is  a  reflection  only  of  the  oneness  of  the 
universe.  Of  it  every  being  is  a  part  and  into  the  image  of 
it  the  intellect  of  rational  beings  has  been  molded. 

Near  the  conclusion  of  his  chapter  on  "Humanism," 
Professor  James  sums  up  the  case  as  follows : 

"The  import  of  the  difference  between  pragmatism  and  ration- 
alism is  now  in  sight  throughout  its  whole  extent.  The  essential 
contrast  is  that  for  rationalism  reality  is  ready-made  and  complete 
from  all  eternity,  while  for  pragmatism  it  is  still  in  the  making,  and 
awaits  part  of  its  complexion  from  the  future.  On  the  one  side 
the  universe  is  absolutely  secure,  on  the  other  it  is  still  pursuing  its 
adventures." 

I  do  not  mean  to  defend  what  Professor  James  at- 
tacks as  rationalism,  but  will  say  that  in  my  opinion  reality 
is  a  constant  flux  and  accordingly  is  never  ready  made  or 
complete.  It  is  always  changing  in  a  kaleidoscopic  manner. 
What  is  really  complete  from  all  eternity  is  the  constitu- 
tion of  the  world,  and  it  is  this  constitution  which  is  re- 
flected in  man's  reason.  The  constitution  of  the  world 
is  not  an  unintelligible  enigma,  but  it  is  the  systematic  unit 
of  norms  of  its  formal  relations,  and  human  reason  is  the 
totality  of  the  formal  relations  of  thought  reduced  to 
logical  rules. 

Professor  James  uses  the  term  "reality"  first  in  the 
sense  of  the  world-constitution,  and  then  in  the  sense  of 
the  unstable  condition  of  nature.  If  rationalism  means  that 
reality  is  ready  made,  it  can  only  mean  that  the  constitu- 
tion of  the  world,  the  sum  total  of  natural  laws,  is  im- 


PRAGMATISM.  17 

mutable.  If  pragmatism  means  that  reality  is  still  in  the 
making,  he  can  reasonably  refer  only  to  nature  with  all 
its  bodily  existences  the  very  condition  of  which  is  always 
instability;  but  in  thus  using  his  words  with  no  definite 
meaning  Professor  James  succeeds  in  pointing  out  the  ad- 
vantages of  his  philosophy  and  representing  the  views  of 
the  rationalists,  the  intellectualists,  and  the  monists  as  ut- 
terly untenable. 

Professor  James  recognizes  uniformity  of  nature,  but 
it  is  only  a  general  and  vague  idea.  He  says: 

"The  general  'uniformity  of  nature'  is  presupposed  by  every 
lesser  law.  But  nature  may  be  only  approximately  uniform." 

TIME  AND  SPACE. 

We  ought  to  let  pragmatism  swallow  its  own  medicine 
and  request  it  to  become  pragmatic,  which  means  to  measure 
values  according  to  the  practical  use  of  things.  Would  it 
then  not  learn  to  appreciate  theory,  abstraction,  the  prin- 
ciple of  consistency,  logic  and  in  general  intellectualism 
and  rationalism  even  in  preference  to  mood,  temperament, 
sentiment  and  the  gratification  of  other  purely  subjective 
dispositions? 

Has  not  the  logical  faculty  developed  solely  for  the 
pragmatic  reason  that  the  simian  brute  was  thereby  changed 
into  rational  man?  Does  not  the  whole  apparatus  of  ab- 
stract thought  serve  very  practical  purposes,  and  is  it 
really  so  desirable  to  live  in  facts  only  and  ignore  all  these 
useful  implements  of  theory,  abstraction,  and  generaliza- 
tion? Does  not  even  monism,  or  rather  the  systematic 
method  of  reducing  the  plurality  of  our  sensations  to  unity, 
serve  a  very  practical  purpose?  If  we  had  to  surrender 
all  these  methods  simply  because  they  are  mental  con- 
structions and  artifices  invented  for  the  simplification  of 
knowledge,  because  they  do  not  possess  the  same  reality 


1 8  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

as  do  our  sensations,  our  sense  experience,  and  our  senti- 
ments, would  we  not  sink  back  to  the  level  of  childhood? 
To  characterize  the  situation  we  will  quote  the  passage 
on  time  and  space  on  pp.  177-178: 

"That  one  Time  which  we  all  believe  in  and  in  which  each 
event  has  its  definite  date,  that  one  Space  in  which  each  thing  has 
its  position,  these  abstract  notions  unify  the  world  incomparably; 
but  in  their  finished  shape  as  concepts  how  different  they  are  from 
the  loose  unordered  time-and-space  experiences  of  natural  men! 
Everything  that  happens  to  us  brings  its  own  duration  and  exten- 
sion, and  both  are  vaguely  surrounded  by  a  marginal  'more'  that 
runs  into  the  duration  and  extension  of  the  next  thing  that  comes. 
But  we  soon  lose  all  our  definite  bearings;  and  not  only  do  our 
children  make  no  distinction  between  yesterday  and  the  day  before 
yesterday,  the  whole  past  being  churned  up  together,  but  we  adults 
still  do  so  whenever  the  times  are  large.  It  is  the  same  with  spaces. 
On  a  map  I  distinctly  see  the  relation  of  London,  Constantinople, 
and  Pekin  to  the  place  where  I  am;  in  reality  I  utterly  fail  to  feel 
the  facts  which  the  map  symbolizes.  The  directions  and  distances 
are  vague,  confused  and  mixed.  Cosmic  space  and  cosmic  time, 
so  far  from  being  the  intuitions  that  Kant  said  they  were,  are  con- 
structions as  patently  artificial  as  any  that  science  can  show.  The 
great  majority  of  the  human  race  never  use  these  notions,  but  live 
in  plural  times  and  spaces,  interpenetrant  and  durcheinander." 

This  passage  is  characteristic. 

Time  is  one  and  space  is  one;  no  one  doubts  it.  Yet 
"our  time  and  space  experiences"  are  "vague,  confused  and 
mixed." 

When  using  the  map  Professor  James  "can  distinctly 
see  the  relation  of  London,  Constantinople  and  Pekin  to 
the  place  where  he  is";  but  he  "utterly  fails  to  see  the 
facts  which  the  map  symbolizes."  Should  we  not  conclude 
then  that  these  artificial  constructions  are  of  paramount 
pragmatic  importance?  And  that  the  intellectualists  and 
rationalists  have  not  labored  in  vain?  My  conclusion 
points  that  way,  and  I  am  convinced  that  Professor  James 
has  misinterpreted  their  philosophies  as  much  as  he  fails 


PRAGMATISM.  19 

to  understand  Kant.  Kant  says  that  time  and  space  are 
Anschauungen,  which  means  that  they  are  data  of  im- 
mediate experience  as  much  as  are  the  objects  of  sight. 
The  translation  "intuition"  carries  with  it  a  mysterious 
and  mystical  meaning  which  is  utterly  absent  in  the  Ger- 
man text  and  was  absolutely  foreign  to  Kant.7 

Considering  the  fact  that  the  illiterate  and  the  uncul- 
tured can  still  be  found  in  all  the  continents  of  the  earth, 
we  will  not  dispute  the  statement,  that  "the  great  majority 
of  the  human  race.  . .  .live  in  plural  times  and  spaces,  inter- 
penetrant  and  durcheinander."  Still  we  do  not  see  what 
renders  the  notion  of  the  oneness  of  time  and  space  objec- 
tionable, and  fail  to  appreciate  the  advantage  of  pluralism. 

LOVE  OF  FACTS  AND  MYSTICISM. 

In  his  dread  of  abstractions  Professor  James  forgets 
or  loses  sight  of  the  fact  that  man  has  acquired  his  human- 
ity through  his  reason  and  that  reason  is  the  faculty  of 
thinking  in  abstractions.  We  grant  that  abstractions  that 
have  no  reference  to  facts  are  either  empty  and  useless  or 
even  positively  erroneous,  but  because  there  are  wrong 
abstractions  we  can  not  overlook  the  paramount  impor- 
tance of  abstract  thought.  Professor  James  says: 

"Pragmatism  is  uncomfortable  away  from  facts.  Rationalism 
is  comfortable  only  in  the  presence  of  abstractions.  This  pragmatist 
talk  about  truths  in  the  plural,  about  their  utility  and  satisfactoriness, 
about  the  success  with  which  they  'work,'  etc.,  suggests  to  the 
typical  intellectualist  mind  a  sort  of  coarse  lame  second-rate  make- 
shift article  of  truth." 

The  pragmatist  seems  to  adopt  the  principle  of  posi- 
tivism in  that  he  clings  to  facts.  Sometimes  it  will  be 
difficult  to  distinguish  between  facts  and  our  interpreta- 
tion of  facts,  but  pragmatism  offers  no  objective  criterion 
for  a  distinction  between  the  two.  We  read  on  p.  68 : 

T  Compare  the  author's  article  "What  Does  Anschauung  Mean  ?"  in  The 
Monist,  II,  527,  and  in  Kant  and  Spencer,  p.  33  ff. 


2O  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

"The  pragmatist  clings  to  facts  and  concreteness,  observes 
truth  at  its  work  in  particular  cases,  and  generalizes.  Truth,  for 
him,  becomes  a  class-name  for  all  sorts  of  definite  working-values 
in  experience." 

This  might  be  construed  as  discarding  everything  that 
is  not  particular  and  concrete  sense-experience;  but  it 
would  be  wrong  to  think  that  Professor  James  does  not 
cherish  a  belief  in  some  reality  above  the  facts  of  sense. 
Indeed,  his  great  interest  in  mystical  phenomena  proves  it, 
and  he  uses  a  very  pretty  allegory  to  justify  his  belief  in 
some  superreal  world  which  interacts  with  the  world  of 
sense  in  which  we  live,  and  yet  constitutes  a  sphere  of  its 
own  and  is  the  product  of  theory.  The  recognition  of  the 
reality  of  this  abstract  realm  is  so  ingenuous  and  it  stands 
in  such  a  contrast,  I  might  almost  say  in  contradiction,  to 
so  many  of  Professor  James's  utterances  that  we  will  quote 
the  passage  in  full  in  order  to  show  how  Professor  James 
justifies  his  eccentric  excursions  into  the  realm  of  the  ab- 
struse. He  says  (pp.  127-128) : 

"I  have  sometimes  thought  of  the  phenomenon  called  'total 
reflection'  in  Optics  as  a  good  symbol  of  the  relation  between  ab- 
stract ideas  and  concrete  realities,  as  pragmatism  conceives  it.  Hold 
a  tumbler  of  water  a  little  above  your  eyes  and  look  up  through  the 
water  at  its  surface — or  better  still  look  similarly  through  the  flat 
wall  of  an  aquarium.  You  will  then  see  an  extraordinarily  brilliant 
reflected  image  say  of  a  candle-flame,  or  any  other  clear  object, 
situated  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  vessel.  No  ray,  under  these 
circumstances  gets  beyond  the  water's  surface:  every  ray  is  totally 
reflected  back  into  the  depths  again.  Now  let  the  water  represent 
the  world  of  sensible  facts,  and  let  the  air  above  it  represent  the 
world  of  abstract  ideas.  Both  worlds  are  real,  of  course,  and  inter- 
act ;  but  they  interact  only  at  their  boundary,  and  the  locus  of  every- 
thing that  lives,  and  happens  to  us,  so  far  as  full  experience  goes, 
is  the  water.  We  are  like  fishes  swimming  in  the  sea  of  sense, 
bounded  above  by  the  superior  element,  but  unable  to  breathe  it  pure 
or  penetrate  it.  We  get  our  oxygen  from  it,  however,  we  touch  it 
incessantly,  now  in  this  part,  now  in  that,  and  every  time  we  touch 


PRAGMATISM.  21 

it,  we  turn  back  into  the  water  with  our  course  re-determined  and 
re-energized.  The  abstract  ideas  of  which  the  air  consists  are  in- 
dispensable for  life,  but  irrespirable  by  themselves,  as  it  were,  and 
only  active  in  their  re-directing  function.  All  similes  are  halting, 
but  this  one  rather  takes  my  fancy.  It  shows  how  something,  not 
sufficient  for  life  in  itself,  may  nevertheless  be  an  effective  deter- 
minant of  life  elsewhere." 

Dreams  are  realities  to  the  visionary,  and  the  mystic 
does  not  hesitate  to  look  upon  the  most  abstruse  theories 
of  his  imagination  as  facts.  If  we  want  to  know  the  truth, 
we  must  learn  to  distinguish  between  the  objective  fact  and 
our  interpretation  of  it. 

MISUNDERSTOOD. 

Professor  James  emphasizes  one  aspect  of  the  truth  only 
and  loses  sight  of  another  that  is  of  greater  importance. 
He  himself  feels  that  he  speaks  in  paradoxes,  and  so  he 
says  of  his  definition  of  truth : 

"But  is  it  not  a  strange  misuse  of  the  word  'truth/  you  will 
say,  to  call  ideas  also  'true'  for  this  reason?" 

When  Professor  James  identifies  that  which  is  profit- 
able, satisfactory,  better  to  believe,  etc.,  with  truth,  he 
says  to  his  reader  in  anticipation  of  his  misgivings: 

"Probably  you  also  agree,  so  far  as  the  abstract  statement  goes, 
but  with  a  suspicion  that  if  we  practically  did  believe  everything 
that  made  for  good  in  our  own  personal  lives,  we  should  be  found 
indulging  all  kinds  of  fancies  about  this  world's  affairs,  and  all 
kinds  of  sentimental  superstitions  about  a  world  hereafter.  Your 
suspicion  here  is  undoubtedly  well  founded." 

Professor  James  grants  that  our  suspicion  is  "well- 
founded,"  but  he  does  not  trouble  to  remove  the  suspicion. 
He  simply  adds: 

"It  is  evident  that  something  happens  when  you  pass  from  the 
abstract  to  the  concrete  that  complicates  the  situation." 


22  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

Man  possesses  a  very  inconvenient  hankering  for  con- 
sistency, and  when  he  adopts  an  idea  as  true  because  he 
finds  that  it  is  expedient  to  believe  it,  it  sometimes  happens 
that  it  clashes  with  other  beliefs  of  vital  benefit.  Professor 
James  refers  to  this  problem,  and  if  he  had  solved  it  he 
would  have  discovered  that  the  old-fashioned  ideal  of  the 
oneness  of  truth  contains  a  lesson,  but  he  feared  to  lose 
himself  in  the  absolute,  and  he  loved  pluralism  too  much 
to  make  the  attempt.  On  page  77  Professor  James  says : 

"I  said  just  now  that  what  is  better  for  us  to  believe  is  true 
unless  the  belief  incidentally  clashes  with  some  other  vital  benefit. 
Now  in  real  life  what  vital  benefits  is  any  particular  belief  of  ours 
most  liable  to  clash  with?  What  indeed  except  the  vital  benefits 
yielded  by  other  beliefs  when  these  prove  incompatible  with  the 
first  ones?  In  other  words,  the  greatest  enemy  of  any  one  of  our 
truths  may  be  the  rest  of  our  truths.  Truths  have  once  for  all  this 
desperate  instinct  of  self-preservation  and  of  desire  to  extinguish 
whatever  contradicts  them.  My  belief  in  the  Absolute,  based  on 
the  good  it  does  me,  must  run  the  gauntlet  of  all  my  other  beliefs." 

And  how  does  Professor  James  escape  the  difficulty? 
His  answer  is  made  in  a  whisper: 

"Let  me  speak  now  confidentially,  as  it  were,  and  merely  in 
my  own  private  person, — it  clashes  with  other  truths  of  mine  whose 
benefits  I  hate  to  give  up  on  its  account.  It  happens  to  be  associated 
with  a  kind  of  logic  of  which  I  am  the  enemy,  I  find  that  it  en- 
tangles me  in  metaphysical  paradoxes  that  are  inacceptable,  etc.,  etc. 
But  as  I  have  enough  trouble  in  life  already  without  adding  the 
trouble  of  carrying  these  intellectual  inconsistencies,  I  personally 
just  give  up  the  Absolute.  I  just  take  my  moral  holidays;  or  else 
as  a  professional  philosopher,  I  try  to  justify  them  by  some  other 
principle." 

This  looks  very  much  like  a  surrender  of  truth  in  order 
to  let  a  belief  that  at  the  time  is  profitable,  count  as  a  truth. 
And  yet  woe  to  any  one  who  would  point  this  out  to 
Professor  James!  He  says  on  page  233: 

"These  pragmatists  destroy  all  objective  standards,  critics  say, 


PRAGMATISM.  2$ 

and  put  foolishness  and  wisdom  on  one  level.  A  favorite  formula 
for  describing  Mr.  Schiller's  doctrines  and  mine  is  that  we  are 
persons  who  think  that  by  saying  whatever  you  find  it  pleasant  to 
say  and  calling  it  truth  you  fulfil  every  pragmatistic  requirement. 
I  leave  it  to  you  to  judge  whether  this  be  not  an  impudent  slander." 

Professor  James  is  very  good-natured  and  can  smile 
at  criticism,  but  here  he  loses  his  temper.  He  adds: 

"The  unwillingness  of  some  of  our  critics  to  read  any  but  the 
silliest  of  possible  meanings  into  our  statements  is  as  discreditable  to 
their  imaginations  as  anything  I  know  in  recent  philosophic  history." 

Is  it  sheer  modesty  when  Professor  James  speaks  of  his 
discourse  as  so  far  having  been  "crude  in  an  unpardonable, 
nay,  in  an  almost  incredible  degree"?  (p.  33). 

He  seems  to  be  in  the  habit  of  sometimes  saying  what 
he  does  not  mean  and  then  blames  the  world  for  misunder- 
standing him.  Here  is  his  own  statement: 

"I  once  wrote  an  essay  on  our  right  to  believe,  which  I  un- 
luckily called  the  Will  to  Believe.  All  the  critics,  neglecting  the 
essay,  pounced  upon  the  title.  Psychologically  it  was  impossible, 
morally  it  was  iniquitous." 

Now  it  seems  to  me  that  the  most  important  sentence 
written  in  an  essay  is  its  title.  It  is  in  the  light  of  the 
title  that  the  reader  reads  the  whole  essay,  and  if  the  title 
reads  "The  Will  to  Believe"  it  is  likely  that  the  author 
really  means  that  which  he  puts  in  the  most  conspicuous 
place.  Moreover  I  would  add  that  although  the  essay 
may  be  wrongly  entitled  "The  Will  to  Believe,"  it  actually 
reflects  the  author's  meaning.  He  has  certainly  no  right 
to  blame  the  readers  for  misunderstanding  him.  Never- 
theless Professor  James  loses  his  temper  and  blames  his 

critics  as  "iniquitous." 

Some  of  his  critics,  however,  may  not  have  missed  his 
meaning  when  they  attributed  to  him  the  proposition  that 
it  is  the  right  of  everybody  to  believe  as  he  wills,  and  that 
the  will  (i.  e.,  the  idiosyncrasies)  of  every  man  is  the  main 


24  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

factor  in  the  makeup  of  his  belief  and  that  arguments  are 
of  no  avail.  In  the  present  volume,  on  page  296,  Professor 
James  says: 

"In  the  end  it  is  our  faith  and  not  our  logic  'that  decides  such 
questions,  and  I  deny  the  right  of  any  pretended  logic  to  veto  my 
own  faith." 

Professor  James  is  possessed  of  an  exuberance  of  tem- 
perament, and  in  his  philosophy  temperament  rules  su- 
preme. He  claims  for  his  faith  the  right  to  be  impervious 
to  logic ;  and  he  denies  the  right  of  any  pretended  logic  to 
veto  his  own  faith.  Of  course  that  closes  the  case  and  all 
argument  must  cease. 

In  the  meantime  I  must  confess  that  my  temperament 
differs,  for  my  convictions  have  been  profoundly  influenced 
by  logical  argument,  and  there  are  many  other  people  in 
the  same  plight  as  I  am.  In  fact  I  know  that  whole  na- 
tions have  changed  their  faith  under  the  influence  of  purely 
intellectual  considerations;  yea,  I  have  some  slight  sus- 
picion that  Professor  James  himself  can  not  entirely  with- 
draw himself  from  the  influence  of  logic,  and  it  may  be 
a  mistake  to  take  his  utterances  too  seriously. 

It  may  be  that  even  the  present  book  on  pragmatism 
contains  statements  which,  by  some  ill  luck,  Professor  James 
did  not  mean,  and  that  when  we  criticize  him  we  stand  in 
the  same  condemnation  as  the  critics  of  his  essay  on  "The 
Right  to  Believe." 

We  do  not  wish  to  misrepresent  Professor  James  and 
have  therefore  characterized  his  pragmatism  in  his  own 
words.  We  grant  that  he  believes  in  truth,  but  his  several 
definitions  and  expositions  of  his  conception  of  truth  are 
either  wrong  or  misleading,  and  though  he  may  not  ac- 
tually deny  the  objective  standard  of  truth,  he  elevates 
mere  subjective  belief  to  the  dignity  of  the  name  truth 
which,  if  this  were  justifiable,  would  practically  render  the 
latter  irrelevant.  Indeed  he  glories  in  this  looseness  of 


PRAGMATISM.  25 

truth  which  ignores  the  ideal  of  both  the  objectivity  and  the 
oneness  of  truth  for  the  sake  of  its  subjective  conceptions, 
resulting  in  Protean  truths  in  the  plural. 

TEMPERAMENTAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

It  is  very  difficult  to  obtain  objective  statements  of  fact 
because  a  subjective  element  enters  into  every  observation 
and  consequently  also  into  every  presentation  of  a  fact. 
It  is  the  ambition  of  the  scientist  to  reduce  the  personal 
element  and,  whenever  possible,  to  eliminate  it. 

Professor  James  says: 

"Of  whatever  temperament  a  professional  philosopher  is,  he 
tries,  when  philosophizing,  to  sink  the  fact  of  his  temperament. 
Temperament  is  no  conventionally  recognized  reason,  so  he  urges 
impersonal  reasons  only  for  his  conclusions.  Yet  his  temperament 
really  gives  him  a  stronger  bias  than  any  of  his  more  strictly  ob- 
jective premises.  It  loads  the  evidence  for  him  one  way  or  the 
other,  making  for  a  more  sentimental  or  a  more  hard-hearted  view 
of  the  universe,  just  as  this  fact  or  that  principle  would.  He  trusts 
his  temperament.  Wanting  a  universe  that  suits  it,  he  believes  in 
any  representation  of  the  universe  that  does  suit  it." 

This  passage  contains  the  key  to  the  philosophical  doc- 
trine of  Professor  James.  He  possessed  a  very  tempera- 
mental personality,  and  he  judged  others  by  himself. 

Scientific  inquiry  demands  that  the  scientist  should 
sink  his  own  personality  before  the  cause  of  truth.  His 
temperament  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  facts  he  investi- 
gates; if  permitted  to  interfere  with  his  investigation  it 
can  only  vitiate  his  arguments  and  lack  of  self-control  is 
pathological.  In  Professor  James,  thought  and  sentiment 
are  so  intricately  interwoven  that  his  preferences  enter  into 
his  conclusions ;  his  temperament  is  always  one  of  his  prem- 
ises, and  to  pass  it  by  in  silence  seems  to  him  hypocritical. 
He  says: 

"There  arises  thus  a  certain  insincerity  in  our  philosophic  dis- 
cussions: the  potentest  of  all  our  premises  is  never  mentioned." 


26  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

We  do  not  deny  that  one's  personal  attitude  is  an  im- 
portant factor  in  life,  nor  would  we  object  to  an  author 
who  with  ability  and  grace  descants  on  any  subject  in  his 
peculiar  characteristic  mood,  but  he  must  not  claim  that 
his  effusions  are  philosophy.  Let  him  announce  his  lec- 
tures as  rhapsodies  and  publish  his  books  under  the  name 
of  poetry;  we  will  gladly  welcome  him  as  the  creator  of 
a  new  department  in  literature.  But  it  is  not  philosophy, 
and  least  of  all,  what  is  so  strongly  needed  in  our  day,  a 
philosophy  of  science,  a  philosophy  that  is  worth  while 
studying  and  which  is  a  desideratum  of  scientists. 

Professor  James  is  an  empiricist.  He  "turns  his  back 
resolutely  and  once  for  all  upon  a  lot  of  inveterate  habits 
dear  to  professional  philosophers.  He  turns  away  from 
abstractions.  . .  .from  fixed  principles,  closed  systems.  . .  . 
He  turns  towards  concreteness  and  adequacy,  towards 
facts,  towards  action  and  towards  power."  He  adds  p.  51 : 

"That  means  the  empiricist  temper  regnant  and  the  rationalist 
temper  sincerely  given  up." 

But  the  facts  of  Professor  James  are  not  facts  in  the 
usual  sense  of  the  word.  They  are  psychical  states,  atti- 
tudes, and  interpretations  of  facts.  An  hallucination  is 
most  assuredly  a  fact  too.  The  sensation  experienced  by 
a  man  who  sees  a  ghost  is  a  fact ;  but  his  experience  may 
be  the  expression  of  a  wrong  interpretation.  Another  man 
under  the  same  conditions  may  see  a  shirt  on  a  clothes 
line;  that  too  is  a  fact  and  an  interpretation.  Necessarily 
both  interpretations  are  contradictory,  and  men  of  a  ra- 
tionalist temper  will  not  rest  satisfied  until  the  contradic- 
tion is  removed.  The  pragmatism  of  Professor  James  is 
pluralistic,  and  different  interpretations  remain  peacefully 
side  by  side.  If  we  can  not  eliminate  the  personal  equation 
and  must  accept  moods  as  facts,  all  interpretations  are 
equally  true.  This  renders  the  conception  of  truth  elusive, 
or  as  Professor  James  calls  it,  "plastic." 


PRAGMATISM.  27 


THE  PLASTICITY  OF  TRUTH. 

The  plasticity  of  truth  makes  pragmatism  elastic  and 
this  playing  fast  and  loose  with  truth  is  deemed  a  great 
advantage.  It  makes  "pragmatism  a  mediator  and  recon- 
ciler/' for  "she  'unstiffens'  our  theories"  (p.  79).  Thus 
it  is  possible  that  pragmatism  may  be  acceptable  to  all, — 
the  materialist  and  the  spiritualist,  the  infidel  and  the  un- 
believer, the  skeptic,  the  mystic,  the  visionary,  and  what 
not.  We  are  told: 

"It  has  no  dogmas,  and  no  doctrines  save  its  methods.  As  the 
young  Italian  pragmatist  Papini  has  well  said,  it  lies  in  the  midst 
of  our  theories,  like  a  corridor  in  a  hotel.  Innumerable  chambers 
open  out  of  it.  In  one  you  may  find  a  man  writing  an  atheistic 
volume;  in  the  next  some  one  on  his  knees  praying  for  faith  and 
strength;  in  a  third  a  chemist  investigating  a  body's  properties. 
In  a  fourth  a  system  of  idealistic  metaphysics  is  being  excogitated ; 
in  a  fifth  the  impossibility  of  metaphysics  is  being  shown.  But 
they  all  own  the  corridor,  and  all  must  pass  through  it  if  they  want 
a  practicable  way  of  getting  into  or  out  of  their  respective  rooms." 

The  excuse  for  ignoring  the  ideal  of  truth,  so  important 
in  our  conception  of  the  world,  is  stated  by  Professor  James 
as  follows: 

"The  'absolutely'  true,  meaning  what  no  farther  experience 
will  ever  alter,  is  that  ideal  vanishing-point  towards  which  we  im- 
agine that  all  our  temporary  truths  will  some  day  converge.  It 
runs  on  all  fours  with  the  perfectly  wise  man,  and  with  the  abso- 
lutely complete  experience;  and,  if  these  ideals  are  ever  realized, 
they  will  all  be  realized  together.  Meanwhile  we  have  to  live  to-day 
by  what  truth  we  can  get  to-day,  and  be  ready  to-morrow  to  call 
it  falsehood." 

I  would  not  characterize  the  ideal  of  truth  by  which  I 
understand  that  solution  of  a  problem  which  is  predeter- 
mined, as  "the  'absolutely'  true."  There  is  nothing  "ab- 
solute" in  it,  and  by  using  the  word  "absolute"  (albeit  not 
in  its  proper  meaning,  but  in  a  loose  way  in  the  sense  of 


28  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

"positive"),  we  introduce  an  idea  which  spreads  vague- 
ness. It  makes  a  final  truth  appear  as  an  "ideal  vanishing 
point,"  i.  e.,  an  unrealizable  quantity  at  an  infinite  distance. 
I  grant  Professor  James  that  "we  must  live  to-day  by  what 
truth  we  can  get  to-day,"  but  I  deny  that  we  must  "be 
ready  to  call  it  falsehood  to-morrow."  This  view  is  based 
upon  an  utter  misapprehension  of  the  nature  of  truth. 

I  beg  leave  to  belong  to  the  old-fashioned  people  who 
still  believe  that  all  truths  must  agree  and  that  the  truth 
of  yesterday  will  be  the  truth  of  to-morrow.  Here  lies  the 
rock  of  ages  which  is  the  basis  of  science.  If  this  rock 
should  prove  an  illusion,  then  indeed  pluralism  would  be 
established  for  good,  and  pluralism  would  look  very  much 
like  nihilism.  But  let  us  hear  what  Professor  James  has  to 
say  on  the  variability  of  truth : 

"Ptolemaic  astronomy,  Euclidean  space,  Aristotelian  logic,  scho- 
lastic metaphysics,  were  expedient  for  centuries,  but  human  ex- 
perience has  boiled  over  those  limits,  and  we  now  call  these  things 
only  relatively  true,  or  true  within  those  borders  of  experience. 
'Absolutely'  they  are  false;  for  we  know  that  those  limits  were 
casual,  and  might  have  been  transcended  by  past  theorists  just  as 
they  are  by  present  thinkers." 

We  will  take  up  each  single  statement  by  itself. 

PTOLEMY  AND  COPERNICUS. 

Ptolemaic  astronomy  was  not  true  at  the  time  of  Ptol- 
emy; it  never  was  true,  nor  ever  will  be  true.  What  from 
our  standpoint  Professor  James  can  reasonably  mean  is 
this,  that  Ptolemaic  astronomy  satisfied  certain  demands 
of  scientific  inquiry  in  the  time  when  Alexandria  was  flour- 
ishing. It  summarizes  certain  facts  in  a  better  way  than 
was  done  in  the  views  that  were  held  by  Ptolemy's  prede- 
cessors except  Eudoxus  who  seems  to  have  been  nearer  the 
truth  than  Ptolemy.  Only  in  so  far  as  it  systematized  some 
observations,  can  we  say  that  the  Ptolemaic  system  was 


PRAGMATISM.  2Q 

correctly  formulated ;  but  it  was  not  true  even  at  the  time, 
because  it  did  not  satisfy  all  observations,  and  the  astron- 
omy of  that  age  had  to  slur  over  those  observations  which 
clashed  with  the  theory.  But  Ptolemy  and  his  followers 
"had  enough  trouble  in  life  already  without  adding  the 
trouble  of  carrying  these  intellectual  inconsistencies." 
Their  calculations  were  sufficiently  complicated  and  so  they 
took  a  holiday  and  thought  that  their  system  worked  well 
enough  for  their  own  needs.  In  other  words  they  turned 
pragmatists  and  ceased  to  trouble  about  consistency. 

We  might  enter  here  upon  a  discussion  of  the  right  to 
choose  a  point  of  reference.  We  have  a  right  to  use  the 
earth  as  a  point  of  reference  as  did  the  Ptolemaic  astron- 
omers; and  we  have  a  right  to  use  the  sun  as  our  point 
of  reference  as  did  Copernicus.  The  former  is  as  much 
justified  as  the  latter,  and  the  advantage  of  the  latter  con- 
sists solely  in  rendering  the  calculation  more  simple.  That 
is  true  enough  according  to  assumption,  but  to  use  this  as 
an  argument  for  the  purpose  of  making  Ptolemaic  astron- 
omy appear  to  be  as  true  as  the  Copernican  system  would 
be  mere  quibbling.  This  inability  to  take  the  right  point 
of  reference  which  would  render  the  calculation  of  the 
planetary  movements  simple,  is  exactly  what  constituted 
the  fault  of  Ptolemaic  astronomers,  and  veiled  from  them 
the  fact  that  the  earth  is  a  planet  among  the  other  planets. 

We  do  not  deny  that  the  progress  of  science  is  by  ap- 
proximation, and  the  Ptolemaic  system  is  indeed  an  ap- 
proximation of  the  attempt  to  calculate  and  predict  certain 
events  in  the  starry  heavens ;  but  one  of  its  premises  was 
wrong,  and  it  prevented  its  supporters  from  solving  the 
astronomical  problem  satisfactorily.  This  wrong  premise 
which  was  their  idea  of  the  fixed  position  of  the  earth  in 
the  center  of  the  solar  system,  was  eliminated  by  Coper- 
nicus who  recognized  that  the  earth  had  to  be  classed  to- 
gether with  the  planets,  and  the  problem  was  finally  solved 


3O  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

by  Kepler  through  the  formulation  of  the  laws  which  bear 
his  name. 

Kepler  has  definitely  solved  the  problem.  He  has  not 
solved  all  the  problems  of  astronomy,  but  I  would  like  to 
see  the  astronomer  who  would  be  ready  to  call  the  three 
laws  of  Kepler  falsehoods  to-morrow. 

The  same  may  be  said  of  the  problem  of  the  acceleration 
of  gravity.  Gravity  itself  taken  as  a  fact,  the  Newtonian 
formula  is  final.  It  satisfies  all  instances  of  gravitating 
bodies.  The  question  of  fact  "why  does  gravity  act  at 
all  ?"  remains,  but  that  being  granted  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
the  formula  is  valid. 

EUCLID  AND  ARISTOTLE. 

The  last  century  has  witnessed  a  remarkable  progress 
in  mathematics  and  logic  in  the  invention  of  non-Euclidean 
geometries  and  the  suggestion  of  new  truths  in  logic,  and 
this  is  used  to  advantage  by  Professor  James  to  prove  the 
plasticity  of  truth.  He  says: 

"How  plastic  even  the  oldest  truths  nevertheless  really  are  has 
been  vividly  shown  in  our  day  by  the  transformation  of  logical 
and  mathematical  ideas,  a  transformation  which  seems  even  to  be 
invading  physics." 

Does  Professor  James  mean  to  say  that  Euclidean  ge- 
ometry and  Aristotelian  logic  have  ceased  to  be  true? 
Scarcely.  Euclid's  geometry  holds  good  to-day  as  well 
as  in  Euclid's  time,  and  the  same  is  true  of  Aristotle's 
logic.  Professor  James  himself  knows  it,  for  he  adds: 

"The  ancient  formulas  are  reinterpreted  as  special  expressions 
of  much  wider  principles,  principles  that  our  ancestors  never  got 
a  glimpse  of  in  their  present  shape  and  formulation." 

A  wider  interpretation  of  an  old  truth  does  not  make 
the  old  truth  false,  but  widens  and  deepens  our  compre- 
hension of  it.  That  is  a  big  difference,  and  the  same  is 


PRAGMATISM.  3! 

true  of  all  truths.    A  truth  once  positively  proved  to  be  a 
truth  is  and  will  remain  a  truth  forever. 

But  what  of  the  discovery  of  new  facts  such  as  the 
Rontgen  rays,  and  radium  ?  Do  they  not  upset  science  and 
render  the  most  basic  truth  antiquated?  We  can  hear 
this  statement  often  enough,  but  we  have  not  yet  seen  the 
day  on  which  it  was  verified.  The  discovery  of  new  facts 
may  upset  pet  theories  of  ours,  but  it  will  never  upset  old 
truths,  not  even  those  which  have  become  paleontological 
with  age.  If  formulas  describe  certain  features  of  facts 
without  any  admixture  of  theory,  they  will  remain  true 
forever.  In  case  we  should  learn  something  about  the 
ultimate  constitution  of  matter  which  would  reveal  to  us 
the  secret  of  gravity,  we  would  not  have  to  discard  the 
Newtonian  formula  of  the  mutual  attraction  of  masses  as 
a  falsehood,  but  we  would  see  its  truth  in  a  clearer  light. 
In  other  words,  we  would  not  replace  one  truth  that  has 
become  antiquated  by  another  truth  that  is  more  up  to 
date  and  happens  to  agree  with  the  present  fashion  of 
our  intellectual  atmosphere,  but  we  would  add  to  the  old 
truth  a  new  truth,  and  the  unity  of  all  the  truths  we  know 
would  thereby  only  become  the  more  apparent. 

MATERIALISM  AND  SPIRITUALISM. 

Professor  James  knows  how  to  put  his  paints  on  thick, 
and  so  his  pictures  exhibit  strong  contrasts.  He  generally 
omits  the  softer  tones  between  the  opposites  and  so  fails 
to  find  that  the  truth  lies  in  the  middle.  Take  for  instance 
his  ingenious  description  of  materialism  (on  pp.  92-93) 
which  is  contrasted  to  theism  and  spiritualism. 

"Philosophical  materialism  is  not  necessarily  knit  up  with  belief 
in  'matter,'  as  a  metaphysical  principle.  One  may  deny  matter  in 
that  sense,  as  strongly  as  Berkeley  did,  one  may  be  phenomenalist 
like  Huxley,  and  yet  one  may  still  be  a  materialist  in  the  wider 
sense,  of  explaining  higher  phenomena  by  lower  ones,  and  leaving 


$2  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

the  destinies  of  the  world  at  the  mercy  of  its  blinder  parts  and  forces. 
It  is  in  this  wider  sense  of  the  word  that  materialism  is  opposed 
to  spiritualism  or  theism.  The  laws  of  physical  nature  are  what 
run  things,  materialism  says. 

"The  highest  productions  of  human  genius  might  be  ciphered 
by  one  who  had  complete  acquaintance  with  the  facts,  out  of  their 
physiological  conditions,  regardless  whether  nature  be  there  only 
for  our  minds,  as  idealists  contend,  or  not.  Our  minds  in  any  case 
would  have  to  record  the  kind  of  nature  it  is,  and  write  it  down  as 
operating  through  blind  laws  of  physics.  This  is  the  complexion 
of  present-day  materialism,  which  may  better  be  called  naturalism. 
Over  against  it  stands  'theism/  or  what  in  a  wide  sense  may  be 
termed  'spiritualism.'  Spiritualism  says  that  mind  not  only  wit- 
nesses and  records  things,  but  also  runs  and  operates  them:  the 
world  being  thus  guided,  not  by  its  lower,  but  by  its  higher  ele- 
ment." 

According  to  Professor  James  every  naturalist  would 
have  to  be  classed  with  the  materialists,  and  according  to 
his  division,  which  with  all  its  faults  and  in  spite  of  its 
being  based  upon  a  wrong  generalization  has  the  advan- 
tage of  a  drastic  vividness,  I  would  myself  count  as  a 
materialist.  And  yet  I  protest  against  calling  the  laws 
of  nature  blind,  and  while  I  would  attempt  to  explain 
higher  phenomena  from  lower  ones  I  would  not  have  the 
higher  degraded  into  the  lower.  Man  does  not  become  a 
brute  even  if  his  pedigree  be  traced  back  to  brute  animals 
and  still  further  back  to  moners  or  amcebas.  For  all  that, 
man's  soul  has  been  molded  not  by  matter  but  by  the  forma- 
tive factors  of  the  world  in  which  all  things  exist  and  move 
and  have  their  being. 

The  romantic  temperament  of  Professor  James  appears 
not  only  in  his  spiritualism  but  also  in  his  theology,  for 
even  here  pluralism  enters.  He  says: 

"Monotheism  itself,  so  far  as  it  was  religious  and  not  a  scheme 
of  classroom  instruction  for  the  metaphysicians,  has  always  viewed 
God  as  but  one  helper,  primus  inter  pares,  in  the  midst  of  all  the 
shapers  of  the  great  world's  fate." 


PRAGMATISM.  33 

RELIGIOUS  PROBLEMS. 

Pragmatism  applied  to  religion  has  great  advantages. 
Says  Professor  James : 

"It  follows  that  in  the  religious  field  she  [pragmatism]  is  at  a 
great  advantage  both  over  positivistic  empiricism,  with  its  anti- 
theological  bias,  and  over  religious  rationalism,  with  its  exclusive 
interest  in  the  remote,  the  noble,  the  simple,  and  the  abstract  in  the 
way  of  conception. 

"In  short,  she  widens  the  field  of  search  for  God.  Rationalism 
sticks  to  logic  and  the  empyrean.  Empiricism  sticks  to  the  ex- 
ternal senses.  Pragmatism  is  willing  to  take  anything,  to  follow 
either  logic  or  the  senses  and  to  count  the  humblest  and  most  per- 
sonal experiences.  She  will  count  mystical  experiences  if  they 
have  practical  consequences.  She  will  take  a  God  who  lives  in 
the  very  dirt  of  private  fact — if  that  should  seem  a  likely  place  to 
find  him. 

"Her  only  test  of  probable  truth  is  what  works  best  in  the 
way  of  leading  us,  what  fits  every  part  of  life  best  and  combines 
with  the  collectivity  of  experience's  demands,  nothing  being  omitted. 
If  theological  ideas  should  do  this,  if  the  notion  of  God,  in  particular, 
should  prove  to  do  it,  how  could  pragmatism  possibly  deny  God's 
existence?  She  could  see  no  meaning  in  treating  as  'not  true'  a 
notion  that  was  pragmatically  so  successful.  What  other  kind  of 
truth  could  there  be,  for  her,  than  all  this  agreement  with  concrete 
reality?" 

The  issue  between  atheism  and  theism,  and  materialism 
and  spiritualism,  before  the  tribunal  of  pragmatism  be- 
comes "little  more  than  a  conflict  between  esthetic  prefer- 
ences" (page  94).  Professor  James  says: 

"What  practical  difference  can  it  make  now  that  the  world 
should  be  run  by  matter  or  by  spirit?. . . . 

"The  pragmatist  must  consequently  say  that  the  two  theories, 
in  spite  of  their  different-sounding  names,  mean  exactly  the  same 
thing 

"And  how,  experience  being  what  is  once  for  all,  would  God's 
presence  in  it  make  it  any  more  living  or  richer?  Candidly,  it  is 
impossible  to  give  any  answer  to  this  question 

"Thus  if  no  future  detail  of  experience  or  conduct  is  to  be  de- 


34  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

duced  from  our  hypothesis,  the  debate  between  materialism  and 
theism  becomes  quite  idle  and  insignificant.  Matter  and  God  in  that 
event  mean  exactly  the  same  thing — the  power,  namely,  neither 
more  nor  less,  that  could  make  just  this  completed  world — and  the 
wise  man  is  he  who  in  such  a  case  would  turn  his  back  on  such  a 
supererogatory  discussion." 

It  would  seem  quite  indifferent  then  whether  God  or 
law,  or  matter,  or  energy,  or  whatever  other  principle 
ruled  the  world.  Professor  James  says  in  this  connection  : 

"Doing  practically  all  that  a  God  can  do,  it  is  equivalent  to  God, 
its  function  is  a  God's  function,  and  in  a  world  in  which  a  God 
would  be  superfluous;  from  such  a  world  a  God  could  never  law- 
fully be  missed." 

Pragmatism  recognizing  the  plurality  of  truths  need 
not  be  consistent,  and  so  Professor  James  sees  nevertheless 
a  difference  between  materialism  and  spiritualism,  and  he 
gives  his  preference  to  the  latter,  not  because  he  can  prove 
that  it  is  truer  but  because  spiritualism  is  a  doctrine  of 
promise,  of  hope,  of  consolation,  and  the  same  is  true  of 
some  other  metaphysical  problems,  such  as  free  will,  design 
in  nature  etc. 

Professor  James  says: 

"Materialism  means  simply  the  denial  that  the  moral  order  is 
eternal,  and  the  cutting  off  of  ultimate  hopes;  spiritualism  means 
the  affirmation  of  an  eternal  moral  order  and  the  letting  loose  of 
hope 

"Spiritualistic  faith  in  all  its  forms  deals  with  a  world  of  prom- 
ise, while  materialism's  sun  sets  in  a  sea  of  disappointment 

"Free-will  thus  has  no  meaning  unless  it  be  a  doctrine  of  re- 
lief  

"Other  than  this  practical  significance,  the  words  God,  free-will, 
design,  etc.,  have  none." 

Professor  James  appears  to  have  an  aversion  to  argu- 
ments. They  smack  of  intellectualism  which  is  an  abomi- 
nation in  his  eyes.  His  preference  is  based  upon  senti- 
mental grounds. 


PRAGMATISM.  35 

It  stands  to  reason  that  those  who  have  worked  out  doc- 
trines and  theories  and  dogmas,  who  have  endeavored  to 
have  them  promulgated,  adopted  and  believed  in,  have  done 
so  because  they  were  conscious  of  the  practical  significance 
of  their  propositions,  but  Professor  James  imputes  to  them 
the  idea  that  they  have  lost  sight  of  facts,  and  that  their 
ultimate  questions  are  "something  august  and  exalted  above 
facts."  His  pragmatism  alone  gives  meaning  to  theories 
which  otherwise  would  have  been  senseless.  He  says : 

"See  then  how  all  these  ultimate  questions  turn,  as  it  were, 
upon  their  hinges;  and  from  looking  backwards  upon  principles, 
upon  an  erkenntnisstheoretisches  Ich,  a  God,  a  Kausalitdtsprinsip, 
a  Design,  a  Free-will,  taken  in  themselves,  as  something  august  and 
exalted  above  facts, — see,  I  say,  how  pragmatism  shifts  the  em- 
phasis and  looks  forward  into  facts  themselves." 

I  cherish  the  opinion  that  every  belief  has  been  framed 
with  a  practical  intent  (or  in  adaptation  to  Professor 
James  I  may  say,  for  a  "pragmatic"  purpose)  and  in 
order  to  find  out  the  significance  of  a  theory  we  ought 
to  see  how  it  works.  The  intellectual  struggle  concerning 
God,  the  soul,  and  immortality  have  not  been  mere  quibbles 
in  my  opinion,  and  I  trust  that  the  problems  of  philos- 
ophy can  be  correctly  formulated  and  solved. 

I  believe  that  we  can  define  God  in  terms  of  experience 
and  say  with  exactness  what  is  true  of  the  idea  of  God 
and  what  is  not  true.  I  believe  myself  that  the  theist  and 
the  atheist  may  come  to  terms,  but  two  contradictory  ideas 
can  not  for  that  reason  both  be  true.  An  idea  ( such  as  the 
God  idea)  may  be  approximately  true.  It  may  contain  an 
important  truth  dressed  up  in  an  allegorical  garb.  The 
atheist  is  right  when  he  negates  the  allegorical  formulation 
of  it,  he  is  wrong  when  he  negates  the  spirit  of  the  dogma ; 
and  vice  versa,  the  theist  is  wrong  when  he  insists  on  the 
allegory  as  being  literally  true,  but  he  is  right  when  he 


36  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

recognizes  the  essential  part  of  it  that  is  backed  up  by  facts, 
and  insists  upon  it.8 

MR.  CHARLES  S.  PEIRCE'S  TYCHISM. 

Our  readers  may  have  noticed  that  since  "pragmatism" 
has  become  the  watchword  of  a  new  and  popular  movement 
with  which  Mr.  Peirce,  the  inventor  of  the  term,  does  not 
appear  to  be  in  full  accord,  he  has  introduced  the  word 
"pragmaticism"  as  if  to  point  out  the  difference  between 
his  own  philosophy  and  that  of  Professor  James. 

I  regret  that  I  shall  not  be  able  to  enter  here  into  a 
discussion  of  the  views  of  Mr.  Charles  S.  Peirce  whose 
conception  of  the  instability  of  natural  laws  is  one  of  the 
most  original  and  most  ingenious  theories  ever  brought 
forth.  I  will  only  briefly  refer  our  readers  to  the  vigorous 
controversy  with  him  which  has  appeared  in  The  Monist,9 
where  he  defends  the  doctrine  of  tychism  versus  necessi- 
tarianism, while  I  take  the  opposite  position.  Mr.  Peirce 
believes  that  natural  laws  are  the  product  of  evolution.  In 
the  beginning  there  was  Chance  (Tyche).  Chance  is  not 
subject  to  law,  it  is  free  as  we  know  spirit  to  be.  Chance 
acts  arbitrarily  but  gradually  it  took  on  habits  and  habits 
became  more  and  more  solidified  and  hardened  into  laws. 
Hence  the  order  of  the  universe  is  not  the  cause  of  evolu- 
tion but  its  product. 

It  is  not  impossible  that  Professor  James  follows  Mr. 
Peirce,  for  there  is  a  passage  which  seems  to  justify  this 
assumption.  Professor  James  says  on  p.  249: 

"Between  categories  fulminated  before  nature  began,  and  cate- 
gories gradually  forming  themselves  in  nature's  presence,  the  whole 
chasm  between  rationalism  and  empiricism  yawns." 

In  another  passage  (p.  158-9)  we  read: 

*  For  details  see  my  discussions  on  the  God  problem,  especially  in  The 
Monist,  Vol.  IX,  p.  106.    The  articles  have  been  collected  in  book  form. 

*  Compare  The  Monist,  Vol.  II,  pp.  321  ff.,  442  ff. ;  and  III,  pp.  526  ff.  and 
57i  ff. 


PRAGMATISM.  37 

"With  the  whole  of  past  eternity  open  for  our  conjectures  to 
range  in,  it  may  be  lawful  to  wonder  whether  the  various  kinds  of 
union  now  realized  in  the  universe  that  we  inhabit  may  not  possibly 
have  been  successively  evolved  after  the  fashion  in  which  we  now 
see  human  systems  evolving  in  consequence  of  human  needs.  If 
such  an  hypothesis  were  legitimate,  total  oneness  would  appear  at 
the  end  of  things  rather  than  at  their  origin.  In  other  words  the 
notion  of  the  'Absolute'  would  have  to  be  replaced  by  that  of  the 
'Ultimate.' " 

The  language  of  Professor  James  is  poetic,  not  exact. 
What  he  means  is  not  that  the  rationalist  (i.  e.,  a  man 
like  Kant)  believed  that  the  categories  fulminated  before 
nature  began,  but  that  the  categories,  or  better  the  entire 
cosmic  order,  are  an  eternal  condition  uncreated  and  in- 
destructible, while  the  empiricist  (or  the  pragmatist)  be- 
lieves that  the  categories  are  a  product  of  evolution. 

We  may  incidentally  call  our  readers'  attentions  to  the 
first  chapter  in  Prof.  Benjamin  Peirce's  Analytic  Mechan- 
ism, where  the  father  of  the  founder  of  pragmatism  utters 
a  few  brief  suggestions  which  seem  to  have  taken  deep 
root  in  the  soul  of  his  son.  Benjamin  Peirce  regarded 
"matter  as  inert"  and  thought  that  "force  may  be  regarded 
as  having  a  spiritual  origin." 

THE  ENEMIES  OF  PRAGMATISM. 

Pragmatism  is  a  philosophy  manufactured  to  suit  all; 
it  is  pluralistic  and  tolerates  any  amount  of  diversity  of 
opinion;  it  ought  to  have  no  enemies,  for  every  one  can 
be,  and  according  to  Professor  James  ought  to  be,  a  prag- 
matist; but  his  book  on  pragmatism  is  in  parts  extremely 
pugnacious,  his  enemies  being  the  monist,  the  rationalist, 
the  intellectualist,  and  their  ilk.  For  reasons  unknown  to 
me  Professor  James  complains  most  of  the  monists.  He 
says: 

"The  temper  of  monists  has  been  so  vehement,  as  almost  at 
times  to  be  convulsive." 


38  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

I  am  sure  I  am  innocent.  The  present  article  is  my  first 
attack  on  pragmatism. 

It  is  strange  that  the  pragmatist  welcomes  every  one 
except  men  of  theory,  and  to  them  he  imputes  all  kinds  of 
erroneous  notions. 

The  reader  will  ask  why  the  pragmatist  who  welcomes 
every  vagary  of  the  human  mind  and  whose  tolerance  is 
unbounded,  should  decry  in  pretty  harsh  terms  monism, 
intellectualism  and  rationalism.  Pragmatism,  according 
to  Professor  James,  is  the  philosophy  of  temperament,  of 
mood,  of  personal  attitude,  and  so  he  naturally  resents 
whatever  would  put  a  check  upon  the  liberty  of  his  prefer- 
ences. He  imputes  to  the  intellectualist  the  slogan: 

"Down  with  psychology,  up  with  logic,  in  all  this  question!" 

Professor  James  himself  wants  the  vagueness  of  psy- 
chological moods  recognized  as  philosophy,  and  he  scorns 
logic.  He  has  no  patience  with  a  thinker  who  demands 
consistency  or  endeavors  to  systematize  the  plurality  of 
facts.  Scientific  exactness  appears  to  the  pragmatist  as 
mere  pedantry.  Professor  James  says: 

"The  actual  universe  is  a  thing  wide  open,  but  rationalism 
makes  systems,  and  systems  must  be  closed." 

Professor  James's  philosophy  can  dispense  with  system. 
He  says: 

"We  measure  the  total  character  of  the  universe  as  we  feel  it, 
against  the  flavor  of  the  philosophy  proffered  us,  and  one  word  is 
enough. 

"  'Statt  der  lebendigen  Natur.'  we  say,  'da  Gott  die  Menschen 
schuf  hinein,' — that  nebulous  concoction,  that  wooden,  that  straight- 
laced  thing,  that  crabbed  artificiality,  that  musty  schoolroom  product, 
that  sick  man's  dream!  Away  with  it.  Away  with  all  of  them! 
Impossible !  Impossible !" 

The  pragmatist  says,  "Gefiihl  ist  Alles — we  need  nei- 
ther intellect,  nor  reason,  nor  a  systematization  of  facts, 
nor  theories,  nor  abstractions.  We  live  in  facts." 


PRAGMATISM.  39 

Professor  James  censures  some  views  with  regard  to 
the  importance  of  the  intellect  and  the  indispensableness 
of  reason,  which  are  commonly  held  by  believers  in  monism, 
but  these  propositions  are  so  strangely  adulterated  with 
notions  which  are  scarcely  held  by  any  one,  that  we  wonder 
who  these  sorry  enemies  of  Professor  James  may  be,  and 
we  are  inclined  to  regard  them  as  men  of  straw  who  do 
not  possess  a  concrete  existence. 

We  are  told  that  according  to  the  intellectualist  "truth 
means  essentially  an  inert  static  relation"  (p.  200),  and 
in  another  passage  that,  "for  the  rationalist  it  remains  a 
pure  abstraction  to  the  bare  name  of  which  we  must  de- 
fer" (p.  68). 

It  is  difficult  to  find  out  who  is  meant  by  intellectualists 
and  rationalists,  for  we  have  yet  to  meet  the  man  to  whom 
truth  remains  "a  pure  abstraction"  or  who  would  insist 
that  truth  should  be  "inert."  Clifford  has  already  pointed 
out  with  great  clearness  that  every  scientific  truth  is  a 
norm  of  conduct  and  can  be  expressed  as  such.  Further 
it  is  a  truism  that  scientists  formulate  truths  in  abstract 
terms,  but  they  always  bear  in  mind  that  their  formulas 
are  generalizations  from  actual  facts,  and  that  they  de- 
scribe certain  features  of  reality.  The  truth  or  untruth 
of  these  formulas  depends  upon  the  correspondence  of  the 
ideas  with  the  facts  in  question.  Truth  accordingly  does 
not  reside  in  the  abstraction  alone,  but  depends  upon  the 
relation  of  the  abstraction  to  facts.  Cancel  the  facts,  and 
where  is  truth? 

Theories  are  attempts  at  explaining  facts  by  the  as- 
sumption of  other  facts.  If  these  other  facts  are  verified, 
the  theory  is  regarded  true  and  may  then  be  justly  called  a 
law  of  nature.  A  law  of  nature  is  always  (or  at  least  should 
be)  a  systematic  description  of  a  certain  group  of  facts. 

We  often  hear  abstractions  and  generalizations  de- 
nounced as  empty,  but  that  is  merely  the  prattle  of  those 


4O  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

who  do  not  know  that  all  abstractions  signify  definite  fea- 
tures of  facts. 

THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  TOLERANCE. 

In  The  Monist  of  April,  1908,  Prof.  John  E.  Boodin,  of 
the  philosophical  department  at  the  University  of  Kansas, 
contributed  an  article  on  "Philosophic  Tolerance"  which  is 
very  well  written  and  shows  the  inclination  of  the  writer 
to  the  pragmatic  movement.  The  title  is  significant,  and 
the  essay  might  be  called  a  pragmatic  rhapsody.  It  is 
pleasant  reading,  and  I  am  sure  that  no  one  can  read  it 
without  enjoying  both  the  style  and  the  thoughts  of  the 
essay.  Nevertheless  it  is  not  philosophy,  and  pretty  though 
it  is  as  a  literary  composition,  it  becomes  warped  by  its 
philosophical  claim,  which  is  exactly  the  same  fault  which 
we  find  with  Professor  Boodin's  master,  Professor  James. 

In  this  pragmatic  interpretation  philosophy  has  given 
up  its  ambition  to  become  a  science.  It  has  no  dogmas,  no 
doctrines,  no  position  either  to  defend  or  to  attack,  and  so 
it  is  tolerant.  Professor  Boodin  claims  that  "philosophy 
like  poetry  and  art,  when  it  is  genuine,  is  only  the  expres- 
sion of  the  mood  of  a  soul."  Mr.  Boodin  wants  to  procure 
for  philosophy  the  same  variety  that  is  possessed  by  art. 

With  reference  to  art  and  poetry  Professor  Boodin 
says,  "We  do  not  demand  rigid  consistency  here,"  and  he 
longs  for  plasticity  in  philosophy  too,  saying,  "Why  should 
not  every  sincere  man  express  his  philosophy  that  seems 
reasonable  to  him  at  the  time?"  We  answer  that  he  most 
assuredly  may,  but  the  expression  of  moods  will  be  a  poor 
contribution  to  philosophy  as  a  science,  in  fact  it  would  be 
no  philosophy  whatever.  It  would  be  a  soi  disant  philos- 
ophy, a  poetic  expression  of  a  transient  Stimmung,  a 
sentiment. 

Far  be  it  from  me  to  denounce  or  object  to  poetical  ex- 
pressions of  our  moods;  they  are  quite  legitimate  in  the 


PRAGMATISM.  41 

domain  of  belles  lettres.  I  would  not  even  find  fault  with 
any  one  for  calling  them  philosophy  or  philosophical  effu- 
sions, but  I  do  object  to  regarding  them  as  the  philosophy 
that  has  come  to  supersede  all  other  philosophies,  denying 
that  there  is  a  true  philosophy,  a  philosophy  as  a  science, 
or  as  we  call  it,  the  philosophy  of  science. 

Pragmatism  claims  to  be  tolerant.  It  is  tolerant  of  all 
philosophies  that  are  merely  subjective  expressions  of  per- 
sonal idiosyncrasies.  Mr.  Boodin  asks,  "Why  are  they 
not  all  true,  in  so  far  as  they  are  really  genuine  and  really 
express  human  nature,  then  and  there?"  This  tolerance 
means  that  whether  true  or  untrue  in  a  scientific  sense, 
they  are  all  on  one  level,  and  according  to  my  old-fashioned 
conception  of  truth,  this  is  practically  a  declaration  that 
all  philosophies  are  subjective,  all  are  castles  in  the  air. 

This  attitude  of  pragmatism  is  about  the  same  as  if 
somebody  were  to  declare  that  in  the  realm  of  science 
astronomy  and  all  different  astrological  systems  are  of 
equal  value.  There  are  no  real  laws  of  nature ;  all  laws  of 
nature  are  mere  approximations.  From  this  standpoint 
the  astrologer  might  have  something  to  say  about  "the 
materialism"  of  the  astronomer  who  assumes  that  the 
stars  run  their  courses  according  to  "the  blind  laws  of 
nature,"  but  one  ought  to  be  as  tolerant  with  the  astron- 
omer as  with  the  different  astrological  interpretations  of 
the  planetary  movements,  viz.,  the  Babylonian  system 
which  looks  upon  the  stars  as  gods,  the  medieval  method 
which  believed  in  some  mysterious  influence  of  the  several 
planets  upon  the  lives  of  men,  and  the  modern  astrologer 
who  tries  to  adapt  the  medieval  traditions  to  the  modern 
conception. 

If  it  were  true,  as  Mr.  Boodin  says,  that  "Truth  is  at 
best  experimental,"  there  would  indeed  be  no  reason  to 
turn  our  backs  upon  the  old  superstitions.  It  would  be 
an  indication  of  our  intolerance.  The  magus  of  ancient 


42  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

Babylon,  and  the  astrologer  of  the  Middle  Ages,  and 
finally  the  occultist  of  to-day,  each  in  his  way  proclaims 
that  there  is  some  pragmatic  meaning  in  the  positions  of 
the  planets,  and  we  ought  not  to  say  that  their  efforts  are 
futile,  for,  says  Mr.  Boodin,  "nothing  can  be  more  fatal 
than  stopping  the  experiment." 

THE  LEADER  OF  THE  PRAGMATIST  MOVEMENT. 

There  is  no  need  of  prolonging  the  discussion.  With 
all  my  admiration  for  Professor  James  I  can  not  take 
kindly  to  his  pragmatism,  and  must  openly  confess  that 
his  loose  way  of  philosophizing  does  not  exercise  a  whole- 
some influence  on  the  young  generation.  If  Professor 
James  were  right  philosophy  as  a  science  would  not  and 
should  not  exist,  for  all  that  were  left  of  philosophy  would 
be  subjectivism,  which  means  an  expression  of  our  attitude 
towards  the  world.  There  would  be  as  many  philosophies 
as  there  are  personal  idiosyncrasies,  and  even  every  indi- 
vidual would  not  always  remain  the  same  but  have  dif- 
ferent moods.  We  would  all  be  pragmatists,  and  we 
would  all  exercise  the  utmost  mutual  tolerance,  for  we 
would  grant  the  privilege  to  every  one  to  regard  his 
thoughts  as  true, — true  to  him  and  true  at  least  at  the 
time.  We  would  draw  the  line  only  when  we  meet  with 
people  who  have  the  impudence  to  believe  in  the  objec- 
tivity, the  permanence,  the  reliability  of  their  truth,  and 
demand  consistency  in  all  statements  of  truth.  In  other 
words,  the  sentimental  and  the  subjective  would  be  su- 
preme, while  an  objective  knowledge  of  truth  would  be- 
come a  matter  of  indifference. 

Professor  James  was  a  fascinating  personality,  original 
and  interesting  in  his  very  vagaries,  genial  and  ingenious, 
versatile  and  learned.  He  was  not  scientific  in  his  habits 
of  thought,  nor  was  he  critical,  and  I  have  the  impression 
that  he  cherished  a  dislike  for  science.  Exactness  of 


PRAGMATISM.  43 

method  seems  to  have  hampered  his  mind  and  naturally 
appeared  to  him  as  pedantry.  He  loved  to  indulge  in  the 
chiaroscuro  of  vague  possibilities,  and  so  he  showed  a  han- 
kering for  the  mysteries  of  psychic  phenomena,  whether 
due  to  telepathy  or  spirit  communication,  as  evidenced  in 
the  case  of  Mrs.  Piper.  He  would  resent  to  have  his 
thoughts  restrained  by  the  balance  wheel  of  critique.  He 
seemed  to  enjoy  being  freely  moved  by  the  spirit.  In  a 
word,  his  temper  was  not  scientific  but  that  of  a  poet  or 
prophet.  He  loved  to  be  guided  by  inspiration.  Being  in- 
spired, he  was  himself  inspiring.  Hence  his  unusual  mag- 
netism, and  hence  also  the  success  of  a  philosophy  which 
he  had  made  his  own. 

In  the  philosophy  of  a  man  like  William  James  the 
personal  equation  is  the  most  important  item,  and  he  judged 
science  and  the  scientific  labors  of  others  after  his  own 
mode  of  thought.  He  did  not  try  to  eliminate  the  factor 
of  his  idiosyncrasies,  and  so  he  assumed  that  that  is  the 
normal  condition  of  all  thinkers.  This  is  evidenced  in  his 
book  entitled  The  Will  to  Believe.  This  attitude  is  desi- 
rable in  a  poet,  but  not  in  a  philosopher;  it  is  good  in 
belles  lettres  but  not  in  science;  and  no  harm  would  be 
done  if  his  pragmatism  were  received  simply  as  an  artistic 
movement  that  has  a  purely  esthetical  significance  but 
should  not  be  taken  seriously.  Pragmatism  comes  with 
the  pretense  of  being  taken  seriously,  and  it  sweeps  over 
the  country  with  the  power  of  a  fashionable  fad.  It  claims 
that  now  at  last  we  have  a  philosophy  that  reconciles  all 
the  contradictory  religions  and  philosophies,  that  redeems 
the  world  from  the  tyranny  of  definite  doctrines,  and  pro- 
claims a  new  view  of  truth,  which  is  no  longer  final,  rigid 
and  stable  but  plastic  and  may  suit  anybody  in  any  emer- 
gency. 

Pragmatism  insists  upon  an  important  truth — a  truth 
which  is  so  obvious  that  it  is  almost  a  matter  of  course; 


44  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

but  it  emphasizes  it  so  onesidedly  that  it  overlooks  a  more 
important  truth  and  thereby  its  very  conception  of  truth 
becomes  warped.  However,  in  this  way  pragmatism  ac- 
quires the  semblance  of  originality,  of  something  new  and 
unheard  of,  while  in  fact  it  is  only  a  modernized  redaction 
of  the  ancient  philosophy  of  the  sophists  and  of  their  prin- 
ciple, 

TTdvTUV  fJLtTpOV  av0/3ft>7TOg, 

which  also  is  true  in  a  certain  sense  but  becomes  a  fallacy 
if  the  onesidedness  of  the  principle  is  lost  sight  of. 

Pragmatism  has  appeared  cometlike  on  our  intellectual 
horizon.  It  flashed  up  with  a  sudden  fluorescence  like  a 
luminous  fog  which  through  the  extent  of  its  broad  sweep 
threatens  to  outshine  the  old  stars  of  a  steadier  light.  The 
nucleus  of  the  comet  is  Professor  James,  brilliant  but 
erratic;  and  he  is  attended  by  a  tail  of  many  admirers 
and  imitators,  all  aglow  with  the  stir  of  their  master's 
enthusiasm,  and  the  world  stands  open-eyed  at  the  un- 
precedented phenomenon. 

Professor  James  prophesies: 

"The  center  of  gravity  of  philosophy  must  therefore  alter  its 
place 

"It  will  be  an  alteration  in  'the  seat  of  authority'  that  reminds 
one  almost  of  the  Protestant  Reformation.  And  as,  to  Papal  minds, 
Protestantism  has  often  seemed  a  mere  mess  of  anarchy  and  con- 
fusion, such,  no  doubt,  will  pragmatism  often  seem  to  ultra-ration- 
alist minds  in  philosophy.  It  will  seem  so  much  sheer  trash,  philo- 
sophically." 

We  answer  with  Professor  James  who  continues, 
"But  life  wags  on." 

Cometlike  pragmatism  has  appeared,  and  we  venture 
to  predict  that  cometlike  it  will  fade  again  after  a  while. 

Personally  I  have  a  decided  liking  for  Professor  James, 
and  I  am  sure  that  in  expressing  it  I  voice  the  opinion  of 


PRAGMATISM.  45 

many.  I  met  him  occasionally  and  always  felt  the  sym- 
pathetic charm  of  his  personality.  I  do  not  begrudge  him 
the  brilliant  success  of  his  life  and  the  honor  of  his  merited 
renown.  I  rejoice  that  to  the  end  of  his  life  he  remained 
buoyant  of  spirit  and  hope  that  in  the  history  of  philos- 
ophy his  significance  will  not  be  underrated.  But  for  all 
that  I  can  not  agree  with  or  accept  the  philosophy  of  the 
great  Harvard  Professor,  and  I  go  so  far  as  to  look  upon 
its  wide  acceptance  as  a  symptom  of  the  immaturity  and 
naivete  that  obtains  sometimes  even  in  the  professional 
circles  of  our  universities. 

With  all  due  respect  for  Professor  James,  for  whose 
extraordinary  and  fine  personality  I  cherish  an  unbounded 
admiration,  I  must  confess  that  I  would  deem  it  a  mis- 
fortune if  his  philosophy  would  ever  exercise  a  determin- 
ing and  permanent  influence  upon  the  national  life  of  our 
country. 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PERSONAL  EQUATION.* 

THE  IMPORTANCE  OF  PERSONAL  EQUATION. 

PRAGMATISM  may  be  characterized  as  a  philosophy 
which  insists  upon  the  significance  of  the  personal 
equation  in  thinking.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the  theory 
works  well  in  explaining  how  certain  thinkers  arrive  at 
definite  results.  It  fails  only — but  in  this  it  fails  most  sig- 
nificantly— in  establishing  a  true  philosophy ;  yea  we  might 
say  that  pragmatism  (if  it  is  to  be  taken  seriously)  actually 
denies  the  possibility  of  philosophy  as  an  objective  science. 
It  deems  the  personal  equation  to  be  the  essential  feature 
of  all  philosophies,  whereby  philosophy  changes  to  a  mere 
expression  of  temperament,  of  mood,  subjective  disposi- 
tion or  the  like ;  in  this  case  philosophy  ought  to  be  classed 
with  belles  lettres  and  be  judged  as  poetry.  This  is  the 
opinion  expressed  in  the  preceding  chapter,  and  we  are 
glad  to  notice  that  Prof.  Edwin  Tausch  at  the  end  of  his 
essay  on  "William  James  the  Pragmatist"  (Monist,  XIX, 
i  ff.),  expresses  a  similar  verdict. 

It  is  true  enough  that  the  personal  equation  is  an  im- 
portant element  in  all  mental  activity ;  even  the  most  mech- 
anical transactions  of  observers  exhibit  a  certain  regularity 
of  definite  fluctuations  due  to  the  makeup  of  the  observer's 
mental  organism.  When  the  astronomer  makes  his  ob- 
servations he  discovers  that  they  are  vitiated  by  certain  ir- 
regularities which  in  the  same  person  keep  within  certain 

*  Republished  from  The  Monist,  Jan.,  1909. 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PERSONAL  EQUATION.  47 

boundaries.  They  are  due  to  the  limit  of  exactness  within 
which  the  observer's  nervous  system,  the  eye,  the  ear  and 
the  hand,  perform  their  functions.  The  personal  equation 
is  a  factor  which  has  to  be  taken  into  consideration.  Dur- 
ing the  development  of  science  it  has  been  more  and  more 
reduced,  but  it  appears  that  it  can  never  be  absolutely  ob- 
literated, because  organisms  as  well  as  machines  are  never 
absolutely  perfect  but  work  with  accuracy  only  according 
to  the  nicety  of  their  adjustment. 

The  factor  of  the  personal  equation  is  less  important 
where  the  facts  are  plain  and  where  the  observations  con- 
sist (as,  e.  g.,  in  astronomy)  of  mere  measuring  or  count- 
ing, but  it  grows  with  the  complication  of  the  problem. 

In  the  domain  of  philosophy,  religion,  ethics,  sociology, 
political  economy,  and  generally  in  the  interpretation  of  all 
spiritual  aspirations  of  man,  more  personal  interests  are 
at  stake  than  in  astronomy;  and  since  a  general  belief  in 
a  certain  doctrine  is  an  important  factor  in  actual  life, 
man's  judgment  is  much  more  easily  influenced  by  his 
desires  than  in  natural  sciences.  Hence  a  widened  scope 
of  the  personal  equation.  In  political  economy  the  per- 
sonal equation  asserts  itself  so  vigorously  that  it  tries  to 
overrule  the  facts  and  is  usually  in  readiness  to  twist  them 
to  suit  its  own  convenience.  We  know  but  too  well  that 
business  interests,  not  scientific  arguments,  are  the  deci- 
sive factors  that  shape  man's  views  concerning  the  tariff, 
and  conditions  are  similar  when  our  favorite  ideals  are 
under  discussion,  our  notions  of  God,  the  soul,  of  immor- 
tality and  ethics. 

Men  who  allow  their  views  in  politics  to  be  shaped  by 
private  interests  lack  breadth  of  mind  and  fairness  towards 
others,  while  sentimentalists  who  are  incapable  of  logical 
reasoning  whenever  their  feelings  are  engaged  are  patho- 
logical. It  is  true  that  very  few  people  can  boast  of  a 
perfect  mental  health,  but  we  need  not  for  that  reason  sur- 


48  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

render  our  aspiration  for  objectivity  in  thought  and  leave 
the  decision  as  to  what  should  be  recognized  as  truth  to 
the  prejudices  of  subjective  preferences. 

PERSONAL  EQUATION  A  FAULT. 

The  mistake  of  the  pragmatist  consists  in  regarding  the 
part  which  the  personal  equation  plays  as  the  essential 
feature  of  cognition.  What  is  a  mere  shortcoming  of 
thought  is  raised  to  the  dignity  of  the  main  principle.  In 
the  pre-scientific  age  almost  all  practical  problems  of  life 
were  settled  more  in  accord  with  the  dictates  of  the  will 
than  of  the  intellect.  Nevertheless  the  intellect  was  not  in- 
active. The  intellect  has  gradually  asserted  itself  more  and 
more  and  from  the  domain  of  the  will  it  has  wrested  the 
formulation  of  one  doctrine  after  another.  Sometimes  it 
upset  old  cherished  errors,  and  sometimes  it  modified  the 
traditional  view  by  adapting  it  to  new  conditions. 

During  the  present  age  the  influence  of  science  on  re- 
ligion has  grown  more  and  more  and  the  will  to  believe 
has  become  less  and  less  the  ultimate  determinant  of  re- 
ligious convictions.  We  are  fully  convinced  that  there  are 
not  two  domains  of  truth,  one  the  noetic,  the  other  the 
teleological  or  spiritual.  The  so-called  spiritual  sciences, 
psychology,  the  history  of  religion,  philosophy,  ethics,  are 
based  on  a  condition  of  objective  facts  just  as  much  as  is 
the  knowledge  of  the  purely  mechanical  processes  of  na- 
ture. There  is  only  this  difference,  that  men  of  a  senti- 
mental temperament  are  more  easily  influenced  in  their 
judgments  in  the  so-called  spiritual  domain  of  the  sciences, 
philosophy,  psychology,  ethics,  etc.,  while  the  scope  for 
difference  in  the  domain  of  the  intellectual  truth,  logic, 
physics,  chemistry,  astronomy,  etc.,  is  scarcely  any  longer 
possible. 

To  the  pre-scientific  man  conviction  is  truth,  and  the 
intensity  of  his  conviction  is  naively  accepted  as  the  meas- 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PERSONAL  EQUATION.  49 

ure  of  the  reliability  of  truth.  The  pragmatist  is  really 
naive  enough  to  continue,  or  rather  to  fall  back  upon,  this 
pre-scientific  stage  of  thought.  So  he  looks  upon  science 
as  an  assumption  and  has  no  use  for  the  work  of  those 
philosophers  who  have  laid  a  foundation  for  philosophy  as 
an  objective  science.  In  this  sense  pragmatists  declare 
Kant  to  be  antiquated,  ein  iiberwundener  Standpunkt. 

Think  what  would  become  of  the  reliability  of  astron- 
omy if  we  had  to  look  upon  the  theories  of  Copernicus, 
Kepler  and  Newton  as  the  products  of  personal  equations 
simply  because  an  element  of  personal  equation  is  to  be 
taken  into  account  in  the  astronomical  calculations. 

Pragmatism  has  taken  a  strong  hold  upon  the  present 
generation,  but  it  remains  to  be  hoped  that  this  is  more  due 
to  the  attractive  personality  of  Professor  James  than  to  any 
intrinsic  power  in  its  leading  ideas.  If  pragmatism  were 
right  the  only  scientific  treatment  of  a  philosophy  would 
be  the  one  which  Professor  Tausch  administers  to  Pro- 
fessor James.  He  abstains  from  critically  investigating 
the  latter's  views  but  analyzes  his  doctrines  and  explains 
them  in  terms  of  genetic  psychology.  It  looks  more  like 
a  physician's  diagnosis  than  a  philosophical  inquiry,  the 
more  so  when  we  notice  that  even  in  his  methods  Professor 
Tausch  is  inclined  to  imitate  Dr.  Morton  Prince  when  he 
deals  with  disintegrated  personalities.  (Monist,  XIX,  i.) 

THE  ELIMINATION  OF  THE  SUBJECTIVE  ELEMENT. 

I  agree  with  Professor  James  in  the  recognition  of  the 
personal  element  that  enters  into  the  makeup  of  our  philos- 
ophies, but  while  I  propose  to  eliminate  it  and  build  upon 
the  assured  conclusions  of  our  thought  a  philosophy  of 
objective  significance,  he,  being  a  man  of  strong  sentiment, 
is  so  overwhelmed  by  the  paramount  part  which  the  per- 
sonal equation  plays  that  he  proclaims  a  doctrine  called 


5O  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

pragmatism  which  however  would  be  more  correctly  de- 
scribed as  a  philosophy  of  personal  equation. 

It  is  true  that  in  philosophy,  and  in  still  higher  degree  in 
religion,  it  is  very  difficult  for  any  man  to  discriminate  be- 
tween objectively  assured  arguments  and  his  own  personal 
equation,  nevertheless  it  is  not  impossible  to  do  so,  and  we 
take  the  progress  of  science,  especially  the  obvious  influence 
of  science  upon  religion,  as  an  evidence  of  our  statement. 
We  grant  further  that  those  philosophers  in  whom  the 
personal  equation  is  greatest,  are  most  emphatic  in  the 
defence  of  their  very  errors,  for  when  men  of  intense  con- 
victions are  unable  to  prove  their  belief,  they  make  up  for 
the  lack  of  logic  by  a  display  of  the  vigor  of  their  faith.  This 
is  but  natural  and  Professor  James  goes  too  far  when  he 
accuses  philosophers  of  dishonesty  declaring  that  they  pass 
over  in  silence  the  most  important  arguments  of  their 
views.  It  is  merely  the  character  of  a  pre-scientific  state 
of  culture. 

When  I  consider  my  own  case,  I  must  grant  that  the 
power  of  sentiment  should  not  be  underrated.  Having 
freqently  been  obliged  to  let  very  intense  convictions  based 
upon  inherited  and  early  acquired  habits  be  overruled  by 
a  calm  consideration  of  the  truth,  I  know  very  wrell  that 
the  personal  equation  exists,  but  I  know  also  that  it  can  be 
reduced  to  considerably  lower  terms,  and  I  deem  it  the 
duty  of  every  thinker  to  eliminate  as  much  as  possible  in 
his  search  for  truth  the  vitiating  factor  of  his  personal 
preferences. 

But  is  not  perhaps  the  entire  fabric  of  all  philosophies 
made  up  of  strands  that  can  be  resolved  into  the  fibers  of 
our  personal  equation?  The  thoughts  of  many  people  are 
indeed  so  interlaced  with  their  sentimental  natures  that  if 
we  consider  their  cases  individually  it  would  seem  hopeless 
to  let  them  establish  a  conception  of  the  universe  that  would 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PERSONAL  EQUATION.  51 

possess  any  objective  reliability.  Nevertheless  there  are 
scientific  minds  who  can  formulate  statements  with  ob- 
jective exactness.  The  multitudes  of  people  are  unscien- 
tific, but  science  is  not  for  that  reason  impossible. 

THE  OBJECTIVITY  OF  SCIENCE. 

Science  stands  and  falls  with  the  objectivity  of  truth. 
If  truth  were  mere  opinion,  if  my  truth  might  be  different 
from  your  truth,  even  though  all  errors  due  to  a  difference 
of  terminology  were  excluded,  if  both  our  truths  in  spite 
of  being  contradictory  might  be  truths,  truth  would  be 
subjective.  It  would  appear  different  in  different  minds, 
and  even  in  the  same  mind  truth  would  be  subject  to  change. 
Objective  truth  would  be  impossible. 

If  objective  truth  does  not  exist,  science  is  a  chimera, 
and  all  our  scientific  knowledge  would  have  to  be  regarded 
as  mere  assumption.  Inventions  made  through  the  appli- 
cation of  a  scientific  insight  into  nature  would  in  that  case 
be  mere  happy  coincidences.  Is  that  probable? 

Science  is  not  only  possible,  science  is  a  fact.  And  if 
it  be  granted  that  science  is  a  fact,  we  can  make  bold  to 
say  that  scientific  method  must  be  reliable.  Here  is  the 
basis  of  the  philosophy  of  science. 

The  philosophy  of  science  is  first  the  science  of  science, 
or  methodology;  then- the  synthesis  of  all  the  sciences  in 
their  unison,  or  ontology,  including  their  systematized  re- 
sult, or  a  scientific  world-conception ;  and  thirdly  the  appli 
cation  of  this  world-conception  to  practical  life;  we  may 
call  it  pragmatology  which  includes  ethics,  sociology,  the 
crafts,  inventions,  art,  etc.  This  domain  of  philosophy 
is  as  solid  ground  as  any  field  of  the  natural  sciences  and 
the  personal  equation  of  the  philosopher,  far  from  being 
the  dominant  factor,  is  here  as  in  astronomical  calculations 
only  a  source  of  error. 


52  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

THE  SUPREMACY  OF  THE  INTELLECT. 

A  philosopher's  personal  equation  lies  mostly  in  his 
sentiments  and  it  would  seem  that  a  rigorously  scientific 
thought  would  leave  no  room  for  sentiment,  but  such  is 
not,  or  at  any  rate  need  not  be,  the  case.  Science  does  not 
antagonize  sentiment ;  it  would  only  protest  that  sentiment 
should  perform  the  function  of  thought.  Let  the  mind  think 
and  the  heart  feel,  but  when  the  heart  governs  the  head, 
the  mentality  of  man  is  apt  to  lose  its  strength. 

I  grant  most  emphatically  that  the  noetic  function  of 
man's  soul  is  not  the  only  feature  that  needs  cultivation; 
the  domain  of  sentiment  and  will  with  all  that  they  imply, 
enthusiasm,  sympathy,  emotional  yearnings,  devotion,  re- 
ligion, the  love  of  art,  music,  etc.,  have  their  due  place  in 
our  lives  and  should  not  be  neglected.  But  the  intellect 
should  after  all  remain  the  supreme  court  of  all  final  de- 
cisions. The  intellect  should  not  be  degraded  into  an  an- 
cilla  voluntatis,  a  handmaid  of  either  the  will  or  sentiment, 
but  should  be  as  independent  as  is  the  judiciary  in  a  well- 
governed  state. 

Sentiment,  religion  and  artistic  tastes  are  indispensable 
attainments,  but  even  these  need  the  guiding  hand  of  in- 
tellectual comprehension.  The  intellect  is  the  organ  of  rea- 
son, of  logic,  of  inquiry,  of  grasping  the  truth,  of  com- 
prehending the  objective  order  of  the  world,  of  solving  the 
problems  of  existence,  and  of  a  redemption  from  the  many 
unnecessary  evils  of  life.  The  intellect  is  truly  the  organ 
in  which  God,  the  authority  of  moral  conduct,  the  standard 
of  truth,  the  norm  of  the  laws  of  nature,  reveals  himself. 
The  intellect  distinguishes  humanity  from  the  brute  crea- 
tion, for  the  beast  is  possessed  of  sentiment  and  joy  of  life 
(sometimes  even  of  noble  sentiments)  just  as  much  as  man, 
and  the  intellect  alone  can  pave  the  way  of  progress.  Even 
in  the  field  of  sentiment  and  ethics,  it  is  the  guidance  of  the 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PERSONAL  EQUATION.  53 

intellect  that  can  improve  the  will  and  ennoble  man's  feel- 
ings and  purify  his  religion.  Neglect  to  cultivate  the  in- 
tellect and  man  will  return  to  the  savage  state. 

In  the  etymological  meaning  of  the  term  the  philosophy 
of  science  is  the  true  pragmatism.  It  is  pragmatic,  if  prag- 
matism means  that  the  truth  must  be  tested  by  practical 
experience.  But  pragmatism  as  propounded  by  Professor 
James  antagonizes  rationalism,  monism  and  the  philosophy 
of  science. 

Being  opposed  to  theory,  to  the  principle  of  consistency, 
to  monism  and  to  any  unity  or  systematization,  pragmatism 
drifts  into  pluralism  as  surely  as  a  disintegrated  soul  will 
develop  a  multiple  personality.  The  result  will  be  a  real- 
ism, a  clinging  to  the  facts — not  objectively  assured  facts, 
but  facts  of  an  uncritical  experience,  facts,  as  mirrored  in 
a  purely  subjective  interpretation  of  sentiment.  Such  is 
pragmatism,  the  philosophy  of  personal  equation ! 

INCONSISTENCY  IN  DEFINITION. 

Professor  James  in  answer  to  his  critics  has  selected 
M.  Marcel  Hebert1  for  his  target.  It  seems  impossible  to 
answer  all  of  them,  they  are  too  many,  and  Professor  James 
takes  his  French  antagonist  as  a  typical  instance  of  one  who 
suffers  from  "the  usual  fatal  misapprehension"  of  the  crit- 
ics of  pragmatism.  It  is  strange  that  all  the  critics  of  Pro- 
fessor James  agree  in  misinterpreting  his  conception  of 
truth.  Professor  James  says: 

"How  comes  it,  then,  that  our  critics  so  uniformly  accuse  us  of 
subjectivism,  of  denying  the  reality's  existence?  It  comes,  I  think, 
from  the  necessary  predominance  of  subjective  language  in  our  anal- 
ysis." 

In  the  detailed    critique    given    in  the  first  essay,  I 

*In  comment  on  Professor  James's  review  of  Marcel  Hebert' s  book,  Le 
pragmaiisme  et  ses  diverses  formes  anglo-americaines.  Reviewed  in  The 
Journal  of  Philosophy,  Psychology  and  Scientific  Methods,  Dec.  3,  1908. 


54  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

have  anticipated  Professor  James's  complaint  and  have 
therefore  avoided  recapitulating  his  views,  but  always 
quoted  him  in  his  ipsissima  verba,  and  if  words  mean 
what  they  say,  Professor  James  is  decidedly  to  be  blamed 
if  he  has  been  uniformly  misunderstood.  I  request  our 
readers  to  go  over  the  definitions  given  by  Professor 
James  himself,  and  look  them  up  either  in  my  quotations 
or,  better  still,  in  his  own  book,  Pragmatism.  He  says: 

"The  true  is  the  name  of  whatever  proves  itself  to  be  gooa  in 
the  way  of  belief,  and  good,  too,  for  definite,  assignable  reasons." 
— Pragm.  p.  76. 

"  'What  would  be  better  for  us  to  believe' !  This  sounds  very 
like  a  definition  of  truth." — Pragm.,  p.  77. 

"You  can  say  of  it  then  either  that  'it  is  useful  because  it  is 
true'  or  that  'it  is  true  because  it  is  useful.'  " — Pragm.,  p.  204. 

"A  new  opinion  counts  as  'true'  just  in  proportion  as  it  gratifies 
the  individual's  desire  to  assimilate  the  novel  in  his  experience  to 
his  beliefs  in  stock." — Pragm.,  p.  201. 

"An  idea  is  'true'  so  long  as  to  believe  it  is  profitable  to  our 
lives."— Pragm.,  p.  75. 

I  could  continue  quotations  from  all  the  chapters  of 
Professor  James  to  prove  that  the  language  he  uses  must 
actually  induce  his  critics  to  believe  that  his  conception 
of  truth  is  subjective.  But,  in  his  reply  to  Professor  He- 
bert  he  says: 

"This  subjectivist  interpretation  of  our  position  seems  to  follow 
from  my  having  happened  to  write  (without  supposing  it  necessary 
to  explain  that  I  was  treating  of  cognition  solely  on  its  subjective 
side)  that  in  the  long  run  the  true  is  the  expedient  in  the  way  of 
our  thinking  much  as  the  good  is  the  expedient  in  the  way  of 
our  behaviour !  Having  previously  written  that  truth  means  'agree- 
ment with  reality,'  and  insisted  that  the  chief  part  of  the  expediency 
of  any  one  opinion  is  its  agreement  with  the  rest  of  acknowledged 
truth,  I  apprehended  no  exclusively  snbjectivistic  reading  of  my 
meaning." 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PERSONAL  EQUATION.  55 

Judging  from  this  explanation  of  Professor  James, 
pragmatism  agrees  after  all  with  the  time-worn  definition 
of  truth  as  an  idea  in  agreement  with  reality.  And  yet 
Professor  James  has  declared  again  and  again  that  prag- 
matism proposes  a  new  definition  of  truth.  Yea  he  denies 
that  there  is  any  explanation  of  truth  except  in  prag- 
matism. He  says  in  the  present  review : 

"Ours  is  the  only  articulate  attempt  in  the  field  to  say  positively 
what  truth  actually  consists  of." 

He  italicizes  "consists  of"  to  distinguish  it  from  his 
former  definition  of  truth  as  "agreement  with  reality." 
If  we  trust  him,  no  one  before  the  appearance  of  prag- 
matism had  ever  a  clear  idea  of  what  is  meant  by  truth. 

TRUTH  AS  AN  IDEA  THAT  WORKS  SATISFACTORILY. 

Professor  James  rebukes  his  "denouncers"  severely  and 
censures  their  conception  of  truth  as  too  rigid,  too  stable, 
too  absolute.  He  says: 

"For  them,  when  an  idea  is  true,  it  is  true,  and  there  the  matter 
terminates,  the  word  'true'  being  indefinable.  The  relation  of  the 
true  idea  to  its  object,  being,  as  they  think,  unique,  it  can  be  ex- 
pressed in  terms  of  nothing  else,  and  needs  only  to  be  named  for 
any  one  to  recognize  and  understand  it.  Moreover  it  is  invariable 
and  universal,  the  same  in  every  single  instance  of  truth,  however 
diverse  the  ideas,  the  realities,  and  the  other  relations  between  them 
may  be." 

The  denouncers  of  Professor  James  must  have  strange 
ideas  of  truth,  for  to  them,  even  if  "the  ideas,  realities  and 
other  relations"  are  different,  truth  remains  the  same  "in- 
variable and  universal."  I  am  unfortunate  enough  never  to 
have  seen  such  use  of  the  word  truth,  but  let  us  hear  what 
the  truth  "consists  of"  according  to  Professor  James.  He 
continues : 


56  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

"Our  pragmatist  view,  on  the  contrary,  is  that  the  truth-relation 
is  a  definitely  experienceable  relation,  and  therefore  describable  as 
well  as  namable ;  that  it  is  not  unique  in  kind,  and  neither  invariable 
nor  universal.  The  relation  to  its  object  that  makes  an  idea  true 
in  any  given  instance,  is,  we  say,  embodied  in  intermediate  details 
of  reality  which  lead  towards  the  object,  which  vary  in  every  instance, 
and  which  in  every  instance  can  be  concretely  traced.  The  chain  of 
workings  which  an  opinion  sets  up  is  the  opinion's  truth,  falsehood, 
or  irrelevancy,  as  the  case  may  be.  Every  idea  that  a  man  has  works 
some  consequences  in  him,  in  the  shape  either  of  bodily  actions  or 
of  other  ideas.  Through  these  consequences  the  man's  relations  to 
surrounding  realities  are  modified.  He  is  carried  nearer  to  some  of 
them  and  farther  from  others,  and  gets  now  the  feeling  that  the 
idea  has  worked  satisfactorily,  now  that  it  has  not.  The  idea  has 
put  him  into  touch  with  something  that  fulfils  its  intent,  or  it  has 
not." 

I  have  quoted  this  passage  in  full  lest  there  be  any  mis- 
understanding, and  here  Professor  James  says  explicitly, 
"The  chain  of  workings  the  opinion  sets  up  is  the  opinion's 
truth,  falsehood,  or  irrelevancy."  And  then  the  man  "gets 
now  the  feeling  that  the  idea  has  worked  satisfactorily, 
now  that  it  has  not." 

Here  we  have  two  definitions  of  truth  side  by  side,  one 
is  agreement  with  reality,  the  other,  specifically  called  "what 
truth  actually  consists  of,"  is  "the  chain  of  workings 
which  an  opinion  sets  up."  It  must  be  noticed  that  an 
opinion  is  not  truth  and  that  the  application  of  an  opinion 
to  practical  life  is  still  less  the  truth,  whether  or  not  it 
works  satisfactorily. 

In  fact  sometimes  a  positive  lie  works  decidedly  satis- 
factorily. 

A  LIE  THAT  WORKS  SATISFACTORILY. 

Ideas  are  potent  factors.  If  certain  errors  are  helpful 
to  me  it  may  be  to  my  own  profit  to  spread  them  and  make 
people  believe  in  them.  When  by  special  couriers  Roth- 
schild learned  of  Napoleon's  defeat  at  Waterloo  in  1815, 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PERSONAL  EQUATION.  57 

he  spread  the  report  through  his  agents  that  the  French 
had  gained  a  decisive  victory  over  the  allied  troops.  His 
own  bank  began  ostentatiously  to  buy  French  and  sell 
Prussian  consols,  but  secretly  was  performing  the  reverse 
transactions  to  a  much  greater  extent.  He  succeeded  in 
spreading  the  untruth  and  it  worked  satisfactorily  and 
yet  we  cannot  say  that  thereby  it  became  a  truth.  Un- 
doubtedly "the  idea  had  put  them  into  touch  with  some- 
thing that  fulfilled  its  intent."  There  was  a  chain  of  work- 
ings set  up,  and  to  the  man  who  pressed  the  button  it 
worked  as  calculated. 

The  idea  and  the  action  which  it  starts  (at  least  so  it 
appears  to  me)  are  two  different  things  which  in  all  circum- 
stances have  to  be  kept  asunder.  I  know  very  well  that 
Professor  James  has  in  mind  other  chains  of  workings, 
but  any  impartial  reader  will  grant — perhaps  he  himself 
will  concede — that  he  uses  his  words  very  indiscriminately 
and  in  his  definition  he  follows  the  impulse  of  the  moment. 

TRUTH  AS  OBJECTS  BELIEVED  IN. 

Some  of  Professor  James's  critics  seem  to  have  confused 
the  ideas  truth  and  reality,  and  when  noticing  the  sub- 
jective trend  in  his  definition  of  truth  have  thought  that 
he  had  denied  the  existence  of  reality  outside.  He  ex- 
pressly states  that  he  believes  in  realities  and  so  there 
need  be  no  quarrel  about  it,  although  to  him  realities  are 
only  "objects  believed  in."  Professor  James  says: 

"Since  the  only  realities  we  can  talk  about  are  such  objects- 
believed-in,  the  pragmatist,  whenever  he  says  'reality,'  means  in  the 
first  instance  what  may  count  for  the  man  himself  as  a  reality,  what 
he  believes  at  the  moment  to  be  such." 

According  to  this  definition,  the  vision  of  a  dreamer 
if  it  is  only  believed  in,  is  a  reality, — of  course  we  must 
add,  "to  him,"  and  "at  the  moment."  It  may  not  be  a 
reality  to  others  or  to  him  at  another  time.  Under  these 


58  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

circumstances  had  we  not  better  avoid  the  phrase  "reality 
to  him"  and  offer  in  its  stead  a  definition  of  reality  without 
any  qualification,  and  in  contrast  to  such  realities  as  are 
mere  objects  believed  in? 

THE  FIXATION  OF  BELIEF. 

Professor  James  is  a  pluralist,  and  everywhere  he  sees 
the  many  where  scientific  method  requires  us  to  single 
out  those  features  which  are  typical  and  universal.  He 
further  demands  the  verification  of  truth  by  the  senses, 
the  reality  must  be  "felt"  to  be  verified. 

Mr.  Charles  S.  Peirce  showed  in  articles  published 
about  thirty  years  ago,  that  there  is  a  certain  stage  in  man's 
development  in  which  he  has  not  yet  an  adequate  concep- 
tion of  truth,  nor  does  he  care  to  discover  the  truth.  What 
he  cares  for  is  merely  a  settlement  of  doubt.  Doubt  is  a 
state  of  disturbed  equilibrium  which  causes  uneasiness. 
Doubt  must  be  removed  in  one  way  or  another  and  Mr. 
Peirce  calls  the  settlement  of  doubt  very  appropriately, 
"the  fixation  of  belief."  Professor  James  has  confessed 
that  this  same  article  of  Mr.  Peirce  has  influenced  him  in 
the  formation  of  his  philosophy  of  pragmatism,  and  we 
cannot  help  thinking  that  Professor  James  calls  truth  what 
in  Mr.  Peirce's  language  is  merely  "the  fixation  of  belief." 
Lest  we  are  accused  of  misrepresenting  Professor  James's 
position  we  will  without  any  further  comments  quote  the 
following  passage  in  which  he  answers  his  critics: 

"Sometimes  the  reality  is  a  concrete  sensible  presence.  The  idea, 
for  example,  may  be  that  a  certain  door  opens  into  a  room  where 
a  glass  of  beer  may  be  bought.  If  opening  the  door  leads  to  the 
actual  sight  and  taste  of  the  beer,  the  man  calls  the  idea  true.  Or 
his  idea  may  be  that  of  an  abstract  relation,  say  of  that  between  the 
sides  and  the  hypothenuse  of  a  triangle,  such  a  relation  being,  of 
course,  a  reality  quite  as  much  as  a  glass  of  beer  is.  If  the  thought 
of  such  a  relation  leads  him  to  draw  auxiliary  lines  and  to  compare 
the  figures  they  make,  he  may  at  last,  perceiving  one  equality  after 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PERSONAL  EQUATION.  59 

another,  see  the  relation  thought  of,  by  a  vision  quite  as  particular 
and  direct  as  was  the  taste  of  the  beer.  If  he  does  so,  he  calls  that 
idea,  also,  true.  His  idea  has,  in  each  case,  brought  him  into  closer 
touch  with  a  reality  felt  at  the  moment  to  verify  just  that  idea.  Each 
reality  verifies  and  validates  its  own  idea  exclusively ;  and  in  each 
case  the  verification  consists  in  the  satisfactorily-ending  conse- 
quences, mental  or  physical,  which  the  idea  was  able  to  set  up.  These 
'workings'  differ  in  every  single  instance,  they  never  transcend  ex- 
perience, they  consist  of  particulars,  mental  or  sensible,  and  they 
admit  of  concrete  description  in  every  individual  case.  Pragmatists 
are  unable  to  see  what  you  can  possibly  mean  by  calling  an  idea  true, 
unless  you  mean  that  between  it  as  a  terminus  a  quo  in  some  one's 
mind  and  some  particular  reality  as  a  terminus  ad  quern,  such  con- 
crete workings  do  or  may  intervene.  Their  direction  constitutes  the 
idea's  reference  to  that  reality,  their  satisfactoriness  constitutes  its 
adaptation  thereto,  and  the  two  things  together  constitute  the  'truth' 
of  the  idea  for  its  possessor.  Without  such  intermediating  portions 
of  concretely  real  experience  the  pragmatist  sees  no  materials  out 
of  which  the  adaptive  relation  called  truth  can  be  built  up." 

Professor  James  speaks  also  of  Professor  Schiller  of 
Oxford  endorsing  his  views.  He  says :  "Schiller's  doctrine 
and  mine  are  identical,  only  our  expositions  follow  different 
directions."  Of  Schiller's  conception  of  truth,  Professor 
James  says: 

"To  be  true,  it  appears,  means,  for  that  individual,  to  work 
satisfactorily  for  him ;  and  the  working  and  the  satisfaction,  since 
they  vary  from  case  to  case,  admit  of  no  universal  description.  What 
works  is  true  and  represents  a  reality,  for  the  individual  for  whom  it 
works.  If  he  is  infallible,  the  reality  is  'really'  there;  if  mistaken 
it  is  not  there,  or  not  there  as  he  thinks  it.  We  all  believe,  when  our 
ideas  work  satisfactorily;  but  we  don't  yet  know  who  of  us  is  in- 
fallible. Schiller,  remaining  with  the  fallible  individual,  and  treating 
only  of  reality-for-him,  seems  to  many  of  his  readers  to  ignore 
reality-in-itself  altogether.  But  that  is  because  he  seeks  only  to  tell 
us  how  truths  are  attained,  not  what  the  content  of  those  truths, 
when  attained,  shall  be.  It  may  be  that  the  truest  of  all  beliefs  shall 
be  that  in  transsubjective  realities.  It  certainly  seems  the  truest,  for 
no  rival  belief  is  as  voluminously  satisfactory,  and  it  is  probably  Dr. 
Schiller's  own  belief ;  but  he  is  not  required,  for  his  immediate  pur- 


6O  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

pose  to  profess  it.    Still  less  is  he  obliged  to  assume  it  in  advance  as 
the  basis  of  his  discussion." 

TRUTH  AS  A  FEELING. 

It  is  astonishing  how  Professor  James  ignores  the  most 
obtrusive  facts  of  the  history  of  philosophy.  To  him  the 
pragmatic  "is  the  only  articulate  attempt  in  the  field  to 
say  positively  what  truth  actually  consists  of,"  and  he  as- 
sumes that  the  opponents  of  pragmatism  never  thought 
about  truth.  In  his  opinion  they  simply  claim  that  "when 
an  idea  is  true,  it  is  true,  and  there  the  matter  terminates." 
And  with  this  blank  in  his  information  concerning  all  that 
has  been  done  in  the  determination  of  the  nature  of  truth, 
he  starts  the  world  over  again  and  repeats  the  errors  of 
the  sophists  which  characterize  the  pre-Socratic  period, 
the  very  beginning  of  the  history  of  philosophy.  Note  at 
the  same  time  in  the  pragmatism  of  Professor  James  the 
exaggerated  significance  of  the  part  which  the  senses  play 
in  the  determination  of  truth.  In  a  passage  just  quoted, 
Professor  James  emphasizes  the  word  "felt"  as  if  a  feeling 
of  fitness  were  the  essential  element  in  the  constitution  of 
truth.  He  describes  the  process  of  discovering  truth  by 
saying  that  "his  idea  has  in  each  case  brought  him  into 
closer  touch  with  a  reality  felt  at  the  moment  to  verify 
just  that  idea."  Note  here  how  he  clings  to  the  particular, 
"in  each  case,"  and  "felt  at  the  moment,"  and  it  must  be 
"just  that  idea."  Nor  is  it  enough  to  use  the  word  "felt" ; 
he  also  speaks  of  "touch."  So  much  is  he  afraid  to  trust 
the  mental  process  which  would  lead  him  to  the  universal. 

Truth  is  not  of  the  senses  but  of  the  mind.  The  senses 
never  produce  either  truth  or  untruth ;  it  is  our  faculty  of 
the  purely  formal  (commonly  called  reason)  that  works 
out  judgments  that  are  either  true  or  untrue,  and  we  verify 
these  judgments  by  exactness  in  the  application  of  logic, 
arithmetic,  geometry,  etc.  The  senses  only  furnish  the 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PERSONAL  EQUATION.  6l 

data ;  and  if  the  senses  are  not  sufficiently  guided  they  yield 
very  unreliable  results,  in  evidence  of  which  we  refer  to 
so-called  sense  illusions. 

To  the  pragmatist,  truth  is  always  particular,  and  in 
the  statement  endorsed  by  Professor  James,  Professor 
Schiller  even  goes  so  far  as  to  say  that  truths  "admit  of 
no  universal  description."  There  are  many  indications 
that  pragmatism  cannot  distinguish  between  facts  and 
truths,  and  this  is  one  of  them.  We  must  remember  that 
a  statement  of  fact  may  be  true,  but  it  is  not  a  truth.  A 
truth  is  always  a  formulation  of  the  essential  features  of 
a  set  of  facts.  Truths  are  not  concrete  realities,  but  ideas 
that  appropriately  describe  certain  characteristics  of  real- 
ities, so  as  to  make  our  anticipations  tally  with  experience 
in  the  past  and  present  and  even  in  the  future.  While 
facts  are  always  particular,  truths  are  always  general; 
facts  are  verified  by  the  senses,  truths  by  the  mind;  facts 
change,  truths  (if  they  were  ever  real  truths  and  not 
errors)  remain  true  forever. 

We  grant  that  the  way  to  truth  is  mostly  by  approxima- 
tion, and  frequently  passes  through  errors.  Yea,  these 
errors  are  sometimes  stoutly  believed  in  with  great  tenac- 
ity and  are  even  forced  upon  unbelievers  by  such  drastic 
arguments  as  dungeon  and  fagots,  but  this  vigor  of  con- 
viction never  changes  them  into  real  truths. 

HOW  A  LIE  DEVELOPS  INTO  A  TRUTH. 

The  most  humorous  critique  of  pragmatism,  which  at 
the  same  time  is  a  truly  scathing  one,  comes  from  the  pen 
of  Mr.  Peter  Finley  Dunne,  the  author  of  the  famous 
Dooley  Monologues.  One  of  these,  entitled  "Mr.  Dooley 
on  Philosophy/'  echoes  the  impressions  which  Professor 
James's  book  makes  upon  the  minds  of  unsophisticated 
readers,  and  we  will  here  quote  the  main  passage.  Mr. 
Dooley  says2: 

'American  Magazine,  March,  1908. 


62  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

"What's  it  all  about?  says  ye.  Faith,  'tis  fine  exercise  f'r  th' 
mind.  It's  like  Turkish  bath.  It  is  good  f'r  th'  Pro-fissor  an'  it  don't 
hurt  th'  victim  much.  Hogan  says  this  here  philosopher  has  some 
fine  idees  about  th'  truth.  I  thought  ivrybody  knew  what  was  th' 
truth  an'  what  wasn't.  It  seemed  aisy  to  me.  Th'  truth  was  some- 
thing I  believed  an'  divvle  th'  bit  I  cared  whether  anny  wan  else 
believed  it  or  not.  'Twudden't  take  me  wan  minyit  to  tell  ye  all 
about  it.  But  ye  ask  th'  pro-fissor  about  it  an'  he  says:  "Th'  truth 
is  something  that  wurruks.  If  it  don't  wurruk  it  ain't  th'  truth. 
A  truth  that  is  lying  off  is  not  half  as  true  as  a  good  wurrukin'  lie. 
Whin  th'  truth  stops  wurrukin'  it's  a  lie,  an'  whin  a  lie  starts  goin', 
it's  th'  truth.  It  is  onforchnit  that  human  nature  is  such  that  it 
overwurruks  th'  truth  to  such  an  extint  that  truth  knocks  off  an' 
says  'twud  rather  starve  thin  go  on  settin'  up  all  night  waitin'  f'r 
people  to  come  home  an'  thin  be  abused  because  it  hasn't  ivrything 
comfortable  f'r  ivrybody.  Thin  is  th'  time  to  call  in  a  few  lies  as 
sthrike  breakers.  They'll  do  well  enough  f'r  awhile.  Th'  rale  test 
iv  truth  is  can  ye  cash  it  in.  F'r  a  gr-reat  manny  cinchries  th' 
wurruld  was  flat.  We  have  th'  best  iv  contimpry  ividince  on  that 
point.  Foolish  people  say  it  was  round  all  th'  time.  I  say  not,  an' 
I  have  th'  most  acc'rate  records  in  me  lib'ry.  Suddenly,  some  time 
ago,  it  become  round.  There  ye  have  th'  idee.  But  th'  rale  test 
iv  a  truth  is  its  cash  value.  What  can  ye  get  on  it?  If  it  ain't  anny 
good  to  ye,  chuck  it  away.  If  it's  something  ye  can't  carry  in  ye'er 
head,  so  far  as  ye  are  concerned,  don't  thry  to  think  about  it.  It 
is  not  th'  truth  onless  ye  can  go  down  with  it  to  th'  exchange  an' 
trade  it  f'r  another  truth,  or  if  ye're  good  at  tradin',  f'r  two  or  three. 
Don't  be  afraid  to  take  a  truth  because  it  looks  suspicyously  new. 
Nearly  all  th'  old  truths  are  bein'  discarded  be  us  profissors  as  too 
large  an'  cumbersome  to  handle.  Don't  refuse  to  accept  a  truth 
because  it  looks  like  a  Mexican  truth  or  because  it  is  made  iv  Bab- 
bit-metal an'  glass.  Ye  may  be  able  to  pass  it  off  on  somebody 
else 

"If  I  had  a  son  wud  I  advise  him  to  take  a  coorse  in  philosophy  ? 
Ye  bet  I  wud.  It  won't  help  him  much  in  getting  a  job  as  a  motor- 
man.  It  wudden't  do  him  much  good  to  presint  a  litter  fr'm  Pro- 
fissor  James  to  the  trainboss  sayin':  'I  can  safely  recommind  th' 
bearer  f'r  any  position  iv  thrust  or  confidence.  He  was  the  bright- 
est philosopher  in  my  class  an'  he  received  hon'rable  mention  f'r 
his  essay  entitled :  "Why  Hegel  Niver  Cashed."  '  But  th'  exercise 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PERSONAL  EQUATION.  63 

wud  be  fine  f'r  his  little  head  an'  wan  iv  th'  best  things  about  a 
college  is  that  ye're  taught  things  there  that  ye  don't  have  to  take 
out  into  th'  worruld  with  ye.  At  th'  end  iv  th'  coorse  th'  philos- 
ophy team  can  safely  go  out  on  th'  campus  an'  burn  their  philosophy 
togs  an'  grajally  acquire  mental  clothes  more  suitable  to  our  rugged 
an'  changeable  intellekchool  climate.  It  don't  take  him  long  to  larn 
that  f'r  wan  truth  that  cashes  the've  got  to  take  a  milyon  on 
credit." 

AN  OLD  TRUTH  CARRIED  TOO  FAR. 

Since  Professor  James  endorses  the  old  definition  of 
truth,  apparently  forgetful  of  other  utterances  he  has  made, 
we  might  come  to  the  conclusion  that  pragmatism  (for- 
merly vaunted  as  a  novel  theory  of  truth)  is  nothing  new 
after  all,  and  that  its  sole  claim  to  originality  consists  in  the 
emphasis  laid  on  the  practical  application  of  truth,  with- 
out which  truth  is  not  yet  truth  were  it  not  for  the  fact  that 
philosophers  and  educators  from  the  time  of  Socrates  to  the 
present  day  have  insisted  on  this  point  almost  ad  nauseam, 
so  as  to  make  the  doctrine  that  truths  must  be  verified  by 
experience  and  applied  to  practical  life,  trite. 

It  appears  that  pragmatism  is  still  in  a  plastic  state, 
its  doctrines  are  not  yet  matured  and  cannot  be  expected 
to  be  consistent ;  they  are  developing  under  our  eyes.  There 
is  reason  to  hope  that  when  it  has  attained  years  of  dis- 
cretion its  conception  of  truth  will  look  very  much  like  that 
of  the  old  philosophers,  now  so  ostentatiously  decried  by 
our  pragmatist  friends. 

We  oppose  pragmatism  as  a  philosophy  and  we  criti- 
cize its  conception  of  truth.  But  for  all  that,  we  find  the 
movement  very  interesting  and  instructive.  If  pragmatism 
would  not  lay  claim  to  being  a  new  philosophy,  but  if  it 
would  merely  be  a  psychological  method  of  determining 
the  establishment  of  truth  in  the  several  philosophies  by 
evaluating  the  purposes  and  tendencies  under  which  a  phi- 
losophy has  been  formed  and  taking  into  consideration  the 


04  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

personal  equation  of  the  several  thinkers,  we  would  recom- 
mend it  as  an  extremely  practical  and  useful  method.  The 
public  at  large  is  too  apt  to  overlook  that  the  purpose  of 
science  is  its  practical  application.  Man  is  not  a  purely 
intellectual  animal.  His  intellect,  including  all  the  truths 
he  can  establish,  serves  the  purpose  of  enhancing  his  life. 
Accordingly  the  most  important  part  of  every  philosophy 
will  always  be  its  pragmatical  aspect,  and  this  is  a  truth 
which  has  been  recognized  since  time  immemorial,  except 
that  now  and  then  it  is  forgotten.  The  easiest  way  to 
reconstruct  the  several  philosophies  of  past  ages  will  be  to 
point  out  the  needs  of  the  generation,  the  duties  with  which 
it  was  confronted,  the  tasks  which  had  to  be  performed, 
and  if  we  bear  these  practical  points  in  mind  we  are  not 
likely  to  misunderstand  if  in  one  period  emphasis  is  placed 
on  one  special  aspect  of  the  truth,  while  at  another  the 
very  opposite  may  come  to  the  fore-ground.  And  this 
is  true  mainly  in  those  branches  of  philosophy  which  are  of 
a  practical  nature,  ethics,  pedagogy,  religion,  the  policy 
of  the  churches,  political  economy,  etc.  Pragmatism  as 
a  philosophy  is  an  evidence  of  this.  In  emphasizing  the 
practical  significance  of  truth,  it  goes  so  far  as  even  to 
deny  the  value  of  theory,  of  consistency,  systematization, 
etc.,  and  when  taken  to  task,  Professor  James  naively  de- 
clares that  the  old  definition  of  truth  has  to  be  taken  for 
granted. 


THE  ROCK  OF  AGES.* 

A  PLURALISTIC  VIEW  OF  SCIENCE. 

'  I  "HE  nature  of  science  is  much  misunderstood  even  by 
J_  scientists  of  rank,  and  as  a  result  theories  such  as 
agnosticism,  pluralism,  pragmatism,  humanism,  etc.,  make 
their  appearance.  The  truth  is  that  the  conception  of 
science  as  a  method,  as  a  systematic  plan  of  investigation, 
as  a  consistent  principle  of  arranging  facts  in  order,  has 
not  as  yet  become  common  property  among  our  main  in- 
vestigators, and  there  is  a  notion  afloat  of  the  haphazard 
character  of  scientific  research. 

Mrs.  Fiske  Warren,  whose  article  "A  Philosophical 
Aspect  of  Science"  appeared  in  The  Monist  of  April,  1910, 
is  an  instance  of  this  tendency.  She  studied  four  years  at 
Oxford,  taking  the  full  philosophical  course  with  teachers 
representing  opposing  schools  of  philosophical  thought. 
She  was  introduced  to  The  Monist  by  Professor  William 
James  who  spoke  of  her  in  the  highest  terms. 

Mrs.  Fiske  Warren's  conception  of  science  is  by  no 
means  isolated.  In  a  lucid  way  she  summarizes  and  ably 
represents  the  view  common  among  many  scientists,  and 
from  this  standpoint  it  almost  appears  a  kindness  toward 
science,  this  inadequate  mode  of  research,  to  look  upon 
its  future  with  indulgence  and  suppress  the  pessimism  of 
despair.  In  spite  of  the  many  drawbacks  of  science,  Mrs. 
Warren  advocates  a  conditional  optimism  which  is  to  com- 
fort us  for  the  loss  of  our  illusion. 

*  Republished  from  The  Monist,  April,  1910. 


66  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

Note  that  in  her  conception  the  progress  of  science 
"might  be  described  in  a  series  of  successes  and  failures 
on  an  ascending  curve;  no  failure  means  a  total  collapse 
of  knowledge,  no  success  is  ever  complete."  Thus  she 
places  scientific  solutions  on  a  level  with  haphazard  proba- 
bilities, but  even  in  doing  this  she  ignores  the  fact  that  the 
simile  here  used  is  based  on  the  conception  of  a  mathemat- 
ical curve  which  would  definitely  predetermine  the  progress 
of  science.  The  development  of  science  is  no  less  subject  to 
law  than  the  growth  of  animals  and  plants,  the  crystalli- 
zations of  minerals,  yea,  the  formation  of  whole  solar  sys- 
tems. This  does  not  prove  as  yet,  but  indicates,  that  sci- 
ence is  not  comparable  to  any  haphazard  mode  of  hitting 
the  bull's  eye  and  does  not  depend  on  incidental  successes, 
harboring  the  failures  also  in  its  own  nature  as  if  they 
were  part  and  parcel  of  science  itself  and  did  not  belong 
to  the  struggles  of  poor  mortal  and  fallible  scientists  who 
fail  to  attain  an  insight  into  its  truths. 

When  Mrs.  Fiske  Warren  calls  her  position  "a  philo- 
sophical conception  of  science,"  I  must  demur,  for  I  hold 
that  her  views  are  unphilosophical  and  even  antiphilosoph- 
ical;  they  are  pluralistic.  Philosophy  has  always  endeav- 
ored to  trace  the  unity  of  our  conception  of  the  world,  and  a 
pluralistic  philosophy  which,  while  clinging  to  particulars 
and  to  individual  facts,  denies  unity  and  scorns  system  as 
pure  theory  is  practically  a  surrender  of  the  ideal  of  philo- 
sophical thought  and  implies,  to  say  the  least,  a  suggestion 
that  science  is  impossible  and  that  the  light  of  science  is  a 
mere  will-o'-the-wisp. 

METHOD  THE  ESSENTIAL  FEATURE  OF   SCIENCE. 

Science  is  a  method  of  inquiry  and  as  such  it  means 
system.  The  results  of  science  are  systematically  formu- 
lated universalities,  i.  e.,  groups  of  facts  of  the  same  char- 


THE   ROCK  OF  AGES.  67 

acter  described  in  their  essential  nature,  singling  out  the 
determinant  features  and  omitting  all  the  rest.  Such  a 
formula  describing  a  definite  set  of  facts  is  called  a  natural 
law,  and  I  will  say  here  incidentally  that  what  Mrs.  Warren 
says  concerning  the  nature  of  abstraction  is  quite  correct, 
although  she  might  have  better  characterized  the  nature 
of  abstraction  if  she  had  borne  in  mind  the  significance  of 
the  formal  sciences,  especially  logic  and  mathematics, 
which  play  such  an  important  part  in  abstraction,  furnish- 
ing the  backbone  of  what  we  call  system  in  science. 

I  feel  prompted  to  make  a  few  further  comments  on 
the  importance  of  abstraction,  for  he  who  truly  under- 
stands the  nature  of  abstraction  can  no  longer  cling  to  a 
pluralistic  conception  either  in  science  or  philosophy. 

Abstraction  singles  out  some  definite  features  and  drops 
all  others.  An  abstraction  is  mind-made  but  it  represents 
a  real  quality  of  objective  things.  People  who  speak  of 
"empty  abstractions"  with  a  view  of  detracting  from  their 
significance  know  not  what  they  say  and  only  exhibit  their 
own  lack  of  judgment.  Abstraction  is  the  scepter  with 
which  man  rules  nature,  for  by  the  means  of  abstraction 
we  recognize  the  common  features  of  things,  classify  them 
as  general  concepts,  and  learn  to  formulate  the  uniformi- 
ties of  nature,  commonly  called  "natural  laws." 

The  very  existence  of  abstraction  proves  that  generali- 
zation is  possible  and  the  mere  possibility  of  generalization 
is  an  evidence  that  there  are  general  types,  and  reason  is 
justified  in  trusting  to  logic,  arithmetic  and  mathematics 
when  dealing  with  facts  of  the  objective  world. 

Man  is  the  only  living  being  on  earth  who  can  make 
abstractions,  for  the  organ  needed  to  think  of  whiteness 
and  not  of  white  snow  or  other  white  things,  to  conceive 
of  numbers  by  counting  things  and  omitting  all  qualities 
of  the  things  counted  except  their  presence  as  items,  pre- 
supposes the  use  of  words  which  serve  as  spoken  symbols 


68  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

for  things  or  their  qualities  and  the  faculty  of  making  ab- 
stractions, of  comprising  many  sense-impressions  into  gen- 
eral concepts,  and  of  classifying  them  into  a  system  of 
genera  and  species,  is  called  reason.  The  speaking  animal 
becomes  a  rational  animal  and  the  rational  animal  alone 
can  form  abstractions,  while  a  methodical  use  of  abstrac- 
tions establishes  science. 

A  formula  describing  a  definite  set  of  facts  is  a  scien- 
tific acquisition  which  (notwithstanding  Mrs.  Warren's 
statement  to  the  contrary)  is  a  success,'  complete  in  its 
special  field.  The  three  Kepler  laws,  for  instance,  are  a 
definite  and  complete  solution  of  the  problem  of  the  move- 
ments of  heavenly  bodies.  While  it  is  true  that  the  attempts 
to  interpret  these  facts  of  nature  were  failures,  of  which 
many  were  by  no  means  a  "total  collapse  of  knowledge," 
it  would  be  a  great  mistake  to  imagine  that  Kepler  had  only 
succeeded  in  a  limited  way,  and  that  we  had  to  wait  for 
further  facts  in  order  to  verify  his  three  laws,  or  even  to 
expect  them  to  be  upset  or  at  least  modified  by  our  increase 
of  knowledge. 

Science  is  not  a  collection  of  more  or  less  verified  hy- 
potheses. It  is  not  an  aggregate  of  mere  probabilities. 
Science  is  a  method  of  determining  the  truth,  and  in  spite 
of  the  many  gaps  in  our  comprehension  it  offers  us  a  well 
guaranteed  fund  of  knowledge. 

It  is  characteristic  of  a  conception  of  science  such  as 
underlies  Mrs.  Fiske  Warren's  presentation  of  the  case 
that  no  distinction  is  made  between  theory  and  well  ascer- 
tained knowledge  of  facts.  Note  the  instances  which  our 
author  adduces  to  prove  her  case.  She  selects  for  the  pur- 
pose a  brief  review  of  the  vicissitudes  of  the  history  of 
matter,  a  problem  which  even  to-day  is  not  yet  ripe  for  solu- 
tion. She  presents  to  us  a  number  of  hypotheses,  not  to 
say  vagaries,  of  prominent  scientists. 


THE  ROCK  OF  AGES.  69 


THEORIES  AND  TRUTHS. 

Newton  formulated  the  law  of  gravitation  in  his  Prin- 
cipia,  and  this  is  Newton's  immortal  work,  but  otherwise 
his  significance  as  a  scientist  is  greatly  overrated.  Bear 
in  mind  Schopenhauer's  strictures1  that  Newton's  fame  is 
based  on  the  statement  of  a  theory  which  was  first  pro- 
nounced by  Hooke,  whose  claim  in  this  case  he  ignored 
with  persistent  narrowness.2  Note  Newton's  childish  ideas 
concerning  the  meaning  of  the  Revelation  of  St.  John,  his 
exaggerated  high  opinion  of  these  his  theological  views, 
and  you  will  understand  that  his  notions  concerning  the 
ultimate  constitution  of  matter  cannot  be  treated  seriously, 
as  possessing  any  scientific  value.  They  are  theories  based 
upon  insufficient  data,  or  we  might  almost  say  on  pure 
imagination.  Though  Newton's  Principia  is  of  great  im- 
portance as  a  definite  formulation  of  the  solution  of  a  prob- 
lem which  had  been  matured  in  his  time,  to  present  his 
views  of  matter  as  a  contribution  to  science"  is  quite  mis- 
leading. 

When  Lord  Kelvin  visited  America  he  was  interviewed 
by  a  sage  newspaper  reporter  who  wanted  an  authoritative 
statement  concerning  his  view  of  the  vortex  theory,  and 
Lord  Kelvin  who  had  probably  been  often  bored  by  similar 
requests  simply  answered,  "It  is  a  mere  theory,"  and  so 
the  reporter  indulged  in  extravagant  language  as  to  the 
modesty  of  the  English  scientist  who  spoke  of  his  most 
famous  discovery  as  a  mere  hypothesis.  The  truth  is  that 
it  was  a  mere  hypothesis,  for  it  is  not  yet  a  formula  cover- 

1  Welt  a.  d.  V.,  I,  25:  IT,  58,  86  (ad  ed.,  88).  The  dispute  anent  the  prior- 
ity of  the  invention  of  the  integral  in  mathematics  might  find  a  true  solution 
in  the  proposition  that  the  first  idea  came  from  Leibnitz's  fertile  brain,  to 
whom  it  was  suggested  by  his  monadology,  the  theory  of  infinitesimal  par- 
ticles, while  Newton  appears  to  have  applied  it  to  the  computation  of  gravi- 
tating bodies  and  thus  reduced  it  to  exact  mathematical  concepts.  Diihring  in 
his  Kritischc  Geschichte  der  Philosophic,  pp.  353,  is  inclined  to  side  with  New- 
ton against  Leibnitz. 

•See  Enc.  Brit.,  s.  v.  "Newton."  XVII,  440 ff. 


7O  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

ing  facts.  It  is  the  attempt  to  explain  certain  facts  for 
which  we  have  not  yet  enough  data.  That  Lord  Kelvin's 
theory  is  not  only  ingenious,  but  that  it  is  very  helpful,  is 
conceded  by  all  who  utilize  his  suggestion  as  a  working 
hypothesis  and  to  speak  of  it  as  "moribund,"  creates  the 
suspicion  that  Mrs.  Warren  has  not  grasped  its  real  sig- 
nificance. 

There  is  a  difference  between  theory  and  truth  which 
is  this:  A  theory  is  a  tentative  statement  of  a  truth;  it  is 
a  working  hypothesis,  temporarily  made  and  awaiting  veri- 
fication, while  a  truth  is  a  description  of  a  certain  set  of 
features  or  of  an  interrelation  of  phenomena  which  covers 
the  entire  range  of  facts. 

THE  LAW  OF  CAUSATION. 

As  an  important  misconception  we  will  mention  Mrs. 
Fiske  Warren's  interpretation  of  causality.  She  speaks 
of  "the  law  of  causality"  as  "gradually  being  excluded 
from  science,  which  more  and  more  contents  itself  with 
description."  She  says,  "it  still  has  a  respectable  reputa- 
tion. But  is  it  an  accurate  law  ?  What  it  asserts  is  this : 
Reproduce  all  the  conditions  of  a  certain  phenomenon,  that 
phenomenon  will  reappear."  It  would  lead  too  far  to  here 
renew  the  discussion  of  the  law  of  causality.  I  will  only 
refer  to  former  expositions  of  mine,  especially  in  discus- 
sions with  Professor  Ernst  Mach.3 

The  law  of  causation  has  not  been  replaced  by  descrip- 
tion. It  has  always  been  description,  except  that  the  term 
"description"  was  not  introduced  until  Kirchhoff  defined 
mechanics  as  an  exhaustive  and  concise  description  of  mo- 
tion. What  Kirchhoff  eliminates  is  the  notion  of  meta- 
physical factors  behind  motion,  which  have  sometimes  been 

1  The  Surd  of  Metaphysics,  pp.  119-130.  Cf.  "Mach's  Philosophy,"  Monist, 
XVI,  350-352.  See  also  Fundamental  Problems,  79-109;  and  Primer  of  Phi- 
losophy, 137-172.  For  a  treatment  of  the  Hume-Kantian  problem  of  causa- 
tion, see  Kant's  Prolegomena,  especially  pp.  198  ff. 


THE  ROCK  OF  AGES.  7 1 

dignified  with  the  name  "cause,"  but  the  scholars  who 
used  this  metaphysical  name  "cause"  did  not  mean  cause 
at  all;  they  meant  "reason,"  and  their  notion  of  reason 
was  based  on  a  distorted  view  of  natural  law  which  then 
was  not  conceived  as  a  uniformity  but  as  a  metaphysical 
entity  behind  phenomena. 

In  former  discussions  of  the  problem  of  causation  I 
have  pointed  out  that  "a  cause"  is  always  a  motion,  an 
event,  an  occurrence,  which  in  a  system  of  conditions 
changes  the  arrangement,  and  results  in  a  new  state  of 
things  commonly  called  "the  effect."  Accordingly  the  law 
of  cause  and  effect  is  the  law  of  transformation.  It  de- 
scribes a  series  of  successive  changes,  the  start  of  which  in 
the  system  of  our  investigation  we  call  "a  cause,"  the  end 
"an  effect";  and  it  goes  without  saying  that  the  effect  in 
its  turn  may  again  be  a  cause,  and  we  thus  have  a  succes- 
sion of  changes  which  represent  causes  and  effects  in  an 
interlinked  concatenation. 

Without  going  into  further  details,  I  will  only  say  that 
Hume's  famous  investigations  of  causation  have  missed  the 
mark  in  so  far  as  he  defined  cause  and  effect  as  "objects 
following  each  other,"  instead  of  treating  them  as  two 
phases  of  one  and  the  same  process;  thus  he  could  not 
understand  the  necessary  connection  between  strychnine 
and  the  dead  mouse. 

After  all,  the  law  of  causation  is  not  being  excluded 
from  science.  It  is  nothing  more  nor  less  than  another 
aspect  of  the  famous  law  of  the  conservation  of  matter  and 
energy. 

Speaking  of  the  law  of  the  conservation  of  matter  we 
must  bear  in  mind  that  matter  is  to  be  used  in  the  more 
general  sense  of  substance,  not  in  its  limited  definition  of 
mass  and  volume;  for  certain  facts,  now  well  established, 
teach  us  to  look  upon  ponderable  matter  as  subject  to  or- 
igin and  destruction.  We  have  reasons  to  assume  that  new 


72  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

matter  originates  in  some  nebulas  of  the  starry  heavens, 
in  due  succession  of  the  Mendeljeff  series,  according  to  their 
atomic  weight,  while  the  discovery  of  radium  suggests  a 
final  dissolubility  of  chemical  atoms.  The  new  view  does 
not  upset  the  law  of  conservation  of  substance,  for  we 
assume  that  the  elements  thus  formed  in  the  celestial  re- 
torts of  nebulas  are  due  to  a  condensation  of  the  ether, 
or  whatever  name  we  may  give  to  the  primordial  world- 
stuff. 

POINTS  OF  REFERENCE. 

If  the  law  of  causation  were  really  what  Mrs.  Fiske 
Warren  says  it  is,  viz.,  "Reproduce  all  conditions  of  a  cer- 
tain phenomenon,  that  phenomenon  will  reappear,"  it  would 
be  useless  even  as  a  working  hypothesis;  for,  as  Mrs. 
Warren  truly  explains,  we  can  never  reproduce  the  very 
same  conditions  the  second  time,  and  this  she  proclaims  in 
the  most  exaggerated  terms  in  spite  of  her  former  ex- 
planation of  the  significance  of  abstraction.  Our  method 
of  science  consists  in  eliminating  all  accidentals  and  con- 
fining the  attention  to  essential  features.  In  order  to  prove 
her  case  she,  following  the  example  of  Poincare,  points 
out  some  accidental  features  and  thus  shows  that  the  repe- 
tition of  the  same  event  is  impossible. 

Poincare  here  makes  the  same  mistake  into  which  Her- 
bert Spencer  falls  in  his  First  Principles,  where  he  attempts 
to  prove  that  the  simplest  phenomena  of  motion  are  un- 
knowable. He  succeeds  only  by  a  blunder.  He  omits  the 
first  essential  condition  of  describing  a  motion, — he  leaves 
out  a  point  of  reference.  If  a  captain  walks  on  deck  of 
his  ship,  from  east  to  west  and  the  ship  is  moving  in  the 
opposite  direction  at  the  same  rate,  is  he  moving  or  stand- 
ing still?  This  conundrum  is  produced  only  by  muddling 
up  the  issues  and  projecting  our  own  confusion  into  the 
world  of  objective  facts.  If  I  promise  to  return  to  the 


THE  ROCK  OF  AGES.  73 

Pantheon  in  Paris  on  a  certain  day  and  hour,  I  mean  that 
place  with  reference  to  our  geography  and  not  the  very 
same  spot  in  the  solar  system  or  even  the  stellar  universe. 
The  very  definition  of  the  hour  and  day  implies  incidentally 
a  changed  position  of  the  earth  with  reference  to  the  sun, 
and  the  identity  of  the  spot  is  determined  by  the  accepted 
meaning  of  language ;  the  introduction  of  astronomical  re- 
lations would  be  mere  quibbling. 

THE  STABILITY  OF  TRUTH. 

In  conclusion  I  will  say:  It  is  not  true  that  "over  and 
over  again  the  fundamental  'truths'  have  been  superseded 
and  buried  under  fresh  growth."  The  real  truths  of  sci- 
ence, the  uniformities  of  nature,  are  descriptions  of  the  es- 
sential features  of  certain  sets  of  facts,  methodically  sys- 
tematized. They  are  never  superseded,  but  each  of  them 
constitutes  a  KTJJPO.  e's  act,  a  possession  that  has  come  to 
stay,  and  which  will  be  useful  as  a  foundation  for  further 
inquiry.4 

The  reason  why  there  is  a  lack  of  appreciation  of  the 
systematic  nature  of  science,  is  most  likely  due  to  a  lack 
of  philosophic  training,  which  in  its  turn  is  due  to  the 
prevalence  of  metaphysical  and  other  faulty  philosophies 
such  as  are  sometimes  taught  even  in  the  foremost  and 
most  renowned  universities.  In  order  to  understand  the 
systematic  character  of  science  we  must  learn  to  appre- 
ciate the  paramount  significance  of  form  and  formal 
thought,  for  here  lies  the  real  problem  of  the  foundation 
of  science. 

The  formal  sciences  give  us  a  key  to  nature;  they  en- 
able us  to  construct  systems  of  reference  which  can  be 
utilized  for  describing  events  under  observation  in  terms 
of  measuring  and  counting,  or,  generally  speaking,  by  a 

*  A  summary  of  the  author's  view  is  stated  very  briefly  in  the  introduction 
to  the  little  book  Philosophy  as  a  Science,  published  by  the  Open  Court  Pub- 
lishing Company. 


74  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

description  of  their  formal  relations.  The  formal  element 
in  thought  as  well  as  in  objective  reality  is  the  connecting 
link  that  overbridges  the  chasm  between  subject  and  ob- 
ject and  which  furnishes  us  with  the  key  by  which  we  may 
scientifically  comprehend  nature. 

The  view  here  presented  appears  to  me  as  the  only  ten- 
able interpretation  of  the  nature  of  science.  Neither  the 
extreme  empiricists  nor  the  Kantian  school  have  offered 
a  satisfactory  solution.  The  empiricists  who  are  at  present 
in  the  ascendancy  fail  to  see  the  systematic  nature  of  sci- 
ence, and  the  Kantian  school  had  the  misfortune  of  finding 
a  wrong  expounder  to  the  English  speaking  world  in  the 
philosopher  Hamilton.  His  misconstruction  of  the  Kantian 
a  priori  changed  the  Kantian  school  in  England  into  a 
metaphysical  philosophy  involving  some  inferences  which 
were  quite  foreign  to  Kant  himself. 

The  empiricists  on  the  other  hand,  having  a  wrong 
conception  of  Kant's  a  priori,  lost  the  truth  of  his  philos- 
ophy, and  instead  of  understanding  the  nature  of  certitude, 
of  consistency,  of  a  systematic  method,  they  produced  a 
kind  of  evidence  by  accumulation  of  details,  thereby  miss- 
ing the  essential  and  characteristic  point  of  science.  The 
only  foundation  of  science  is  to  be  sought  in  a  philosophy  of 
pure  form. 

SYSTEM  THE  AIM   OF   SCIENCE. 

System  is  the  backbone  of  science,  and  system  is  the 
result  of  the  formal  sciences.  The  latter  have  been  gained 
through  abstraction  and  constitute  what  is  commonly  called 
"reason."  The  purely  formal  aspect  of  things  makes  it 
possible  to  create  purely  formal  systems  of  thought  such 
as  arithmetic,  geometry,  and  logic.  They  are  a  priori  in 
the  Kantian  sense.  They  are  subjective  or  purely  mental, 
but  serve  as  models  for  any  object  of  investigation,  be  it 
purely  imaginary  or  actual,  merely  possible,  potential  or 


THE  ROCK  OF  AGES.  75 

real,  and  thus  they  can  be  used  as  means  of  reference  for 
describing  any  existence,  real  or  imaginary,  which  is  dom- 
inated by  consistency.  Consistency  in  the  realm  of  the 
purely  formal  sciences  produces  that  wonderful  harmony 
which  we  observe  for  instance  in  mathematics.  Consist- 
ency in  nature  produces  what  in  another  place  I  have  called 
lawdom,5  a  state  of  things  known  in  German  as  Gesetz- 
massigkeit,  which  makes  it  possible  for  certain  facts  of  the 
same  class  to  be  described  as  uniformities.  Consistency 
in  action  renders  possible  the  rationality  of  living  crea- 
tures, enabling  them  to  exercise  choice,  to  make  plans,  and 
carry  out  purposes. 

Though  many  scientists  look  upon  science,  in  the  light 
of  Hume's  skepticism,  as  the  result  of  good  chances,  of 
mere  lucky  haphazard  successes,  there  is  developing  in  the 
present  age  a  deeply  rooted  confidence  that  science  is  more 
than  the  result  of  accidental  guesses,  and  we  believe  that 
we  have  produced  the  evidence  of  the  attainment  of  scien- 
tific certitude,  the  foundation  of  which  is  laid  in  the  phi- 
losophy of  form. 

But  this  confidence  is  of  a  broader  nature  and  of  a  more 
ancient  date  than  is  commonly  granted.  This  same  con- 
fidence has  accompanied  man  from  the  dawn  of  his  ration- 
ality and  has  found  expression  in  his  religion.  The  world 
was  never  a  chaos  to  man,  but  always  the  law-ordained  cos- 
mos, and  this  feature  of  cosmic  order  was  pictured  in  man's 
religion  as  a  belief  in  a  divinity  of  some  kind,  mostly  as 
a  hierarchy  of  gods,  and,  in  the  theistic  stage  of  religious 
development,  simply  as  God. 

Religion  accordingly  appears  in  this  conception  as  an 
instinctive  formulation  of  a  trust  in  the  world-order,  and 
this  world-order,  which  the  philosophy  of  form  has  been 
able  to  trace,  constitutes  the  bed-rock  of  all  our  thoughts 

8  See  The  Monist,  XX,  p.  36. 


76  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

and  aspirations  in  religion  as  well  as  in  science.     In  this 
sense  we  can  truly  say  that  here  lies  the  Rock  of  Ages. 

STATING  A  TRUTH  AND  TELLING  THE  TRUTH. 

My  statement  on  page  61  that  "truths  are  not  concrete 
realities,  but  ideas  that  appropriately  describe  certain  char- 
acteristics of  realities,  so  as  to  make  our  anticipations  tally 
with  experience  in  the  past  and  present  and  even  in  the 
future,"  was  criticized  by  Mr.  E.  H.  Randle6  who  says  that 
"we  must  be  careful  in  definitions,  for  every  prominent 
word  has  many  secondary  meanings." 

As  to  the  meaning  of  truth  he  finds  fault  with  my  propo- 
sition that  "while  facts  are  always  particular,  truths  are 
always  general.  Facts  are  verified  by  the  senses,  truths 
by  the  mind.  Facts  change,  truths  remain  forever." 

Mr.  Randle  says: 

"Facts  are  always  particular  but  I  do  not  see  how  a  fact  can 
possibly  change.  'It  is  a  fact  that  John  shot  a  bird':  Can  that  fact 
ever  be  changed?  A  fact  is  something  done.  Neither  can  I  see 
that  truths  are  always  general;  but  if  Dr.  Carus  means  laws  he  is 
correct.  Many  truths  are  laws.  'All  bodies  set  free  above  the 
ground  fall  to  the  earth' :  this  is  a  truth  and  a  law.  I  told  the  truth 
when  I  said,  'John  shot  a  bird.'  But  the  shooting  of  the  bird  was 
a  fact  and  not  a  truth." 

I  grant  that  Mr.  Randle  is  right  when  he  says  that 
every  prominent  word  has  many  secondary  meanings.  This 
becomes  obvious  in  our  use  of  the  term  "truth."  I  do  not 
think  that  there  is  any  disagreement  between  his  conception 
of  truth  and  mine,  but  truth  like  other  words  has  many 
secondary  meanings,  and  certain  meanings  are  used  with 
definite  phrases  and  connections. 

I  trust  that  every  thoughtful  reader  will  read  the  pas- 
sage quoted  and  criticized  by  Mr.  Randle  in  the  correct 
sense.  Truths  are  always  mental  and  general,  facts  are 

*  In  a  brief  article  on  "Truth"  in  The  Open  Court,  Oct.,  1909,  pp.  632-634. 


THE  ROCK  OF  AGES.  77 

always  concrete  and  particular.  Truths  are  identical  with 
laws  and  if  true  are  true  forever.  Facts  are  the  fleeting 
phenomena  in  the  flux  of  events  that  pass  by  and  change, 
which  means  that  there  are  always  new  facts  filling  the 
present  moment  and  commanding  our  attention. 

I  do  not  think  that  Mr.  Randle  would  find  fault  with 
this  statement  rightly  understood,  but  I  grant  that  the  word 
"truth"  is  used  also  with  reference  to  single  statements, 
and  in  this  connection  I  will  call  attention  to  the  fact  that 
if  the  statement  be  true  that  "John  shot  a  bird,"  we  never 
would  call  it  a  truth,  but  we  would  say  of  the  man  who  says 
so  that  he  told  the  truth. 

To  "tell  the  truth"  means  that  the  statement  of  a 
special  case  is  true,  but  to  tell,  or  better  to  state,  a  truth 
has  a  different  meaning,  which  shows  that  the  phrase  "to 
tell  the  truth"  is  idiomatic,  and  we  cannot  make  use  of  it 
for  the  purpose  of  formulating  an  exact  definition  of  the 
term  "truth." 

Accordingly  I  object  to  Mr.  Randle's  expression  when 
he  says,  "The  three  angles  of  a  triangle  are  equal  to  two 
right  angles ;  this  statement  is  true  and  it  tells  the  truth." 
He  ought  not  to  say,  "the  statement  tells  the  truth,"  but 
simply,  "the  statement  is  true." 

The  opposite  of  "telling  the  truth"  is  "telling  a  lie," 
always  implying  the  reproach  of  a  moral  deficiency,  but  the 
opposite  of  "truth"  in  the  scientific  sense  of  the  word  is  not 
"lie"  but  "error"  or  "that  which  is  not  true." 

Mr.  Randle  unconsciously  proves  his  own  contention 
that  "every  prominent  word  has  many  secondary  mean- 
ings" ;  thus  if  an  author  now  and  then  uses  a  word  in  more 
than  one  sense,  we  must  be  charitable  and  understand  the 
use  of  it  according  to  the  context. 


THE  NATURE  OF  TRUTH.* 

THE  WORD  "TRUTH"  IN  EUROPEAN  LANGUAGES. 

THE  words  true,  truth,  troth,  trust,  truster,  trustee, 
truce,  etc.,  are  derived  from  an  old  Teutonic  root 
which  appears  also  in  the  modern  German  words  treu, 
"faithful,"  trauen,  "to  have  confidence,"  and  also  Trost, 
which  means  originally  "rest"  or  "assurance,"  then  "re- 
liance," and  finally  "comfort"  or  "solace." 

The  noun  truth  is  formed  from  true  by  the  ending  th 
in  the  same  way  as  wealth  from  weal  (prosperity),  health 
from  hale  (sound),  dearth  from  dear  (scarce),  and  hearth 
from  a  word  now  lost  corresponding  to  the  Gothic  hauri 
and  Icelandic  hyrr  meaning  "coal,"  a  "cinder"  or  "em- 
ber." 

By  "truth"  we  generally  understand  the  trustworthi- 
ness or  reliability  of  an  idea.  According  to  the  etymology 
of  the  word,  truth  is  that  which  endures,  that  which  con- 
tinues to  remain  the  same,  that  which  stands  the  test  and 
is  not  subject  to  change. 

The  German  words  wahr  and  Wahrheit  are  most  prob- 
ably derived  from  the  root  WAS,  the  infinitive  of  which  in 
Old  German  is  wesen,  "to  be,"  "to  exist."  Derivatives 
of  this  root  are  preserved  in  the  English  "was"  and  "were." 
The  German  word  wahr  must  originally  have  denoted  ac- 
tual existence,  and  then  acquired  the  meaning  "true"  in 
the  sense  that  what  we  think  is,  actually  exists. 

*  Republished  from  The  Monist,  Oct.,  1910. 


THE  NATURE  OF  TRUTH.  79 

The  English  word  "worth"  as  well  as  its  German  equiv- 
alent Wert  are  probably  connected  with  the  same  root 
from  which  wahr,  "true,"  is  derived.  It  means  originally 
the  quality  of  having  substance  or  reality,  that  which  is 
wahr  or  truly  being;  that  which  is  reliable,  because  it 
endures. 

The  German  word  wahr  has  no  direct  connection  with 
the  Latin  verus  \  at  any  rate  it  is  not  derived  from  it,  for 
it  existed  among  the  Saxons  as  well  as  the  Germans  and 
other  Germanic  nations  before  Roman  civilization  began  to 
influence  northern  Europe;  but  it  is  not  impossible  that 
verus  is  derived  from  the  same  root,  WAS,  which  is  common 
to  all  the  Indo-Germanic  nations. 

In  Anglo-Saxon,  the  word  war,  "true,"  meant  the  same 
as  the  German  wahr,  but  it  was  replaced  in  English  by 
"true,"  the  German  treu,  meaning  faithful.  Judging  from 
the  Gothic  word  tuzwers,  "doubtful,"  the  Goths  must  also 
have  had  the  root  of  the  German  wahr ;  it  was  presumably 
pronounced  wers,  but  at  the  time  of  Ulfila  the  term  sunjis 
("true,"  the  root  of  which  is  SA  or  AS,  as  it  appears,  for 
instance,  in  the  German  sein  and  in  asmi,  ct/u,  sum  and 
am)  was  used  in  its  stead. 

If  we  attempt  to  reproduce  the  Gothic  sunjis  in  modern 
German,  we  might  render  it  seinig,  analogous  to  an  Eng- 
lish formation,  be-ish. 

The  German  affirmation  ja,  "yes,"  and  its  English 
equivalent  yea  mean  "it  is  true"  and  are  derived  from  a 
root  which  appears  in  the  Old-High-German  verb  jehan, 
"to  own,  to  confess,  to  profess."  In  Old-Saxon  it  reads  ja 
and  in  Anglo-Saxon  gea  orge-swa,  the  latter  being  an 
amplification  meaning  "yea  thus"  or  "yea  so,"  and  was 
contracted  into  gese,  from  which  the  modern  word  yes  is 
derived. 

The  root  of  jehan  appears  also  in  the  German  word 


8O  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

Beichte,  "confession,"  which  is  derived  from  the  verb  be- 
jehan,  or  later  be-ichten. 

How  far  ja  is  connected  with  je  (Old-High-German 
ie)  is  doubtful. 

The  word  ie  or  iwe  (English  ever)  is  preserved  in  the 
German  je  and  ewig,  "eternal."  The  same  root  has  produced 
the  German  Ehe,  "marriage,"  denoting  the  alliance  be- 
tween husband  and  wife  destined  to  last  forever.  In  Greek 
the  word  cuwv,  an  unlimited  long  period,  is  etymologically 
the  same  as  the  German  Eke.  The  h  in  Ehe  corresponds 
to  a  digamma  (pronounced  v)  in  the  old  Greek  aivon  as 
well  as  the  German  ewig,  but  it  disappears  in  the  Attic 
pronunciation  of  the  Greek  a  tow,  as  well  as  in  its  English 
derivative  "eon." 

The  German  wahren,  "to  guard"  and  wdhren  (the  lat- 
ter etymologically  the  same  as  the  English  "wear"  in  the 
sense  "to  last,"  "to  endure")  are  also  kin  to  wahr,  but 
here  the  idea  of  existence  has  been  changed  to  that  of  per- 
sistence. 

How  far,  and  whether  at  all,  the  old  Slovenian  word 
vera,  "faith,"  and  the  Irish  fir,  "truth,"  are  etymologically 
related  to  the  Teutonic  word  war,  "true,"  or  the  root  WAS, 
"real,"  is  doubtful. 

In  Greek  the  word  dX^eta  means  that  which  is  not 
hidden,  that  which  can  be  beheld  unconcealed,  that  which 
is  not  masked,  or  does  not  put  on  a  false  show. 

In  the  Slavic  languages  truth  is  called  pravda  (in  Polish 
spelled  prawda)  and  in  Croatia  it  is  called  istina. 

The  Hungarian  word  for  truth  is  igaz,  and  from  this 
same  root  are  derived  a  number  of  other  words,  such  as 
igazsag,  literally  "truthhood,"  denoting  "justice,"  igeret, 
"promise,"  and  igen,  "yes"  or  "yea." 

In  addition  there  exists  a  special  word  ige  which  means 
truth  in  a  religious  sense  and  denotes  especially  the  scrip- 
tures, or  the  Bible,  or  the  word  of  God.  Since  Hungarian 


THE  NATURE  OF  TRUTH.  8 1 

is  a  non-European  language,  the  roots  of  which  are  differ- 
ent from  any  Aryan  speech,  it  is  difficult  to  trace  the 
original  meaning  of  these  words,  but  the  several  derivatives 
prove  that  the  original  meaning  can  not  be  much  different 
from  their  English  equivalents,  true,  truth,  troth,  and  yea 
or  yes,  "it  is  true,"  as  an  affirmation. 

THE  HEBREW,  THE  EGYPTIAN  AND  THE  CHINESE  NOTIONS 

OF  TRUTH. 

In  Hebrew  there  are  several  words  denoting  truth,  but 
all  of  them  denote  what  will  last  or  will  stand  inquiry. 
The  words  'omen  as  well  as  emeth  are  derived  from  verbal 
stems  which  mean  "to  be  firm."1  The  former  verb  aman 
has  entered  into  the  New  Testament  and  thence  into  all 
modern  languages  in  the  shape  of  Amen,  "verily,"  which 
literally  means  "it  stands  firm,"  or  "it  is  true." 

Netsakh2  means  originally  glory,  brightness,  then  last- 
ingness  and  truth,  while  the  affirmation  yetseb  is  used  to 
denote  that  which  will  stand  in  court,  being  derived  from 
yatzab.3 

The  Chaldee  word  Qeshotf  "truth,"  is  derived  from 
Qashat,  "to  divide  evenly,"  "to  make  equal,"  "to  measure 
off  rightly,"  and  is  connected  with  words  meaning  a  pair 
of  balances  and  weights.  The  underlying  idea  of  the  con- 
ception is  the  determination  of  exact  measure. 

*       *       * 

In  Egyptian  truth  is  called  Ma'at,  represented  as  a 
goddess  with  an  ostrich  feather,  a  figure  which  is  different 
from  all  other  gods  in  so  far  as  she  plays  no  part  in  mythol- 
ogy, except  that  she  is  called  the  daughter  of  Ra,  the  Sun- 
god,  and  is  commissioned  with  weighing  the  heart  of  the 

1  The  word  ^'N  is  derived  from  pX,  "to  be  firm,"  and  n$.X  from  DttX,  nto 
stable." 

2  Two  forms,  !"i^J  and  n^J,  are  in  use,  both  being  derived  from  n3Jj. 
8  2£?  from  DIP,  "to  stand  in  court." 

truth,  and  n^$j?,  weight,  are  both  derived  from 


82 


TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 


soul  in  the  underworld  before  the  throne  of  Osiris.  Other- 
wise she  is  the  personification  of  truth  and  right,  but  the 
abstract  idea  of  the  term  has  been  and  has  always  remained 


HORUS  WEIGHING  THE  HEART  IN 
THE  UNDERWORLD* 


ANCIENT  BREASTPLATE 
REFERRED  TO  IN  TEXT. 


A  GOVERNOR  OF  RAMESES  IX. 
From  Erman,  Life  in  Ancient  Egypt. 


THE  GODDESS  MAAT. 
From  Budge's  Mummy,  p.  29. 


uppermost  in  the  minds  of  the  Egyptian  people.    She  is 
also  spoken  of  in  the  dual  form  ma'ati,  "the  two  truths," 

*  In  the  scale  is  the  hieroglyphic  for  truth. 


THE  NATURE  OF  TRUTH.  83 

as  the  goddess  who  attends  to  both  punishments  and  re- 
wards. 

The  goddess  Ma'at  is  repeatedly  mentioned  in  the  oldest 
extant  Egyptian  inscription  which  praises  King  Unas  be- 
cause "he  loved  truth  (maa)  .  .  .  and  the  double  truth 
(maati)  has  heard  him. .  .the  double  truth  has  given  com- 
mand to  let  him  pass  through  the  realm  of  Seb,  and  to 
make  him  rise  at  his  pleasure.  .  .  .And  Unas  cometh  forth 
on  this  day  as  the  fruit  of  the  truth  (maa)  of  a  living  soul 
.  .  .  Unas  cometh  forth  according  to  the  truth,  which  brings 
him  his  desire." 

The  adjective  maa  means  "straight"  or  "level,"  then 
"right"  or  "due,"  and  also  "genuine"  or  "real." 

The  emblem  of  Ma'at  is  the  ostrich  feather.  As  a  god- 
dess Ma'at  is  the  patron  of  justice,  and  it  is  reported  that 
the  chief  judge  wore  her  picture  on  a  chain  upon  his  breast. 
The  breastplate  here  reproduced  shows  Ma'at  and  the 
hawkheaded  Ra,  seated  on  either  side  of  an  obelisk.  The 
picture  of  a  governor  under  Rameses  IX  shows  him  in 
his  capacity  as  a  judge,  holding  the  ostrich  feather  of  truth 

in  his  left  hand. 

*       *       * 

The  Chinese  word  for  "truth"  is  M  chan,  which  is  a 
compound  of  the  two  characters  A  jan,  "man,"  and  ill 
chih,  "upright."  The  character  jan  appears  in  the  two 
strokes  underneath  the  word  chan.  The  word  "upright" 
is  a  compound  of  three  radicals,  which  are  ~h  shih,  "ten," 
@  "eye,"  and  L  an  abbreviation  of  H  yin,  which  means 
"hidden."  The  whole  compound  character  is  explained  in 
the  Chinese  dictionaries  as  "ten  eyes  see  the  hidden."  The 
word  "ten"  also  means  "perfect"  or  "complete,"  and  so  it 
might  as  well  mean,  "a  perfect  vision  of  the  hidden."5 

As  the  character  chan,  "truth,"  now  reads,  the  radical 

"The  character  chan,  "truth,"  is  found  in  Chinese  dictionaries  under  the 
radical  No.  109,  meaning  "eye,"  as  accompanied  by  five  strokes. 


54  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

shihf  "ten,"  on  top  of  the  old  way  of  writing  chan,  is  re- 
placed by  the  radical  No.  21,  fc  pi,  "ladle,"  in  the  sense 
"to  compare"  or  "to  change,"  and  in  this  form  the  word 
is  explained  according  to  the  Taoist  notion  as  referring 
to  the  changes  which  spiritual  beings  or  fairies  undergo. 
In  explanation  of  this  view  we  must  state  that  under  the 
influence  of  mysticism  the  "true  man"  has  come  to  denote 
first  a  purely  spiritual  person,  then  a  magician  who  can 
change  his  shape  at  will. 

The  adjective  "truthful"  in  Chinese  is  fit  sin,  and  the 
character  consists  of  A  "man"  (in  compounds  on  the  left 
side  written  thus  4  ) ,  and  the  word  It  yen,  the  latter  being 
composed  of  P  "mouth"  and  four  strokes  above  it,  mean- 
ing "what  comes  out  of  the  mouth."  The  whole  character 
"truthful"  accordingly  depicts  "a  man  standing  by  his 
word,"  a  pictorial  description  than  which  certainly  no 
better  could  be  invented. 

A  DESCRIPTION   OF  THE  NATURE  OF  TRUTH. 

Before  we  enter  into  further  explanations  of  the  sig- 
nificance of  truth  we  will  hear  what  philosophers  have  said 
about  it,  how  they  define  it  and  what  they  think  about  it. 

But  since  many  of  their  statements  are  vague  and  un- 
clear, it  will  render  a  review  of  their  definitions  easier  if 
we  know  the  state  of  things  which  suggested  the  coinage 
of  the  word.  It  is  advisable  for  this  reason  that  we  under- 
stand exactly  why  and  how  the  word  originated  and  what 
we  ourselves  mean  by  truth.  If  we  are  clear  ourselves 
we  shall  the  quicker  see  what  our  predecessors  intended 
to  say  even  when  they  missed  the  point  or  could  not  find  the 
right  expression. 

The  need  of  communicating  our  intentions,  our  re- 
quests and  our  ideas  concerning  things  has  produced  lan- 
guage; but  incidentally  while  this  purpose  is  fulfilled,  lan- 
guage accomplishes  a  task  which  grows  in  importance; 


THE  NATURE  OF  TRUTH.  85 

it  clarifies  the  mind,  it  begets  abstract  ideas  and  thereby 
produces  that  order  in  the  methods  of  thought  which  is 
called  reason.  The  speaking  animal  becomes  a  rational 
being. 

All  speech  is  representative.  Every  word  stands  for 
something,  and  every  sentence  either  is  itself  a  declara- 
tion or  implies  one.  Every  statement  refers  to  some  object 
of  thought  which  may  be  anything  or  of  any  kind  and  need 
not  be  a  bodily  and  concrete  object.  It  may  be  a  mere 
relation  and  even,  as  in  mathematics,  a  purely  mental 
conception,  or  the  product  of  a  mental  function. 

A  declaration  may  describe  its  object  of  thought  cor- 
rectly or  incorrectly,  appropriately  or  inappropriately, 
with  exactness  or  inadequately.  In  the  former  case  it  is 
called  true;  in  the  latter  false,  erroneous,  untrue  or  in- 
complete. 

When  we  ask  what  truth  means,  we  must  first  bear  in 
mind  that  truth  always  refers  to  a  statement  made  con- 
cerning some  fact.  If  the  statement  describes  the  fact  as 
it  is,  it  is  called  "true."  We  do  not  speak  of  facts  as  being 
true;  facts  are  either  "real"  or  "unreal."  The  existence 
of  the  chair,  the  table,  the  pen  is  not  called  "true,"  but  the 
statement  that  the  chair  on  which  I  sit,  or  the  table  on 
which  I  write,  has  four  legs,  is  either  "true"  or  "untrue." 
A  statement,  as  a  rule,  can  be  verified.  We  can  count  the 
legs  of  the  table,  and  if  we  count  to  four  we  say,  "It  is  true 
that  the  table  has  four  legs." 

Truth  accordingly  consists  in  a  relation.  There  is  a 
subjective  statement  and  an  objective  condition  of  things. 
Truth  means  that  the  former  properly  describes  or  repre- 
sents the  latter.  If  I  investigate  and  find  my  expectations 
fulfilled,  I  call  the  statement  true,  and  this  correspondence, 
this  congruence  of  thought  and  thing,  is  called  truth. 


86  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

THE  PHILOSOPHERS   OF   CLASSICAL  ANTIQUITY. 

A  review  of  philosophical  definitions  of  truth  must 
naturally  be  very  incomplete,  because  not  every  philos- 
opher has  left  a  succinct  exposition  of  the  subject,  and  what 
can  be  offered  here  is  practically  a  mere  compilation  of 
extracts  made  from  the  history  of  philosophy,  having  no 
other  merit  than  that  they  furnish  a  brief  synopsis  of 
various  views  and  explanations. 

We  will  introduce  our  collection  with  a  quotation  from 
the  literature  of  the  Old  Testament  Apocrypha,  which  is 
not  a  definition  but  an  appreciation  of  truth.  It  is  not 
philosophical  but  religious  and  reflects  in  general  and  emo  • 
tional  language  the  reverence  in  which  truth  is  held  by 
mankind.  We  read  in  I  Esdras,  iv.  38-40: 

"As  for  the  truth,  it  endureth,  and  is  always  strong;  it  liveth 
and  conquereth  for  evermore. 

"With  her  there  is  no  accepting  of  persons  or  rewards  ;6  but  she 
doeth  the  things  that  are  just,  and  refraineth  from  all  unjust  and 
wicked  things ;  and  all  men  do  well  like  of  her  works. 

"Neither  in  her  judgment  is  any  unrighteousness;  and  she  is 
the  strength,  kingdom,  power,  and  majesty  of  all  ages.  Blessed  be 
the  God  of  truth." 

By  turning  from  the  Jewish  literature  to  Greek  philos- 
ophy we  must  regret  the  absence  of  any  definition  of  truth 
among  the  oldest  thinkers,  since,  with  the  exception  of 
a  few  extracts,  quotations  and  general  characterizations, 
their  writings  have  been  lost. 

The  oldest  Greek  philosopher  whose  definition  of  truth 
has  been  preserved  is  Parmenides  of  Elea.  He  was  born 
about  515  B.  C,  flourished  in  the  beginning  of  the  fifth 
century  and  must  have  been  advanced  in  years  in  the  time 
of  Socrates.  He  was  the  philosopher  of  pure  being  to 
whom  reality  appeared  as  merely  phenomenal,  and  ac- 

*  In  the  place  of  "rewards,"  the  word  "privileges"  would  perhaps  better 
convey  the  meaning  of  the  text. 


THE  NATURE  OF  TRUTH.  87 

cording  to  him  truth  consists  in  the  knowledge  that  being 
is  and  not-being  cannot  be.  The  error  accordingly  arises 
through  the  belief  that  not-being  exists.  This  view  of 
Parmenides  is  preserved  in  a  passage  repeatedly  quoted, 
which  according  to  Proclus  in  his  commentary  on  Plato's 
Timaeus  (II,  105  b)  reads  thus:7 

"Listen  and  I  will  instruct  thee — and  thou,  when  thou  hearest,  shalt 
ponder, 

One  path  is :  That  Being  doth  be,  and  Non-Being  is  not ; 

This  is  the  way  of  conviction,  for  Truth  follows  hard  in  her  foot- 
steps. 

The  other  path  is :  That  Being  is  not,  and  Non-Being  must  be ; 

This  one,  I  tell  thee  in  truth,  is  an  all-incredible  pathway. 

For  thou  never  canst  know  what  is  not  (for  none  can  conceive  it) 

Nor  canst  thou  give  it  expression,  for  one  thing  are  Thinking  and 
Being." 

We  must  remember  that  Parmenides  identified  pure 
existence  with  the  absolute  conception  of  pure  being,  thus 
identifying  existence  with  pure  thought.  Plotinus  quotes 
from  him,  "For  one  thing  are  thinking  and  being,"  which 
is  thought  to  belong  at  the  end  of  the  passage  just  quoted, 
and  has  therefore  been  included  with  it. 

Plato  was  greatly  influenced  by  Parmenides  and  recon- 
ciled his  views  with  the  philosophy  of  Heraclitus,  whose 
system  is  characterized  by  the  phrase  TTOLVTO,  /oet,  "Every- 
thing is  in  a  flux."  Plato's  view  of  truth  is  condensed  by 
Ueberweg  as  follows:8 

"Plato  opens  the  exposition  of  his  physics  in  the  Tim.  (p.  28  et 
seq.}  with  the  affirmation  that  since  the  world  bears  the  form  of 
yc'veo-is  (development,  becoming)  and  not  that  of  true  being  (ovsia) 
nothing  absolutely  certain  can  be  laid  down  in  this  field  of  investi- 
gation, but  only  what  is  probable  (ei/cores  11x601).  Our  knowledge 
of  nature  bears  not  the  characters  of  science  f$n*r%tf)  or  of  the 

1  The  passage  as  quoted  here  is  translated  from  Mullach's  Fragmenta 
Philosophorum  Graecorum  by  Thomas  Davidson  in  the  Journal  of  Speculative 
Philosophy,  Vol.  IV,  No.  I  (January,  1870). 

'History  of  Philosophy,  New  York,  Scribners,  1903,  I,  125. 


88  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 


knowledge  of  truth  (dAr^eia),  but  those  of  belief  (TTIO-TIS).  Plato 
says  (Tim.,  p.  290)  :  "What  being  is  to  becoming,  that  is  truth  to 
faith"  (o  TI  irep  Trpos  ylveaiv  ovaLa,  TOVTO  Trpos  TTIOTIV  dA^eia).  What 
Plato  says  in  the  Phaedo,  p.  114  d,  explains  his  idea  of  the  probable: 
'Firmly  to  assert  that  this  is  exactly  as  I  have  expressed  it,  befits 
not  a  man  of  intelligence  ;  yet  that  it  is  either  so  or  something  like  it 
(on  rf  TOUT'  60-riv  rj  TOMVT'  O.TTO.}  must  certainly  be  assumed.'  ' 

Aristotle's  definition  of  truth  commends  itself  more 
than  Plato's  to  the  scientist,  and  has  been  summed  up  by 
Ueberweg  thus  (op.  cit.,  I,  152)  : 

"Truth  in  a  logical  judgment  is  the  correspondence  of  the  com- 
bination of  mental  representations  with  a  combination  of  things,  or 
(in  the  case  of  the  negative  judgment)  the  correspondence  of  a 
separation  of  representations  in  the  mind  with  a  separation  of  things  ; 
falsity  in  judgments  is  the  variation  of  the  ideal  combination  or 
separation  from  the  real  relation  of  the  things  to  which  the  judg- 
ments relate." 

Further  down  Ueberweg  says  concerning  Aristotle: 

"Truth  in  knowledge  is  the  agreement  of  knowledge  with  real- 
ity (Cdteg.,  C.  12:  TO>  yap  etvat  TO  7rpay/xa  r)  /u.rj  a\if)ffi)<;  o  Adyos  T;  \f/ev8r)<i 
Aeyerai)-  This  dictum  is  thus  particularized,  in  Met.,  IV,  7,  with 
reference  to  the  various  possible  cases:  'Affirming  non-existence  of 
the  existent,  or  existence  of  the  non-existent,  is  falsehood;  but 
affirming  existence  of  the  existent,  and  non-existence  of  the  non- 
existent, is  truth.'  " 

The  Stoics  have  devoted  themselves  to  explaining  the 
method  by  which  truth  becomes  known,  or,  as  we  would 
now  say,  they  lay  much  stress  on  epistemology  or  the 
theory  of  cognition,  better  expressed  by  the  Saxon  for- 
mation "kenlore."  According  to  them  all  knowledge 
arises  from  sense  perception,  and  the  fundamental  crite- 
rion of  truth  is  found  in  the  distinctness  with  which  sense 
perceptions  are  represented  in  the  mind. 

Epicurus,  though  very  different  from  the  Stoics  in  his 
ethics,  agrees  closely  with  their  theory  of  cognition.  His 


THE  NATURE  OF  TRUTH.  89 

criteria  of  truth  are  sensation  and  feeling.  To  him  all 
sensations  are  true  and  indisputable. 

Here  Epicurus  ought  to  have  said  that  sensations  are 
the  ultimate  data  from  which  we  derive  our  knowledge, 
but  a  sensation  cannot  properly  be  called  true.  It  is  simply 
a  fact. 

That  Epicurus  confused  truth  and  reality  appears  from 
his  contention  that  no  perception  can  be  proved  false  (he 
means  unreal)  and  that  even  dreams  and  the  hallucinations 
of  the  insane  are  true,  because  they  produce  an  impression 
which  the  non-existent  could  not  do. 

The  images  of  past  sensations  are  remembered,  and 
Epicurus  calls  them  representations.  Beliefs  are  called 
true  or  false  in  so  far  as  they  are  confirmed  or  refuted  by 
sensations.  It  is  noteworthy  that  Epicurus  disregarded 
the  value  of  logical  syllogism  because  according  to  his  view 
no  syllogism  could  supply  the  place  of  direct  sensation.  It 
is  interesting  to  note  that  this  view  is  paralleled  in  India 
by  the  materialist  school,  the  Charvakas  or  Lokayatas, 
who  also  deny  that  logical  argument  can  carry  conviction 
because  they  claim  that  the  only  source  of  information  is 
sense-perception. 

CHRISTIANITY  AND  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  TWO  TRUTHS. 

Augustine  understands  by  truth  the  norm  according 
to  which  reason  argues,  and  he  declares  that  it  must  be  un- 
changeable (De  lib.  arb.,  II,  3).  To  reach  the  unchange- 
able is  to  him  the  attainment  of  truth.  He  says  (De  vera 
rel,  72  f )  : 

"If  thou  findest  thy  nature  to  be  changeable,  rise  above  thyself 
to  the  eternal  source  of  the  light  of  reason.  Even  if  thou  only 
knowest  that  thou  doubtest,  thou  knowest  what  is  true ;  but  nothing 
is  true  unless  truth  exists.  Hence  it  is  impossible  to  doubt  the 
existence  of  the  truth  itself." 

Truth  and  existence  are  the  same  according  to  St. 


9O  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

Augustine,  and  he  identifies  them  with  God  (De  vera  rel., 
57;  De  trin.,  VIII,  3).  This  ultimate  truth  is  the  highest 
good  in  virtue  of  which  all  other  blessings  are  good  (De 
trin.,  VIII,  4).  Created  things  stand  in  a  contrast  to  the 
unchangeable  highest  good  and  thus  indirectly  the  muta- 
bility of  created  things  reminds  us  of  the  immutability  of 
truth. 

Thomas  Aquinas  defines  truth  as  adaequatio  intellectus 
et  rei,  which  is  best  translated  as  "agreement  of  thought 
and  thing." 

During  the  Middle  Ages  the  church  claimed  the  author- 
ity of  a  special  divine  revelation  as  the  source  of  truth, 
its  truth,  the  truth  of  ecclesiastical  dogmas. 

In  Spain  where  in  a  Mohammedan  country  a  high 
civilization  had  developed  we  find  a  distinction  made  be- 
tween esoteric  and  exoteric  truth.  Revealed  religion  was 
the  truth  made  palatable  to  the  masses,  it  was  exoteric, 
while  esoteric  truth  was  the  special  privilege  of  the  thinker, 
and  it  was  not  deemed  necessary  for  the  two  to  agree.  In 
a  similar  way  and  not  without  the  influence  of  Averroes 
and  Maimonides  the  conflict  between  scientific  truth  and 
religious  truth  led  to  the  theory  of  the  two  truths,  theolog- 
ical and  philosophical,  and  it  was  assumed  that  what  is 
true  in  theology  need  not  be  true  in  philosophy  and  vice 
versa.  Prof.  M.  Maywald  has  made  a  special  study  of  this 
strange  aberration  in  his  book  Die  Lehre  von  der  zwei- 
fachen  Wahrheit,  Berlin,  1871,  and  Windelband  condenses 
this  subject  in  his  History  of  Philosophy  (pp.  320-321)  as 
follows : 

"If,  by  theology,  we  understand  the  exposition  of  the  positive 
doctrine  of  religion,  arranged  and  defended  according  to  the  formal 
laws  of  science,  i.  e.,  Aristotelian  logic, — and  this  was  the  form 
which  the  relation  of  theology  to  religion  had  taken  in  the  West  as 
in  the  East, — it  follows  that  something  may  be  true  theologically 
which  is  not  true  philosophically,  and  vice  versa.  Thus  is  explained 


THE  NATURE  OF  TRUTH.  91 

that  doctrine  of  the  twofold  truth,  theological  and  philosophical, 
which  went  through  the  entire  Middle  Ages,  although  we  cannot 
exactly  fix  the  authorship  of  this  formula.  It  is  the  adequate  ex- 
pression of  the  mental  state  necessarily  brought  about  by  the  oppo- 
sition of  the  two  authorities  under  which  the  Middle  Ages  stood, 
viz.,  Hellenistic  science  and  religious  tradition ;  and  while  at  a  later 
time  it  often  served  to  protect  scientific  theories  from  the  persecu- 
tion of  the  church,  it  was  for  the  most  part,  even  in  these  cases,  the 
honest  expression  of  the  inner  discord  in  which  just  the  most  im- 
portant minds  of  the  age  found  themselves. 

"The  science  of  the  Christian  peoples  accepted  this  antithesis, 
and  while  the  doctrine  of  the  twofold  truth  was  expressly  pro- 
claimed by  bold  dialecticians  such  as  Simon  of  Tournay,  or  John 
of  Brescia,  and  was  all  the  more  rigidly  condemned  by  the  power 
of  the  church,  the  leading  minds  could  not  evade  the  fact  that  phi- 
losophy, as  it  had  been  developed  under  the  influence  of  Aristotle 
and  the  Arabians,  was,  and  must  remain,  in  its  inner  nature,  alien 
to  precisely  those  doctrines  of  the  Christian  religion  which  were 
specific  and  distinctive." 

The  doctrine  of  the  twofold  truth  found  its  most  ener- 
getic champion  in  the  French  savant  Pierre  Bayle.  Albertus 
Magnus  had  distinguished  between  natural  and  revealed 
religion,  but  he  clung  to  the  idea  that  there  might  be  no 
contradiction  between  the  two.  He  tried  to  show  that 
what  science  and  philosophy  teach  holds  good  also  in  the- 
ology, but  that  certain  realms  inaccessible  to  natural  in- 
sight (lumen  naturale}  could  be  entered  only  through  the 
mysteries  of  revelation.  Pierre  Bayle,  however,  went  so 
far  as  to  declare  that  all  doctrines  of  the  church  were  posi- 
tively contrary  to  reason,  indeed  that  they  were  absurd 
from  the  standpoint  of  science.  He  thus  exemplified  the 
sentence  credo  quia  absurdum.  But  the  doctrine  of  the 
double  truth  proved  a  two-edged  sword  and  in  the  long 
run  served  more  to  weaken  than  to  establish  confidence  in 
the  traditional  religious  belief. 

The  church  itself  with  its  usual  instinctive  foresight 
would  not  brook  the  doctrines  of  the  twofold  truth,  and  the 


92  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

Lateran  Council  of  1512  condemned  this  distinction  and 
pronounced  everything  false  which  stood  in  contradiction 
to  revelation. 

MODERN  THINKERS. 

Spinoza  inserts  his  definition  of  truth  among  the  axioms, 
in  the  sixth  of  which  he  states  that  "the  true  representa- 
tion must  agree  with  the  object  represented." 

Hume  is  a  skeptic  and  so  has  little  to  say  about  truth 
except  that  all  positive  attempts  at  stating  truth  are  futile. 

Kant,  who  was  awakened  from  his  dogmatic  slumber 
by  Hume's  skepticism,  so  changed  his  attitude  toward  the 
data  of  knowledge  that  instead  of  a  conception  of  truth 
he  presents  in  his  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  an  inventory 
of  our  faculty  of  working  out  sense  experience  into  scien- 
tific knowledge.  He  calls  his  system  "critical  idealism" 
and  says  that  since  things-in-themselves  are  unknowable, 
human  knowledge  is  limited  to  phenomena.  Thus  it  hap- 
pens that  reason  is  practically  our  norm  of  knowledge; 
but  it  may  not  be  accidental  that  he  has  nowhere  discussed 
the  problem  of  truth.  It  is  as  if  this  problem  had  lost  its 
usual  significance  in  his  philosophy,  and  so  we  find  that 
the  very  caption  of  truth  is  not  listed  in  Gustav  Wegener's 
Kant-Lexikon. 

Schopenhauer  adopts  Kant's  idealism,  but  he  repeatedly 
discusses  the  nature  of  truth  and  insists  most  emphatically 
on  its  consistency,  saying  that  truth  alone  agrees  through- 
out with  itself  and  with  nature  while  all  wrong  views  clash 
internally  with  themselves  and  externally  with  experience. 
In  fact  experience  protests  step  by  step  against  errors.9 
One  truth  can  never  upset  another,  but  all  must  ultimately 
agree  because  no  contradiction  is  possible  in  intuition  (An- 
schauung}  which  is  their  common  foundation.  Thus  no 

•  Cf.  Grundprobe  der  Ethik,  258,  and  Welt  als  Wille  und  Vorstellung,  II, 
114. 


THE  NATURE  OF  TRUTH.  93 

truth  can  be  in  fear  of  another.  Fraud  and  error,  how- 
ever, must  stand  in  awe  of  every  truth.  All  truths  form 
one  system.  They  postulate  and  complement  one  another 
while  error  collides  everywhere.10  Schopenhauer  distin- 
guishes between  general  truths  and  special  truths,  and  of 
these  he  rates  general  truths  the  higher,  as  gold  is  more 
valuable  than  silver.  Gold  can  always  be  easily  changed 
into  small  coin.11 

Schopenhauer  distinguishes  between  correct,  true,  real 
and  evident,  saying  that  concepts  are  correct,  judgments 
are  true,  material  things  are  real,  and  interrelations  such 
as  mathematical  figures  are  evident.  When  he  speaks  of 
the  foundation  of  truth  as  being  based  on  intuition  (An- 
schauung)  he  means  such  knowledge  as  is  contained  in 
geometrical  and  arithmetical  theorems,  which  in  Kant's 
terminology  is  called  a  priori  and  according  to  Schopen- 
hauer is  based  on  Anschauung  or  intuition  whose  truth 
appears  or  becomes  evident  by  merely  contemplating  the 
interrelations  of  geometrical  figures. 

There  are  four  kinds  of  truth  according  to  Schopen- 
hauer. One  is  purely  formal  or  logical,  referring  to  syl- 
logisms and  correctness  of  deductions;  the  second  is  em- 
pirical, referring  to  statements  of  fact;  the  third  is  tran- 
scendental where  the  word  is  used  in  the  sense  of  Kant's 
terminology.  It  comprises  judgments  of  pure  mathemat- 
ical and  pure  natural  science  (referring  mainly  to  the  law 
of  causation).  The  fourth  kind  of  truth  is  metalogical, 
referring  to  the  conditions  of  thinking  itself. 

Schopenhauer's  philosophy,  as  is  well  known,  insists 
on  the  dominance  of  the  will.  The  intellect,  though  really 
the  priestess  of  truth,  is  misused  by  the  will  as  his  hand- 
maid, for  the  will  in  Schopenhauer's  system  plays  the  part 
of  the  devil.  But  some  of  his  successors,  especially  Nietz- 

19Panerga  und  Paralipomena,  II,  253,  and  I,  136. 

"P.  U.  P.,  11,22. 


94  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

sche,  accept  upon  the  whole  the  foundation  of  Schopen- 
hauer's world-conception,  but  they  deify  the  will  and  claim 
that  the  intellect  ought  to  be  secondary.  Nietzsche  goes 
so  far  as  to  deny  the  right  of  truth  to  exist  except  by  the 
gracious  permission  of  the  will,  and  this  same  tendency 
to  give  preeminence  to  the  will  has  invaded  other  circles, 
as  we  have  seen,  and  has  found  definite  expression  in  prag- 
matism. The  great  question  remains  whether  or  not  truth 
is  possible  at  all,  and  with  this  question  ethics  stands  and 
falls  as  well  as  science,  for  if  there  is  no  standard  of  truth 
neither  can  there  be  a  standard  of  right  and  wrong. 

The  average  opinion  as  to  the  nature  and  function  of 
truth  among  modern  scientists  is  characterized  by  John 
Theodore  Merz,  who  speaks  as  follows  in  his  History  of 
European  Thought  in  the  Nineteenth  Century:12 

"At  one  time — and  that  not  very  long  ago — the  word  truth 
seemed  to  indicate  to  the  seeker  not  only  the  right  method  and  road 
for  attaining  knowledge,  but  also  the  end,  the  crown  of  knowledge. 
'Truth,  and  nothing  but  truth,'  seems  still  to  the  popular  mind  the 
right  maxim  for  seeking  knowledge — the  whole  truth  stands  before 
it  as  the  unity  of  all  knowledge,  were  it  found.  I  think  it  is  now 
sufficiently  clear  to  the  scientific  inquirer,  as  well  as  to  the  philosopher, 
that  love  of  truth,  while  it  does  indeed  denote  the  moral  attitude 
of  the  inquiring  mind,  is  insufficient  to  define  either  the  path  or  the 
end  of  knowledge.  'What  is  truth?'  is  still  the  unsolved  question. 
The  criteria  of  truth  are  still  unsettled.  It  would,  indeed,  be  a  sor- 
rowful experience,  a  calamity  of  unparalleled  magnitude,  if  ever 
the  moral  ideas  of  truth  and  faith  should  disappear  out  of  the  soul 
of  either  the  active  worker  or  the  inquiring  thinker ;  but  it  is  with 
these  as  with  other  treasures  of  our  moral  nature,  such  as  goodness 
and  holiness,  beauty  and  poetry — our  knowledge  of  them  does  not 
begin,  nor  does  it  increase,  by  definition ;  and  though  in  the  un- 
thinking years  of  our  childhood  we  acquire  and  appropriate  these 
moral  possessions  through  the  words  of  our  mother-tongue,  they 
rarely  gain  in  depth  or  meaning  by  logical  distinctions  which  we 
may  learn,  or  to  which  we  have  to  submit,  in  later  life.  These  do 

u  English  translation,  p.  29  f. 


THE  NATURE  OF  TRUTH.  95 

not  touch  the  essence,  though  very  frequently  they  may  succeed  in 
destroying  the  depth,  of  our  convictions. 

"In  the  place,  then,  of  the  high-sounding  but  indefinable  search 
after  truth,  modern  science  has  put  an  elaborate  method  of  inquiry : 
this  method  has  to  be  learned  by  patient  practice,  and  not  by  listening 
to  a  description  of  it.  It  is  laid  down  in  the  works  of  those  modern 
heroes  of  science,  from  Galileo  and  Newton  onward,  who  have  prac- 
tised it  successfully,  and  from  whose  writings  philosophers  from 
Bacon  to  Comte  and  Mill  have — not  without  misunderstanding  and 
error — tried  to  extract  the  rationale." 

While  knowing  that  this  is  the  average  opinion  of  our 
scientists  we  must  enter  a  vigorous  protest  against  the 
proposition  that  "the  criteria  of  truth  are  still  unsettled." 
It  is  true  enough  that  "the  scientific  method  has  to  be 
learned  by  patient  practice,  not  by  listening  to  a  descrip- 
tion of  it,"  but  that  what  has  been  successfully  practised 
by  the  heroes  of  science  from  Galileo  down  to  Lord  Kelvin, 
Hertz  and  their  most  recent  successors,  should  be  equiv- 
ocal and  doubtful  is  not  true.  The  methods  of  an  investi- 
gation of  truth  are  not  vague  nor  indefinite.  Our  scien- 
tists rely  on  observations  unequivocal  and  reliable,  which 
are  made  by  mechanical  contrivances,  registry  machines, 
instruments  of  precision,  with  photography  and  chemical 
reactions,  according  to  circumstances.  We  always  have 
a  combination  of  sense  perception,  which  at  present  is  ren- 
dered more  reliable  by  the  invention  of  various  devices,  the 
machinery  of  the  scientist,  with  the  calculation  of  arith- 
metic, mathematical  construction  or  logical  argumentation. 
In  brief,  the  scientific  method  is,  as  cognition  has  always 
been  since  the  beginning  of  the  human  race,  sense  experi- 
ence treated  by  the  rules  of  reason  (the  purely  formal 
sciences).  Sense  experience  furnishes  the  fact  in  question, 
reason  (that  is,  the  sum  total  of  all  purely  formal  modes 
of  reasoning)  furnishes  the  method  of  treating  the  facts, 
of  classifying  and  systematizing  them. 


96  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 


TRUTH    AND    MIND. 

There  is  an  unmistakable  agreement  among  most  of 
these  different  opinions  as  to  the  nature  of  truth.  It  seems 
that  all  philosophers  of  the  world  bear  in  mind  a  certain 
ideal  and  are  guided  by  the  same  tendency  only  with  more 
or  less  lucidity  and  with  more  or  less  depth.  It  is  plain 
that  truth  is  a  relation,  and  it  always  denotes  an  agree- 
ment between  thought  as  stated  in  a  formula  and  the 
object  of  thought,  whatever  the  latter  may  be.  If  this 
object  of  thought  be  called  "thing"  we  can  accept  unhesi- 
tatingly the  definition  of  Thomas  Aquinas  that  truth  is  the 
agreement  between  thought  and  thing  (adaequatio  intel- 
lectus  et  rei)  ;  in  fact  this  is  the  simplest  definition,  but  it 
needs  further  explanation  as  to  the  nature  of  both  thought 
and  thing. 

Truth  is  in  thought  and  in  thought  only.  There  is  no 
truth  elsewhere.  What  is  sometimes  called  truth  ought 
to  be  called  reality  or  existence,  actuality,  fact  or  what- 
ever else  we  may  call  the  objective  meaning  of  a  thought. 
There  is  a  great  difference  between  existence  and  truth. 
Facts  (by  which  we  mean  concrete  things,  events  or  con- 
ditions that  obtain  independent  of  what  anyone  may  think 
of  them)  are  real,  while  truths  are  correct  images,  symbols, 
descriptions,  or  representations  of  such  facts.  The  sense 
impressions  of  which  a  sentient  being  becomes  conscious 
are  not  truths  but  facts.  They  are  the  data  from  which 
we  construct  our  knowledge  of  the  objective  world.  These 
sense  impressions  are  the  results  of  impacts  made  by  the 
surrounding  world  upon  a  sentient  being  .  Sense  impres- 
sions are  states  of  awareness  which  come  to  indicate  the 
presence  of  the  causes  producing  them,  and  thus  these  sense 
impressions  acquire  meaning,  or,  as  we  might  say,  are 
worked  out  into  sense  perceptions.  The  external  impacts 
are  physical  facts — ether  waves  that  strike  the  eye,  air 


THE  NATURE  OF  TRUTH.  97 

waves  that  strike  the  ear,  mechanical  impressions  that  affect 
the  skin,  etc.  Sense  impressions  are  psychical,  they  are 
states  of  feelings,  and  sense  perceptions  are  mental. 

As  soon  as  a  sense  perception  begins  to  stand  for  its 
external  cause  and  is  interpreted  to  picture,  delineate  or 
characterize  an  outside  fact,  we  have  to  deal  with  mind, 
and  mind  is  the  domain  of  truth.  While  a  sense  impression 
is  a  fact,  a  sense  perception  may  be  true  or  false. 

Sense  impressions  work  with  the  infallibility  of  natural 
laws,  and  they  are  nature's  work  over  which  we  have  no 
control;  but  sense  perceptions  are  our  own  doing.  They 
are  the  result  of  a  reaction  which  takes  place  in  us  in  re- 
sponse to  a  number  of  sense  impressions.  Every  sense 
perception,  even  in  its  simplest  form,  is  an  unconscious 
judgment.  It  presupposes  that  a  sense  impression  of  the 
same  kind  has  been  received  and  has  left  a  trace  in  the 
sentient  substance.  If  then  a  new  sense  impression  of  the 
same  kind  is  made,  it  fits  into  the  path  left  by  the  trace  of 
the  former  sense  impression  and  revives  it.  Thus  we  have 
two  feelings,  that  of  the  new  sense  impression  and  the 
revived  memory  of  the  former  sense  impression,  but  in 
addition  there  originates  another  and  a  new  feeling  by  the 
fusion  of  the  two  which  is  the  perception  of  the  two  being 
of  the  same  kind.  The  analogy  to  a  logical  syllogism  is 
obvious.  The  memory  of  the  preceding  impression  repre- 
sents the  major  premise,  under  which  the  new  sense  im- 
pression is  subsumed  as  the  minor  premise,  and  the  feel- 
ing that  the  impression  fits  is  tantamount  to  the  conclusion 
that  the  subjects  of  the  premises  belong  to  the  same  cat- 
egory. 

So  far  as  prior  and  subsequent  sense  impressions  tally 
correctly,  they  are  appropriately  called  true,  and  the  truth 
consists  in  the  correct  subsumption  of  what  belongs  in  the 
same  class.  Thus  truth  in  its  simplest  shape  is  the  fitting  of 
a  certain  form  of  feeling  in  its  proper  place,  or  by  impli- 


98  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

cation  the  correctness  of  the  unconscious  judgment  that 
the  new  sense  impression  is  the  same  in  kind  as  the  pre- 
ceding one  and  indicates  the  presence  of  the  same  cause. 
Truth  and  mind  are  twins,  and  truth  is  co-existent  with 
mind.  When  sense  impressions  acquire  meaning,  when 
they  develop  into  perceptions,  mind  originates  and  the 
origin  of  mind  denotes  the  birth  of  truth,  and  also  of  the 
possibility  of  error. 

SENSE   PERCEPTIONS    AND   HALLUCINATIONS. 

The  formation  of  sense  perceptions  is  the  beginning 
of  mind,  but  by  the  side  of  sense  perceptions  there  are 
hallucinations.  Does  not  their  mere  existence  obviously 
invalidate  the  character  of  sense  perceptions,  especially 
their  reliability,  and  does  it  not  thereby  throw  suspicion 
upon  truth? 

We  grant  the  occurrence  of  hallucinations,  but  their 
prevalence  no  more  invalidates  the  reliability  of  sense  per- 
ceptions than  the  prevalence  of  error  invalidates  or  renders 
doubtful  the  character  of  truth.  We  must  only  bear  in 
mind  that  with  the  appearance  of  truth  there  necessarily 
rises  the  possibility  of  error,  and  this  happens  at  the  very 
beginning  of  the  origin  of  mind.  In  other  words,  as  soon 
as  sense  impressions  change  into  sense-perceptions  there 
appears  the  possibility  of  mistakes.  If  a  sense  impression 
receives  a  wrong  interpretation  it  is  called  an  hallucination. 
Here  is  an  instance. 

The  eye  of  a  sentient  being  gazes  fixedly  at  a  red  figure 
on  a  white  sheet  of  paper  and  this  red  spot  on  the  retina 
is  rightly  conceived  and  interpreted  by  the  resulting  sense 
perception.  Now  the  paper  is  withdrawn,  but  the  image 
persists,  except  that  in  place  of  the  red  figure  a  blue  spot 
of  the  same  outline  appears  in  view,  and  this  seems  almost 
as  tangible  and  real  as  was  the  red  figure.  We  call  it 
the  after-image  of  the  red  figure,  and  its  nature  is  suffi- 


THE  NATURE  OF  TRUTH.  99 

ciently  explained  in  the  physiology  of  optics.  This  after- 
image is  as  truly  a  sensation  and  it  is  as  real  as  is  the 
original  sense  impression,  and  if  we  interpret  it  rightly 
to  be  an  after-image  we  cannot  speak  of  it  as  an  hallucina- 
tion. But  suppose  the  eye  were  part  of  the  organism  of 
an  unsophisticated  person  who  knows  nothing  about  sense 
illusions,  the  after-image  would  naturally  be  interpreted 
to  indicate  the  presence  of  a  blue  figure,  and  this  wrong 
interpretation  would  be  called  an  hallucination. 

Hallucinations  accordingly  are  sensations  produced  by 
internal  causes  which  are  wrongly  interpreted  to  be  of  ex- 
ternal origin.  There  may  be  hallucinations  of  all  the  senses 
—even  tactual  and  gustatory,  but  the  auditory  hallucina- 
tions caused  by  some  internal  disturbance  of  the  ear  and 
also  of  the  center  of  hearing  are  the  most  common.  Next 
to  them  in  frequency  are  visions  which  are  the  hallucina- 
tions of  the  sense  of  sight,  frequently  caused  by  disturb- 
ances in  the  eye,  specks  in  the  circulating  fluids  of  the  outer 
eye  or  on  the  retina,  but  they  are  sometimes  also  caused 
by  an  abnormal  excitation  of  the  cerebral  center  of  vision. 

The  sensory  part  of  hallucinations  is  an  actual  fact  and 
is  as  real  as  any  sense  impression;  the  fault  of  hallucina- 
tions lies  in  the  wrong  interpretation  which  is  superadded 
by  the  mind.  Therefore,  it  has  been  rightly  remarked, 
it  is  wrong  to  speak  of  sense  illusions,  for  in  these  so-called 
sense  illusions  the  senses  remain  reliable,  and  it  is  the 
mind  which  errs.  Sense  illusions  are  instances  of  such 
circumstances  as  are  apt  to  mislead  our  judgment,  but  they 
are  really  mental  mistakes.  They  are  in  the  domain  of 
sense  perception  what  in  the  realm  of  our  intellectual  ac- 
tivity is  called  error, — a  failure  to  attain  the  truth. 

The  field  of  hallucinations  is  wide  but  we  need  not  enter 
into  further  details.  We  will  only  say  that  dreams  are 
natural  occurrences,  and  we  may  call  them  hallucinations 
experienced  in  sleep  or  in  any  subconscious  state  in  which 


IOO  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

the  normal  waking  consciousness  is  temporarily  oblite- 
rated. The  sensory  experience  of  dreams  is  as  real  or  at 
least  may  be  as  real  as  the  sense  impressions  of  a  normal 
life,  and  a  scientifically  educated  man  knows  them  to  be 
dreams.  But  if  a  nervous  patient  or  the  untrained  Indian 
assumes  dreams  to  be  realities,  he  falls  into  an  error,  and 
then  his  dreams — especially  if  they  occur  in  a  half  awake 
state  of  mind  which  sometimes  may  happen — become  hal- 
lucinations. 

UNIVERSALS  AND  THEIR  CORRELATES. 

Thus  we  see  that  the  foundations  of  truth  are  laid  by 
nature  herself  in  accordance  with  natural  law  and  with 
the  same  precision  as  that  which  originates  in  a  machine 
by  mechanical  necessity.  This  mechanical  necessity  is  pos- 
sible only  on  the  supposition  that  the  world  is  law-ordained, 
that  the  beams  of  light  are  such  and  always  such,  that  the 
same  causes  under  the  same  conditions  always  produce  the 
same  results,  and  that  this  world  is  a  world  of  uniformities, 
not  a  sporadic  chaos.  If  the  world  were  a  sporadic  chaos, 
mind  could  not  have  originated  even  in  its  most  primitive 
beginning.  In  fact  mind  is  nothing  but  the  systematic 
upbuilding  of  the  lawdom  (Gesetxmdssigkeit)  that  pre- 
vails in  the  world,  and  we  may  say  that  this  lawdom  is  the 
ultimate  basis  of  truth;  it  is  the  condition  which  makes 
truth  possible. 

Facts  appear  to  be  chaotic.  Not  one  is  exactly  like  any 
other.  All  the  various  facts  that  appear  in  existence  pre- 
sent a  kaleidoscopic  irregularity  which  in  itself  appears 
to  be  a  hopelessly  confused  tangle.  If  mind  did  not  origi- 
nate, the  world  would  remain  a  meaningless  play  of  blind 
forces.  But  the  very  origin  of  mind  proves  that  law  rules 
in  the  world  of  facts,  and  all  these  innumerable  items  of 
material  existence  and  this  display  of  unlimited  forces  is 


THE  NATURE  OF  TRUTH.  IOI 

subject  to  rule,  which  makes  it  possible  to  formulate  all 
occurrences  into  general  formulas. 

There  has  been  much  discussion  in  the  history  of  phi- 
losophy about  universals,  and  two  contradictory  views  have 
been  taken  of  this  much  mooted  subject.  There  are  on  the 
one  side  thinkers  who  see  in  universals  the  only  true  real- 
ity, the  true  being  or  cWoos  6v,  and  on  the  other  side  ob- 
servers of  nature  who  look  upon  them  as  mere  generali- 
zations which  have  no  true  existence  and  have  been  in- 
vented merely  for  the  purpose  of  classifying  the  real  things. 
Both  views  are  right,  but  both  are  one-sided,  and  much 
depends  upon  the  meaning  of  the  word  "real."  If  it  means 
"thingish,"  as  the  word  implies,  universals  are  nonentities, 
for  they  are  not  things,  nor  objects,  nor  concrete  material 
bodies,  they  cannot  be  touched  by  hands  or  perceived  by 
any  one  of  the  senses. 

If  concrete  actuality  of  existence  is  the  meaning  of 
"real"  we  must  absolutely  grant  that  universals  do  not 
possess  reality.  From  this  standpoint  the  nominalists  speak 
of  universals  as  flatus  vocis,  as  words,  and  more  modern 
followers  of  this  line  of  thought  treat  them  as  devices  for 
thinking  the  realities  of  life.  Materially  considered  uni- 
versals are  non-existent.  They  are  products  of  the  scien- 
tist's imagination  and  neither  telescopes  nor  microscopes, 
no  chemist's  crucible  nor  physicist's  scales  will  ever  dis- 
cover the  slightest  trace  of  the  actual  existence  of  uni- 
versals, natural  laws,  formulas,  Platonic  Ideas,  or  any- 
thing that  belongs  to  that  class. 

Now  let  us  consider  the  opposite  view.  Does  the  nom- 
inalist school  or  any  one  of  their  type  really  mean  to  say 
that  universals  are  mere  flatus  vocis,  mere  generalizations, 
mere  contrivances  to  think  the  world  more  easily?  Many 
men  of  this  type  actually  say  so,  but  do  they  truly  mean  it  ? 
Would  they  really  be  prepared  to  say  that  universals  pos- 
sess no  objective  meaning,  that  there  is  nothing  corre- 


IO2  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

spending  to  them  in  the  actual  world?  We  have  granted 
that  no  actual  things,  no  material  entities  correspond  to 
them.  They  are  not  divinities  presiding  over  certain  de- 
partments of  nature  as  represented  in  the  mythology  of  the 
religions  of  the  past,  nor  are  they  metaphysical  essences 
which  somehow  mysteriously  underlie  the  phenomena  of 
nature.  Nevertheless  there  is  no  one  who  would  be  pre- 
pared to  deny  that  there  are  certain  somethings  corre- 
sponding to  them  in  the  actual  world,  and  that  these  some- 
things are  the  very  factors  which  shape  the  world.  These 
somethings  are  not  of  a  material  nature,  nor  are  they 
energies;  they  are  of  a  purely  formal  nature,  they  are  re- 
lations, shapes,  arrangements  of  parts  in  one  way  or  an- 
other. Yet  these  purely  formal  arrangements  are  the  es- 
sential conditions  of  the  world  of  material  actuality  which 
determine  new  formations,  and  so  we  cannot  say  that  in 
every  respect  they  are  nonentities. 

It  is  obvious  that  reality  or  thingishness  and  actuality, 
which  means  that  the  material  things  act,  that  they  do 
something,  that  they  move  about,  that  there  is  an  active 
play  of  forces  summarized  under  the  term  of  energy,  are 
not  the  whole  of  existence.  There  is  some  additional  fea- 
ture which  is  non-material  and  has  nothing  to  do  with 
energy.  It  is  the  shape,  the  interrelation,  the  form,  the 
direction,  the  arrangement  in  which  either  forces  or  mate- 
rial particles  are  combined,  and  this  interrelational  some- 
thing is  the  true  factor  that  moulds  the  world  and  is  the 
reason  why  this  enormous  congeries  of  atoms  is  not  a 
chaos  but  a  law-ordained  cosmos. 

We  must  not  overlook  the  fact  that  in  addition  to  form 
there  is  another  non-material  element  ensouling  the  world, 
and  this  is  that  indescribable  something  which  develops 
into  human  consciousness.  It  is  feeling,  the  peculiar  char- 
acteristic of  which  appears  in  awareness.  For  reasons 
into  which  we  need  not  enter  here,  we  assume  that  the 


THE  NATURE  OF  TRUTH.  IO3 

whole  world  is  aglow  with  a  potentiality  of  feeling,  which 
in  a  philosophical  term  we  may  call  subjectivity.  Subjectiv- 
ity emerges  from  purely  physical  conditions  and  finally  de- 
velops in  the  course  of  a  long  evolution  into  the  thinking 
subject.  But  even  this  psychic  element  of  subjectivity 
would  have  remained  forever  a  scintillating  chaos  of  sub- 
conscious feelings  if  its  elements  had  not  been  arranged 
into  an  orderly  whole  according  to  the  laws  of  pure  form. 
It  is  the  orderly  interrelation  of  elementary  subjectivity 
which  in  a  nervous  system  makes  feeling  possible;  it  is 
further  the  proper  classification  of  feelings  of  the  same 
form  which  renders  feelings  representative;  and  finally  it 
produces  reason  in  the  natural  course  of  the  evolution  of 
mentality. 

The  significance  of  interrelations,  of  the  mode  or  ar- 
rangement, of  form,  has  been  strangely  overlooked  in 
philosophy,  while  it  has  produced  in  minds  of  a  mystic 
turn  fantastic  views  as  to  the  nature  of  spirit,  soul  and 
God.  Opponents  of  mysticism  have  always  been  inclined 
to  deny  the  existence  of  anything  spiritual.  They  try  to  do 
without  believing  in  spirit,  soul,  or  God,  and  certainly  they 
are  right  in  denying  the  mythology  attached  to  these  no- 
tions. Nevertheless  the  facts  remain,  and  the  facts  which 
produce  these  notions  are  explicable  by  the  significance  of 
relations  and  forms,  and  though  the  purely  formal  laws 
as  laws  have  no  objective  existence,  there  are  purely  formal 
relations  which  are  of  utmost  importance,  and  though  they 
are  not  real  in  the  literal  sense  of  reality,  though  they  are 
not  thingish,  they  are  not  for  that  reason  negligible  quan- 
tities, for  they  are  the  most  essential  feature  of  all  exist- 
ence. In  fact  all  comprehension,  all  cognition,  all  intel- 
lectual activity  becomes  possible  only  through  them.  When 
we  speak  of  reality  and  actuality,  we  refer  merely  to  state- 
ments of  fact.  These  names — reality  and  actuality,  in  other 
words,  matter  and  energy — conta*"  nothing  that  can  be 


IO4  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

understood  or  would  become  in  any  way  an  object  of  com- 
prehension. All  comprehension  consists  in  tracing  trans- 
formations of  matter  or  the  changes  of  the  forms  of  energy. 
Matter  and  energy  simply  represent  the  "that"  of  exist- 
ence, not  the  why  or  the  wherefore. 

Accordingly  we  come  to  the  conclusion  that  there  are 
objective  correlates  of  our  subjective  thoughts,  of  univer- 
sals,  of  the  laws  of  nature,  and  also  of  the  unities  of  parts 
which  combine  into  things.  Though  they  are  neither  con- 
crete objects  nor  metaphysical  essences,  they  possess  an 
objective  significance.  They  are  traceable  in  the  uniformities 
of  nature  and  the  laws  in  which  we  summarize  these  uni- 
formities are  true  and  reliable  descriptions  of  definite  fea- 
tures of  the  constitution  of  the  world.  We  call  these  de- 
scriptions, these  laws  of  nature,  these  generalized  state- 
ments of  fact,  truths,  and  the  instinctive  reverence  which 
men  at  large  have  for  these  truths  is  well  grounded. 

THE   ONENESS    OF   ALL    TRUTHS. 

Experience  has  taught  us  to  look  upon  all  truths  as 
one  great  system  of  more  or  less  general  uniformities, 
which  are  co-,  sub-  and  super-ordinated  in  such  a  way 
that  all  of  them  complement  one  another  and  that  the 
more  general  truths  comprise  and  thereby  explain  the 
more  particular  ones,  while  the  latter  are  specifications  of 
the  former.  At  any  rate  we  expect  that  no  two  truths  shall 
contradict  one  another.  They  form  contrasts  but  never 
come  in  conflict  with  each  other.  The  more  they  stand  in 
contrast  the  more  they  are  supplementary.  This  leads  to 
the  assumption  of  the  unison,  the  harmoniousness,  the 
consistency,  of  all  truths.  To  state  the  case  from  the  oppo- 
site point  of  view,  we  assume  a  priori  that  there  cannot  be 
any  contradiction  in  truth,  and  so  we  try  to  harmonize  all 
contrasts  that  might  occur  in  the  field  of  our  observation. 

The  a  priori  assumption  of  the  unity  of  all  truth  which 


THE  NATURE  OF  TRUTH.  IO5 

finally  abuts  in  the  theory  of  the  oneness  and  consistency 
of  all  existence,  called  monism,  is  as  a  principle  of  thinking 
ultimately  based  in  the  systematic  unity  of  our  mind.  The 
human  mind  has  been  built  up  during  the  course  of  its  de- 
velopment as  a  collection  of  uniformities  and  these  uniform- 
ities have  classified  themselves  in  proper  order  according 
to  their  sameness,  similarity  and  kinship,  so  that  the  whole 
constitutes  a  system,  and  this  system  represents  the  proto- 
type of  logic.  The  rules  of  logic  have  been  deduced  from 
it,  and  in  this  sense  the  human  mind  is  predestined  to  pro- 
duce in  its  further  development  certain  ideas  which  such 
philosophers  as  Leibnitz  call  "innate." 

The  human  mind  has  reached  that  point  of  mental  de- 
velopment in  which  a  sentient  being  can  designate  by  name 
the  several  co-,  sub-  and  superordinated  classes  and  become 
conscious  of  their  interrelation.  The  animal  mind  cannot 
do  so  and  yet  it  acts  instinctively  as  if  it  were  possessed 
of  logic.  The  reason  is  that  its  composite  memory  images 
are  logically  arranged  and  operate  like  a  living  machine  in 
a  perfectly  logical  order.  Through  the  instrumentality 
of  language  this  interrelation  can  be  objectified  in  terms 
of  abstract  thought  and  presented  in  systematic  form.  This 
system  of  interrelations  becomes  a  conscious  faculty  of 
thought,  called  reason,  which  is  used  as  a  method  for  an 
orderly  arrangement  of  ideas.  In  its  highest  perfection 
the  application  of  this  method  is  called  science. 

Reason  enables  man  to  see  in  every  single  occurrence 
an  instance  of  a  general  rule,  and  if  general  rules  describe 
real  uniformities,  if  they  possess  correlates  in  the  objective 
world,  we  call  them  truths. 

We  understand  now  that  the  domain  of  truth  and  the 
realm  of  the  mind  are  coextensive,  and  mind  is  practically 
nothing  but  the  embodiment  of  the  most  common  truths 
of  the  world  order,  the  logic  of  which  in  its  systematized 
form  we  call  reason. 


IO6  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

• 

We  will  here  forestall  a  common  error  frequently  com- 
mitted by  beginners  and  would-be  philosophers,  which  is 
this,  that  the  most  general  truths  ought  to  contain  the  key 
to  all  the  riddles  of  the  world.  In  a  certain  sense  this  is  true 
enough  because  an  important  part  of  explanation  consists 
in  subsuming  a  certain  set  of  experiences  under  its  proper 
caption,  but  all  explanations  presuppose  also  a  knowledge 
of  the  reason  why  in  specific  cases  a  general  rule  will  pro- 
duce specific  results.  The  power  of  generalization  is  the 
first  development  of  mentality,  the  power  of  discrimination 
is  its  more  subtle  and  also  more  difficult  correlate.  Those 
who  praise  a  man  for  his  power  of  generalization,  forget 
that  the  savage,  as  well  as  the  superficial  investigator,  is 
great  in  generalizing  all  things,  but  that  he  is  weak  in 
making  the  necessary  discriminations.  In  fact,  wrong  gen- 
eralizations are  a  common  source  of  many  errors,  and  no 
scientist  can  attain  distinction  unless  he  is  keen  in  dis- 
crimination. 

Truths  are  discovered,  they  are  not  invented.  Though 
truths  belong  to  the  mind  and  exist  only  in  the  mind  in 
the  thinking  subject,  they  have  an  objective  significance 
and  describe  conditions  which  obtain  somewhere  or  some- 
how independent  of  the  mind. 

When  we  say  truths  are  discovered  we  mean  that  they 
cannot  be  different,  and  it  is  not  in  our  power  to  shape  them 
as  we  please.  They  are  predetermined  and  this  again  im- 
plies that  in  some  form  or  other  they  exist  as  potentialities. 
At  the  same  time  the  conditions  which  are  formulated  in  the 
laws  of  nature  are  potent  factors  of  reality;  they  are  the 
prototypes  of  our  truths  and  we  call  them  "verities."  While 
the  verities  in  their  totality  as  the  sum  total  of  the  deter- 
minants of  the  world  order  correspond  to  God  the  Creator 
or  God  the  Father  in  the  Christian  doctrine  of  the  Trinity, 
a  perfect  system  of  all  the  truths  would  correspond  to  God 
the  Son,  truths  being  incarnations  of  the  verities.  In  addi- 


THE  NATURE  OF  TRUTH.  1 07 

tion  to  the  contrast  between  verities  and  truths,  there  is  a 
middle  ground  composed  of  those  ideas  which  tend  to  set 
the  world  in  harmony  with  the  cosmic  order  and  these  are 
called  ideals.  These  ideals  in  so  far  as  they  pursue  the 
right  tendency  represent  the  third  person  of  the  Trinity, 
the  Holy  Ghost. 

Truths  are  subjective  statements,  but  the  reason  why 
they  are  truths  and  deserve  this  high  name  is  their  agree- 
ment with  their  objective  correlates,  and  it  is  noteworthy 
that  these  objective  correlates  are  not  concrete  things  but 
features  of  things,  relations,  proportions  of  interdepen- 
dence, and  other  items  or  events  determined  by  definite 
causes  such  as  can  be  subsumed  under  general  formulas. 
These  objective  correlates  of  truth  are  not  concrete  things, 
nor  divinities,  nor  metaphysical  essences ;  the  formulas  are 
mere  generalizations,  and  what  corresponds  to  them  are 
generalities  of  existence  which  however  are  not  nonentities. 
They  are  not  material,  not  concrete,  they  are  interrelations 
and  thus  belong  to  the  domain  of  pure  forms.  A  compre- 
hension of  them  transforms  sentient  creatures  from  the 
state  of  brute  animals  into  rational  beings,  and  the  objec- 
tive counterparts,  though  mere  interrelations  of  the  mate- 
rial universe,  constitute  the  factors  which  determine  its  de- 
velopment and  mould  the  inert  mass  of  material  existence 
into  that  grand  law-ordained  cosmos  as  which  we  com- 
prehend the  universe. 

The  formulas  which  correctly  describe  the  uniformities 
that  obtain  in  the  universe,  are  truths,  and  the  same  term 
is  sometimes  also  applied  to  their  objective  correlates;  but 
for  the  sake  of  clearness  we  here  distinguish  between  the 
two  and  have  called  the  latter  "verities." 

Pragmatism  denies  the  existence  of  verities.  It  does 
not  believe  in  consistency  and  repudiates  the  unity  of  truth. 
It  knows  only  truths  in  the  plural  and  these  truths  have 


IO8  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

no  objective  significance;  they  are  shifting  and  without 
stability. 

The  better  we  know  the  uniformities  of  nature,  of  so- 
cial interrelations  and  of  all  the  phases  of  life,  the  more 
profoundly  conversant  do  we  become  with  the  constitution 
of  the  universe,  or  in  other  words,  the  more  we  know  of 
truth  the  farther  does  our  soul  extend  and  the  deeper  does 
it  fathom  the  world.  Truths  are  the  subjective  reflection 
of  the  verities  that  sustain  the  universe.  The  more  we 
know  of  truth,  the  higher  shall  we  rise  in  the  course  of  evo- 
lution, the  better  adapted  shall  we  be  to  the  conditions  of 
life,  the  more  powerful  shall  we  become,  the  higher  shall 
be  our  dignity  and  our  worth,  and  the  nearer  shall  we  be 
unto  God, — for  what  is  God  but  that  systematic  unison  of 
all  the  correlates  of  truth?  God  is  the  oneness  of  all  the 
verities  of  existence. 

In  the  same  way  as  uniformities  are  not  mere  subjective 
notions,  not  mere  names,  but  designate  definite  conditions 
in  the  objective  world,  the  things  \vhich  we  meet  with  in 
experience  are  not  mere  conglomerations  of  parts.  True 
things,  by  which  we  here  mean  objects  of  experience  which 
are  rightly  conceived  as  unities  are  not  arbitrarily  so  named 
and  are  not  of  a  purely  subjective  nature.  The  unity  of 
the  thing  in  our  conception  corresponds  to  a  unity  of  its 
parts  in  the  objective  world.  It  is  true  that  what  we  call 
things  are  bundles  of  sensations,  and  we  can  analyze  things 
into  their  constituent  parts,  but  the  bond  of  union  is  of 
deep  significance.  An  engine  is  not  the  sum  total  of  its 
parts,  but  the  arrangement  of  its  parts  in  such  an  inter- 
relation that  it  will  do  work,  and  so  we  must  grant  that 
combinations,  groupings,  forms,  interrelations  produce  de- 
finite and  actual  effects. 

And  what  is  the  test  that  an  aggregate  of  parts  con- 
stitutes a  true  unity,  a  thing  worthy  of  the  name  ?  A  true 
thing  must  not  be  a  mere  addition  of  its  parts,  not  a  mere 


THE  NATURE  OF  TRUTH.         „  IO9 

summation  of  its  elements,  not  a  mechanical  mixture  of  its 
ingredients,  but  a  combination  into  a  systematic  whole 
which  possesses  an  individuality  of  its  own;  and  the  test 
is  that  a  thing  which  is  not  a  mere  quantitative  aggregate 
but  constitutes  a  higher  configuration  into  something  new 
is  qualitatively  different  from  its  parts. 

To  look  upon  formations,  the  relational  factors,  or  the 
purely  formal  aspect  of  things  as  nonentities,  because  they 
are  not  material  items  is  a  misconception  of  the  paramount 
significance  of  form.  I  not  only  grant,  I  even  insist  most 
emphatically  that  there  are  no  "things-in-themselves,"  no 
unknown  or  unknowable  metaphysical  magnitudes  behind 
the  world  of  experience,  but  for  all  that  I  recognize  the 
objective  significance  of  things,  the  efficiency  of  formations, 
of  natural  laws,  of  uniformities,  and  also  the  importance 
of  the  idea  of  unity,  the  highest  realizations  of  which  are 
found  in  organisms,  plants,  animals  and  above  all  in  human 
personalities. 


CONCLUSION. 

'  I  "RUTH  has  been  on  trial.  The  very  backbone  of  truth, 
J.  its  consistency,  the  unison  of  all  truths,  has  been 
doubted  and  even  denied.  The  belief  in  the  stability  of 
truth,  in  its  persistence  and  eternality,  has  been  denounced 
as  a  superstition. 

So  far  truth  has  guided  us  safely  from  the  beginning 
of  mentality ;  it  has  endowed  man  with  reason,  it  has  cre- 
ated the  sciences,  inspired  the  inventor's  imagination  and 
is  still  leading  mankind  onward  on  the  path  of  progress, 
but  it  has  grown  old-fashioned,  and  the  new  generation 
has  become  tired  of  it.  The  old  truth  is  the  living  water 
which  nourishes,  sustains  and  quickens  every  fiber  of  our 
mental  constitution,  but  this  generation  is  thirsty  for  inno- 
vations. They  are  sick  of  the  monotony  of  a  truth  that  is 
true  to  itself;  they  hanker  for  a  truth  that  is  variegated, 
fickle,  multi-significant.  So  they  leave  this  venerable  ideal 
and  look  upon  it  as  an  idol.  It  no  longer  fits  into  the  pro- 
gram of  the  "new  thought"  movement,  and  pragmatism 
replaces  it  by  a  more  elastic  kind  of  truth  which  can  change 
with  the  fashions  and  makes  it  possible  that  we  need  no 
longer  trouble  about  inconsistencies;  for  what  is  true  to 
one  need  no  longer  be  true  to  others,  and  the  truth  of  to-day 
may  be  the  real  now,  and  yet  it  may  become  the  error  of 
to-morrow.  The  new  conception  of  truth  flatly  contradicts 
the  old  rigorous  and  inconvenient  notion  according  to 
which  no  two  truths  can  be  contradictory.  The  pluralistic 


CONCLUSION.  Ill 

truth  is  more  accommodating,  for  it  lets  all  contradictions 
pass  and  dispenses  with  the  exacting  demands  of  the  old 
ideal  of  consistency. 

This  new  truth  conception  is  a  fad  that  has  its  day  but 
will  pass  by,  for  truth,  the  old  time-worn  and  time-honored 
ideal  of  truth  as  being  one  and  eternal,  will  sooner  or  later 
assert  itself  again.  We  cannot  live  without  truth,  and  the 
new  truth  is  a  pseudo-truth  that  cannot  help  us.  Those 
who  resent  truth's  sternness  and  stability  prefer  to  conceive 
truth  as  an  errant  light  which  points  in  one  direction  to- 
day and  in  another  to-morrow.  This  truth  is  a  will-o'-the- 
wisp  which  does  not  throw  light  on  the  path  of  progress 
but  entices  its  followers  to  wend  their  way  into  the  quag- 
mire of  opinions  and  opinionated  subjectivism. 

In  the  meantime  the  truth  continues  to  encompass  us, 
for  tf uly  all  our  mental  life  lives  by  the  grace  of  truth,  and 
in  it  every  creature  that  thinks,  lives  and  moves  and  has 
its  being. 

Truth,  most  wonderful  presence  in  the  life  of  man,  thou 
encompassest  our  every  throb  of  thought.  Thou  art  God 
incarnate  in  our  soul.  Without  thee  spirituality  would 
never  have  risen  into  being,  the  light  of  cognition  would 
not  shine,  and  chaotic  darkness  would  prevail.  Without 
thee  this  world  would  be  a  congeries  of  dull  matter  and  a 
play  of  blind  forces  void  of  meaning  and  void  of  purpose. 

How  ineffably  great  art  thou,  O  Truth,  and  yet  thou 
hidest  even  in  things  trivial.  The  senses  can  not  find 
thee,  for  thou  art  not  made  of  matter,  nor  dost  thou  consist 
of  force.  Thou  residest  in  the  meaning  of  fleeting  sensa- 
tions, and  thy  significance  is  a  mere  relation,  a  description 
of  the  uniformities  of  nature.  And  yet  thou  alone  pos- 
sessest  dignity,  thou  alone  art  worthy  to  be  called  divine, 
and  thou  art  the  son  of  that  All-One  whom  thou  revealest, 
that  One  in  All  who  sways  motes  and  stars  and  moulds  the 
destinies  of  all  the  worlds. 


112  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

Thou  needest  no  shrines  and  no  altars  and  thou  de- 
mandest  no  doxologies.  There  is  no  worship  that  pleaseth 
thee,  except  the  worship  without  ritual,  a  surrender  of 
error,  of  falsehood,  of  lies.  He  is  thy  true  devotee  who  re- 
ceiveth  thee  in  his  soul  and  inviteth  thy  presence  to  bless 
him. 

The  ideal  of  truth  may  remain  neglected  or  misunder- 
stood for  some  time,  but  its  light  will  not  be  darkened  for- 
ever. We  need  not  fear  for  truth,  because  truth  will  take 
care  of  itself.  The  cause  of  truth  is  God's  cause,  for  truth 
reflects  and  reveals  the  eternal,  and  the  eternal  is  God. 


AN  APPENDIX  ON  PRAGMATISM. 

A  GERMAN  CRITIC  OF  PRAGMATISM  * 

TUDWIG  Stein  of  Berne,  editor  of  the  Archiv  fur  systematische 
JL_^  Philosophic,  publishes  a  criticism  of  pragmatism  in  a  recent  num- 
ber of  his  periodical  (XIV,  Part  II).  His  summary  of  the  history  of 
the  word  will  be  interesting  both  to  pragmatists  and  to  people  in 
general  who  are  interested  in  pragmatism,  for  he  points  out  that 
pragmatism  is  not  even  a  "new  name  for  old  ways  of  thinking, 
but  that  both  the  pragmatic  method  and  the  name  in  its  most  modern 
sense  are  ancient."  He  says  (pp.  143-5)  '• 

"The  expressions  pragma1  and  pragmateia2  occur  in  Plato's 
dialogue  Cratylos,  but  especially  in  the  logical  writings  of  Aristotle 
(see  the  Aristotelian  Index  of  Bonitz)  as  frequently  as  they  are 
rare  in  post-Aristotelian,  particularly  in  the  pre-Socratic,  philosophy. 
The  meaning  of  the  word  pragma  varies  between  'thing/  'object'  and 
'reality'  ____ 

"According  to  Aristotle  the  linguistic  phonetic  symbol3  bears 
the  same  relation  to  the  concept4  as  the  name5  bears  to  the  object.8 
In  this  case  the  word  pragma  means  the  concrete  individual  object. 
Aristotle  shows  perfectly  the  distinction  between  figures  and  phonetic 
symbols  (De  soph,  clench.,  cap.  I,  p.  i65a,  7).  He  says  that  we  can 
never  cognize  things  (pragma},  but  we  only  utilize  names  as  sym- 
bols of  things.  Therefore  we  erroneously  confuse  the  name  and 
the  thing  it  stands  for  in  that  when  performing  calculations  as  in 
the  cipher  code  we  substitute  the  name  for  the  thing.  In  the  logic 
of  Aristotle  the  object,  pragma,  plays  an  important  role  in  opposition 
to  the  name,  onoma.  The  Aristotelian  Index  of  Bonitz  enumerates 
dozens  of  passages  under  the  catch-words  pragma,  pragmateia,  and 
pragmateuesthai.1  Once  even  the  expression  pragmatologein*  ap- 

*  Republished  from  The  Monist,  Jan.,  1909. 

1  irpa.ypa.  *  wpaynareia.  *  ffijuelov.  *v6ijfta 


Vpcry/uaretfeotfat. 


1  14  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

pears  (1439/1?  20).  The  opposition  between  pragma  and  onotna  seems 
to  have  been  familiar  in  Socratic  circles  presumably  even  as  early 
as  in  the  time  of  the  Sophists  ..... 

"However,  with  Aristotle  we  find  the  expression  pragma  used 
also  in  the  very  same  meaning  which  Peirce  and  James  assign  to  the 
word  to-day.  Aristotle  sometimes  understands  by  it  the  real  em- 
pirical fact  in  opposition  to  that  which  is  merely  thought,  that  is  to 
say,  pure  thought-entities  (entia  rationis).  In  his  logical  writings 
and  in  the  Metaphysics  Aristotle  distinguishes  repeatedly  between 
the  ideal9  and  the  real."10 

On  page  148  Professor  Stein  criticises  James's  etymology  of 
the  term  praxis11  as  "at  least  one-sided."  He  goes  on  to  say: 

"This  is  the  definition  given  by  the  greatest  leader  of  the 
Stoics,  Chrysippus,  according  to  Laertius  Diogenes  (VII,  94)  :  good 
is  that  which  is  morally  useful,  and  evil  is  that  which  is  morally 
harmful.  The  question  of  the  telos12  is  the  central  point  of  their 
ethics.  Every  good,  we  read,  (loc.  cit.  VII,  98)  is  profitable.13  We 
call  that  profitable  which  is  of  use  to  us.14  Since  Aristotle  had 
made  the  statement  that  in  nature  there  is  nothing  useless  and 
nothing  happens  in  vain,16  the  Stoics  caricature  this  utilitarian  prin- 
ciple to  the  point  of  absolute  folly.  In  Chrysippus  utility  degen- 
erates to  a  farce.  According  to  Cicero  (De  Natura  Deorum  11,  13, 
37),  everything  exists  in  the  world  only  for  the  sake  of  the  gods 
and  man  :  the  horse  for  riding,  the  ox  for  plowing,  the  dog  for  hunt- 
ing and  watching.  The  gradation  of  creatures  is  equally  utilitarian 
with  a  view  toward  the  benefit  of  the  human  race  which  comprises 
the  center  of  the  universe,  as  the  human  community  itself  is  derived 
and  founded  for  purely  utilitarian  ends  (Cicero,  De  Finibus,  III,  20, 
67).  And  so  accordingly  the  real  founder  of  pragmatism,  Peirce, 
refers  to  the  connection  of  his  ideas  with  those  of  the  Stoics. 

"In  Baldwin's  Dictionary  of  Philosophy  and  Psychology,  II, 
323,  under  the  catch-word  "Pragmatism"  the  originators  of  the 
term,  Peirce  and  James,  give  their  position.  Etymologically  the 
following  derivation  is  given:  'Pragmatism  (Gr.  pragmatikos,19 
versed  in  affairs).'  This  derivation  as  shown  above  is  historically 
untenable.  Only  pragma  and  pragmateia  are  customary  terms,  not 
pragmatikos.  Then,  too,  pragma  in  Plato  and  Aristotle  never  means 
'versed  in  affairs,'  that  is  to  say,  versatile,  skillful,  intelligent,  ex- 


•  diKvoia.  **  vp&ffuiffi.  u  rpa£ts. 


AN  APPENDIX  ON  PRAGMATISM.  115 

perienced ;  but  first  of  all  it  means  an  object  or  thing  in  opposition 
to  a  name  or  phonetic  symbol.  In  post-Aristotelian  philosophy 
indeed  the  expression  pragma  or  pragmateia  disappears  from  use. 
In  the  Doxographi  Graeci  of  H.  Diels  this  expression  occurs  in  only 
half  a  dozen  passages  in  all.  The  later  the  word  pragma  is  used 
the  more  the  emphasis  is  laid  upon  the  practical  meaning  which  has 
been  pushed  to  the  foreground  by  Peirce  and  James,  and  in  general 
the  post-Aristotelian  philosophy  shifts  the  center  of  gravity  from 
theory  to  practice,  from  logic  and  physics  to  ethics.  The  good  is 
no  longer  referred  to  the  true  but  the  true  is  referred  to  the  good. 
And  this  is  the  kernel  of  the  pragmatism  of  Peirce  and  James. 

PRAGMATISM,  A  TELEOLOGICAL  VIEW. 

"Consequences  are  the  decisive  epistemological  viewpoint  of 
Peirce  and  James.  Exactly  as  we  have  recognized  an  ethics  of 
consequence  ever  since  the  first  utilitarians,  the  Cyrenaics  or  hedon- 
ists, that  is  to  say,  the  ethics  of  utility,  later  so  called  by  Ben- 
tham  and  Mill,  there  lies  in  pragmatism  an  attempt  to  formulate  a 
logic  of  consequence.  Let  James's  definition  be  placed  side  by  side 
with  that  above  given  by  Peirce  (Peirce  has  repeated  his  definition 
in  Baldwin's  Dictionary  s.  v.  'Pragmatism').  Pragmatism  is,  ac- 
cording to  James,  'the  doctrine  that  the  whole  "meaning"  of  the 
conception  expresses  itself  in  practical  consequences'  (the  italics  are 
mine),  consequences  either  in  the  shape  of  conduct  to  be  recom- 
mended or  in  that  of  experience  to  be  expected,  if  the  conception  is 
true 

"The  expression  'pragmatic'  had  a  historical  sound  long  before 
Peirce  used  it.  The  'pragmatic  sanction'  of  Charles  VI  established 
the  Austrian  succession  according  to  the  requirements  of  utility  in 
the  interest  of  principles  which  served  the  public  welfare,  and 
even  in  German  usage  an  intelligent  foresighted  and  able  person 
is  called  a  pragmatic  fellow  (ein  pragmatischer  Kopf)  without  any 
evil  secondary  meaning.  Moreover,  the  'pragmatic  method'  has 
been  naturalized  in  historiography  much  longer  than  Peirce  and 
James  imagine.  The  'Text  Book  of  the  Historical  Method'  by  Ernst 
Bernheim  devotes  an  entire  section  to  the  instructive  pragmatic 
method  of  history  (Lehrbuch  der  historischen  Methode,  p.  17  ff.). 
Bernheim  defines  the  essence  of  pragmatic  historiography  as  fol- 
lows: 'At  this  stage  matter  does  not  appear  desirable  for  its  own 
sake  alone,  but  on  account  of  definite  practical  applications;  man 
must  learn  something  for  practical  purposes  from  events  of  the 


1  16  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

past.'  The  first  conclusive  representative  of  the  pragmatic  stand- 
point is  Thucydides.  Polybius  introduced  the  term  'pragmatic  his- 
tory'17 (Hist.  I,  cap.  2).  The  mistakes  of  the  pragmatic  method 
of  historiography  are  subjectivity  and  a  tendency  against  objectivity. 
And  these  also  are  the  reefs  along  which  the  philosophical  prag- 
matism of  a  James  or  Schiller  must  steer  carefully,  as  we  will  show 
later  ---- 

"Where  Peirce  has  picked  up  the  word  'pragmatism,'  whether 
in  Kant  or  in  Aristotle,  he  himself  is  not  aware.  The  expression 
apparently  was  in  the  air.  Peirce  himself  informs  us18  that  thirty 
years  previously  in  his  above  mentioned  publication  he  had  set  in 
motion  the  subject  although  not  the  word  of  pragmatism.  He  had 
only  used  this  expression  in  oral  conversation  until  James,  who  was 
not  acquainted  with  him  when  he  wrote  The  Will  to  Believe,  had 
appropriated  it  and  put  his  stamp  upon  it  as  a  philosophical  term. 
In  my  book  Leibniz  und  Spinoza  (Berlin,  Reimer,  1890)  I  have 
made  the  statement  that  Leibnitz  had  the  same  experience  with  his 
term  'monad.'  It  is  true  he  met  occasionally  with  the  term  in  Plato, 
but  it  was  not  until  his  intercourse  with  the  younger  van  Helmont  at 
the  court  of  Queen  Sophia  Charlotte,  that  he  definitely  appropriated 
and  set  in  circulation  this  term  whose  meaning  had  been  heightened 
by  van  Helmont.  However,  not  only  did  Peirce  happen  upon  the 
expression  'pragmatism'  as  a  designation  of  his  theory  of  activity 
but  simultaneously,  although  quite  independently,  it  was  coined  by 
the  French  thinker  Maurice  Blondel,  the  advocate  of  a  'philosophy 
of  action.'  Andre  Lalande  in  his  treatise  'Pragmatism  and  Prag- 
maticism'  (Revue  Philosophique,  1906,  p.  123)  relates  how  Blondel 
had  answered  his  question  about  the  discovery  of  the  term  prag- 
matism as  follows:  'I  proposed  the  name  of  pragmatism  to  myself 
in  the  year  1888,  and  I  am  conscious  of  having  invented  it  as  I  never 
before  had  met  with  the  term,  etc.'  In  his  work  'Action'  he  ana- 
lysed the  difference  between  praxis,  pragma  and  poiesis,19  and  de- 
cided upon  the  expression  pragmatism  at  a  time  when  Peirce  had 
used  it  only  in  oral  discourse.  This  duplication  of  the  incident  is  not 
surprising,  especially  since  this  designation  was  made  obvious  by  the 
pragmatic  historiography  then  in  vogue.  Yet  as  early  as  the  year 
1867  Conrad  Herrmann  wrote  a  'History  of  Philosophy  Treated 


Iffropla 
M  "What  Pragmatism  Is,"  Monist,  April,  1905. 


AN  APPENDIX  ON  PRAGMATISM.  117 

Pragmatically.'20  In  this  Herrmann  expresses  his  opinion  on  the 
subject  of  the  pragmatic  method  in  the  science  of  the  history  of 
philosophy,  that  the  impression  of  the  pragmatic  seemed  to  him 
the  most  suitable  for  his  style  of  historical  representation  (Preface, 
p.  vii)  :  'The  expression  of  the  pragmatic  indicates  in  and  for  itself 
only  the  simple  real  or  properly  actual  in  things,  and  it  apparently 
coincides  with  the  concept  of  a  merely  narrative  or  purely  empirical 
presentation  of  history'  (he.  cit.,  p.  viii).  In  this  connection  Herr- 
mann sets  himself  in  conscious  opposition  to  the  speculative  method 
of  Hegel  (p.  463  ff.) :  'Pragmatism  is  the  only  true  scientific  prin- 
ciple for  the  treatment  of  historical  material.  The  essense  of  all 
historical  pragmatism  is  to  eliminate  chance  from  history  and  to 
place  in  its  stead  causative  necessity.  The  pragmatic  method  should 
have  the  individual  data  to  combine  in  a  whole  system.  Pragmatic 
historiography  should  not  work  with  principles  but  with  facts.'  In 
a  special  essay  'The  Pragmatic  Sequence  in  the  History  of  Philos- 
ophy/ Conrad  Herrmann  had  previously  laid  down  his  program 
according  to  which  all  historical  pragmatism  'should  have  a  definite 
practical  point.'  Exactly  this  'practical  point'  James  has  evidently 
adopted.  He  did  not  need  to  give  a  'new  name'  to  'old  methods,' 
especially  the  methods  which  arose  under  Thucydides  and  those 
theorists  among  the  sophists  who  advocated  the  right  of  might, 
but  the  name  itself  has  had  a  historical  ring  since  the  time  of  Poly- 
bius  and  a  philosophical  ring  ever  since  Plato  and  Aristotle." 

According  to  Stein  the  trend  of  pragmatism  is  a  teleological 
view  of  the  world  in  contrast  to  the  aeteological  view  of  science 
now  commonly  accepted  by  naturalists.  Says  Stein  (p.  156)  : 

"The  kernel  of  the  pragmatic  method  consists  in  referring  the 
logical  to  the  teleological.  Every  method  of  classifying  a  thing, 
says  James  (The  Will  to  Believe,  p.  76)  is  only  a  method  of  apply- 
ing it  to  some  particular  purpose.  Concepts  and  classes  are  teleo- 
logical instruments." 

UTILITY  AS  A  CRITERION  OF  TRUTH. 

• 

Professor  Stein  says  on  page  146,  that  pragmatism  is  prac- 
tically neither  more  nor  less  than  a  theory  of  truth.  It  proposes 
a  new  criterion  of  truth  which  gives  life  and  color  to  this  philosoph- 
ical movement  that  is  spreading  with  lightning  speed.  He  says: 

"This  criterion  of  truth  which  is  found  in  pragmatism — the 

"  Geschichte  der  Philosophie  in  pragntatischer  Behandlung.    Leipsic,  Flei- 
scher. 


Il8  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

utility  of  cognition,  its  suitability,  its  efficiency  or  power  to  work — 
C.  S.  Peirce  himself  has  formulated  clearly  and  tersely  in  a  later 
essay  ('What  Pragmatism  Is/  Monist,  April  1905,  p.  171):  'Con- 
sider what  effects  that  might  conceivably  have  practical  bearings 
you  conceive  the  object  of  your  conception  to  have;  then  your  con- 
ception of  those  effects  is  the  whole  of  your  conception  of  the  ob- 
ject.' Some  years  earlier  Georg  Simmel,  whom  James  indeed  claims 
as  a  typical  pragmatist  (with  incomparably  greater  right  moreover 
than  R.  Eucken  whose  theory  of  activity  follows  Fichte  much  more 
closely  than  Mills  and  Spencer)  in  the  first  volume  of  the  Archiv 
fur  systematische  Philosophie  (1895)  found  a  much  terser  wording 
without  even  knowing  the  name  pragmatism  or  having  in  mind  this 
tendency  which  even  then  lay  potentially  in  embryo.  The  treatise, 
Ueber  eine  Beziehung  der  Selektionstheorie  zur  Erkenntnistheorie, 
concludes  with  the  following  words  which  might  be  placed  as  a 
motto  for  pragmatism :  'The  utility  of  cognition  produces  at  the 
same  time  the  objects  of  cognition'  (p.  45). 

"Simmel  sees  in  the  utility  of  cognition  the  primary  factor 
which  matures  certain  methods  of  procedure  so  that  'originally  cog- 
nition was  not  first  called  true  and  then  useful,  but  first  useful  and 
afterwards  true.'  This  criterion  of  truth  by  its  tendency  towards 
an  act  of  selection  receives  from  Simmel  that  biological  bent  which 
has  prevailed  since  the  appearance  in  the  field  of  Avenarius  and 
Mach.  The  thought  is  itself  essentially  Leibnitzian.  Leibnitz  con- 
cedes true  existence  only  to  that  which  w>rks  (quod  agit}.  In  Eng- 
land and  America  this  criterion  of  truth  has  been  given  the  epithet 
'instrumental'  in  contrast  to  'normative.' ': 

PROTAGORAS  REDIVIVUS. 

The  tendency  is  in  the  air,  but  Professor  James  has  made 
himself  the  standard  bearer  of  the  movement.  Stein  says: 

"At  first  pragmatists  sailed  under  various  flags.  Those  who 
were  of  an  especially  logical  turn,  originally  called  themselves  'in- 
tentional' or  'instrumental.'  James  was  called  a  'radical  empiricist' 
before  he  brought  forward  the  word  in  the  year  1898  in  a  lecture 
before  Professor  Howison's  philosophical  union  at  the  University 
of  California,  and  made  a  special  application  of  it  to  religion. 
(Cf.  Pragmatism,  p.  47).  F.  C.  S.  Schiller  was  called  'humanist' 
before  he  joined  James  and  adopted  the  designation  'pragmatism' 
for  his  world-conception.  And  so  summing  up  we  can  well  say 
that  the  same  struggle  which  took  place  in  the  last  decade  in  Ger- 


AN  APPENDIX  ON  PRAGMATISM. 

many  between  psychologists  and  logicians — the  polemical  pamphlet 
of  Melchior  Palagyi  gives  the  best  account  of  the  situation — on  the 
other  side  of  the  water  takes  the  form  of  a  skirmish  between  prag- 
matists  and  spiritualists  or  idealists,  pur  sang.  Protagoras  is  the 
model  of  the  one  party  (Schiller  professes  to  follow  Protagoras 
as  perhaps  also  Laas  and  Mach),  Plato  that  of  the  other.  A  new 
wine  in  old  bottles.  The  sentimentalism  of  the  pragmatism  of 
James  comes  from  Protagoras,  but  on  the  other  hand  he  owes  both 
method  and  expression  to  Aristotle." 

Whether  Professor  Stein  is  right  in  regarding  pragmatism  as 
opposed  to  "spiritualism  or  idealism  pur  sang"  is  rather  doubtful, 
for  we  must  remember  that  Professor  James  himself  and  many  of 
his  adherents  have  vigorously  defended  some  of  the  most  disputed 
facts  of  spiritualistic  seances.  It  is  well  known  that  to  the  last  Pro- 
fessor James  believed  in  the  genuineness  of  occult  phenomena  and 
communications  from  the  dead  to  the  living. 

THE  SUPREMACY  OF  THE  WILL. 

Pragmatism  is  a  strange  compound  of  many  contradictory  con- 
ceptions and  it  is  probable  that  Professor  Stein  systematizes  it 
more  than  the  pragmatists  themselves  would  approve.  Pragmatism 
is  in  a  word  sentimentalism,  that  is  to  say,  it  places  all  reality  in 
sentiment.  This  is  done  also  by  Mach  in  so  far  as  Mach  deems 
sensations  to  be  the  ultimate  realities.  Yet  for  all  that,  James  draws 
other  conclusions  and  incorporates  in  his  conception  of  sentiment 
many  things  which  Mach  would  cut  out  as  illusions.  There  is  an 
unmistakable  kinship  between  Schopenhauer,  Nietzsche  and  James 
as  pointed  out  by  Professor  Stein.  He  says: 

"The  kernel  of  the  whole  matter  is  the  supremacy  of  the  will, 
practical  reason  as  Kant  would  say,  over  thought.  Therefore 
James  also  is  a  much  stricter  voluntarist  or  activist  than,  say, 
Wundt;  he  approaches  more  nearly  the  theory  of  the  supremacy 
of  feeling  over  understanding  as  it  was  prevalent  in  the  English 
sentimentalist  philosophy  of  the  eighteenth  century,  and  is  to-day 
in  the  psychological  school  of  Th.  Ribot  in  France  and  in  the 
'world-conception  theory'  of  H.  Gomperz  in  Vienna.  The  voluntarism 
of  Schopenhauer  receives  in  James  as  well  as  in  Ribot  the  Hamann- 
Jacobi  tendency  which  Goethe  once  expressed  in  the  terse  formula 
'sentiment  is  everything'  (Gefuhl  ist  alles}.  Quite  without  justi- 
fication James  leads  a  passionate  polemic  against  Herbert  Spencer 
in  whom  he  sees  his  opposite  pole  with  relation  to  the  theory  of 


I2O  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

cognition,  while  Spencer  in  his  latest  works  teaches  entirely  and 
without  reserve  supremacy  of  feeling  as  much  as  James  and  Ribot. 
Whoever  reads  Spencer's  treatise  'Feelings  versus  Intellect'  in  his 
last  work  Facts  and  Comments  (1902)  will  find  the  following  sen- 
tences which  appear  literally  in  Duns  Scotus,  but  which  are  no  less 
decisive  than  those  of  James:  'The  chief  component  of  mind  is 
feeling'  (p.  25) ...  .'emotions  are  the  masters  and  intellect  the 
servant'  (p.  30).  That  is  the  James-Ribot  form  of  the  voluntarism 
of  Schopenhauer. . . . 

"The  voluntarist  James  should  take  one  step  farther  and  enlist 
himself  in  the  ranks  of  the  great  voluntarists  and  energeticists  from 
the  Scotists  to  Fichte's  'being  springs  from  doing,'  and  Nietzsche's 
'will  for  power.'  In  reality  the  question  in  pragmatism  is  nothing 
else  than  a  consistent  development  of  the  supremacy  of  practical 
reason  not  in  a  sense  of  a  Kant-Platonizing  concept-realism  but  in 
the  style  of  that  innate  nominalism  which  has  pervaded  England 
since  Duns  Scotus,  Roger  Bacon  and  William  Occam.  For  already 
with  these  English  nominalists,  as  is  the  case  to-day  with  James, 
an  extreme  voluntarism  was  combined  with  the  supremacy  of  the 
practical  reason,  an  epistemological  nominalism  with  an  ethical  in- 
dividualism." 

KANT'S  OPINION  OF  PRAGMATISM. 

Professor  James  who  often  has  his  fling  at  Kant  may  be  sur- 
prised to  find  that  there  is  a  great  probability  that  the  word  prag- 
matism is  directly  derived  from  Kant.  It  is  interesting  to  read 
what  Professor  Stein  has  to  say: 

"Kant  is  perhaps  the  innocent  cause  that  the  name  pragmatism 
has  been  taken  up  and  has  been  made  the  small  coin  of  daily  philo- 
sophical intercourse.  In  this  connection  I  am  thinking  less  about 
the  title  of  Kant's  anthropology  which  Kant  himself  labeled  'prag- 
matically considered'  (in  pragmatischer  Hinsicht),  than  of  Kant's 
preface  to  this  work  in  which  the  pragmatic  is  opposed  to  the 
physiological:  'The  physiological  knowledge  of  man  rests  upon  the 
investigation  of  what  nature  makes  of  man ;  the  pragmatic,  on  that 
which  as  a  free  agent  he  makes  of  himself  or  can  and  should  make 
of  himself.'  So  according  to  Kant  all  rules  of  intelligence,  for 
instance,  are  pragmatic  (Grundlegung  zur  Metaphysik  der  Sitten, 
p.  42,  Rosenkranz  ed.).  Everything  practical  which  serves  human 
welfare  he  calls  pragmatic.  'The  practical  principle  derived  from  the 
hankering  after  happiness  I  call  pragmatic'  (Kritik  der  reinen  Ver- 


AN  APPENDIX  ON  PRAGMATISM.  121 

nunft,  p.  611).  Hence  according  to  Kant,  pragmatism  would  be  a 
rule  of  prudence  or  a  utilitarian  demand  of  merely  accidental  persua- 
sive power.  The  distinctive  mark  of  the  useful  and  the  universally 
valid  is  derived  from  pragmatic  cognition.  It  is  only  a  belief,  not 
knowledge  (Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft,  p.  623).  And  indeed  the 
question  is  not  of  a  necessary  but  of  an  accidental  belief.  'I  call 
such  accidental  beliefs  which  however  lie  at  the  bottom  of  the 
actual  employment  of  the  means  to  certain  actions,  pragmatic  be- 
liefs' (Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft,  p.  628).  Thus  we  may  see  that 
according  to  Kant  a  pragmatic  conception  of  truth  such  as  James 
and  Schiller  have  to-day  established,  represents  pretty  well  the  first 

step  to  the  knowledge  of  truth 

"The  utilitarian  is  the  undertone  of  the  pragmatic,  and  exactly 
this  pragmatic  utilitarian  sous  entendu  is  as  great  a  discord  to  the 
ear  of  the  German  idealist  of  Konigsberg  as  it  is  sweet  harmony 
flattering  the  ear  of  the  'smart'  American.  For  Kant,  utility  is  a 
counter-argument  to  absolute  moral  worth,  hence  the  pragmatically 
useful  method  of  observation  or  treatment  is  only  of  value  in  orien- 
tating, as  a  card  catalogue  or  alphabetical  arrangement  is  to  the 
librarian,  for  these  are  always  better  as  rules  of  wisdom  than  ab- 
solute disorder.  But  such  a  pragmatic  arrangement  is  in  the  most 
favorable  instance  an  artificial,  even  though  ever  so  useful,  classi- 
fication of  the  schools,  but  not  a  classification  made  by  nature.  The 
distinction  between  pragmatic  classification  and  the  accuracy  of  the 
classification  according  to  nature  is  according  to  Kant  a  fundamental 
one  (Werke,  VI,  315)  ;  the  classification  of  the  schools  has  only 
one  purpose,  namely  to  bring  created  things  under  their  proper 
title,  the  classification  according  to  nature  endeavors  instead  to  bring 
them  under  laws." 

CONTRASTS  RECONCILED. 

Professor  Stein's  tendency  to  systematize  appears  in  the  fol- 
lowing comment.  He  says: 

"Heinrich  von  Stein  in  his  'Seven  Books  on  the  History  of 
Platonism'  has  produced  the  convincing  proof  that  philosophical 
thought  has  vibrated  back  and  forth  in  constant  rhythm  for  two 
thousand  years  between  Plato  and  Aristotle.  This  is  true  as  well 
of  the  twentieth  century  as  of  its  predecessors.  Half  a  century 
ago  Trendelenburg  brought  Aristotle  again  to  our  knowledge.  The 
neo-Kantianism  under  the  leadership  of  Cohen  on  the  other  hand 
helped  Plato  to  victory.  Just  now  Aristotle  is  again  on  top  by  the 


122  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

roundabout  way  via  Leibnitz.  Those  thinkers  who  are  interested 
in  biological  considerations  are  to-day  grouping  themselves  again 
around  Aristotle  just  as  those  who  tend  in  a  mathematically  logical 
direction  cluster  around  Plato.  In  Germany  this  dissension  appears 
under  the  slogans,  Psychologism  against  Logism,  Vitalism  against 
Mechanicalism,  and  Positivism  against  Idealism.  In  America  and 
England  it  has  coined  the  formula,  Pragmatism  against  Transcen- 
dentalism. Tout  comme  chez  nous.  The  French  maxim:  plus  que 
qa  change,  plus  c'est  la  meme  chose  is  true  of  philosophical  con- 
troversies, schools,  party  designations,  and  catch  words." 

Professor  Stein  appears  to  go  too  far  in  characterizing  the  dif- 
ferent philosophers  as  either  Platonists  or  Aristotelians.  It  is  true 
that  there  is  a  contrast  between  a  recognition  of  the  facts  upon 
which  our  world-conception  is  based  and  the  theories  which  furnish 
the  system  of  its  construction.  But  if  he  would  carefully  compare 
Plato  and  Aristotle  he  would  find  (as  has  been  pointed  out  from  time 
to  time)  that  Aristotle  is  a  Platonist  and  Plato  is  an  Aristotelian. 
Though  Aristotle  has  his  fling  at  the  Platonic  ideas  he  practically 
adopts  the  theory  that  there  are  eternal  types,  and  though  Plato  is 
an  idealist  who  believes  in  the  eternal  ideas  as  the  modes  of  things, 
he  does  not  deny  that  the  phenomenal  world  is  the  actual  world  of 
sense ;  and  the  contrast  in  which  these  two  systems  have  frequently 
been  placed  is  a  contrast  merely  produced  by  more  or  less  of  em- 
phasis laid  upon  two  opposed  (not  contradictory)  principles,  and 
the  different  systems  in  the  history  of  philosophy  are  exactly  char- 
acterized by  the  way  in  which  they  combine  the  contrast  and  recog- 
nize the  truth  of  these  principles.  It  is  true,  however,  that  Pro- 
fessor James  carries  the  principle  of  pragmatism  to  such  an  ex- 
treme as  to  almost  entirely  obliterate  the  principle  of  systematic 
thought,  theory,  logic,  rationality,  etc.  Professor  James  is  a  roman- 
ticizing philosopher  in  contrast  to  such  stern  and  strict  classical 
thinkers  as  Kant  and  his  school.  Says  Stein :  "The  type  of  thought 
directly  opposed  to  this  logistic  classicism  is  sentimental  romanti- 
cism. As  the  former  longs  for  the  peace  of  the  conclusive  answer 
the  latter  seeks  the  eternal  activity  of  restless  questioning;"  and 
further  down  on  page  172:  "Pragmatism  gathers  together  all  those 
tendencies  of  our  age  with  its  fevered  philosophical  excitement 
which  carry  on  a  common  war  against  the  thing-in-itself,  against 
all  metaphysics,  against  transcendentalism,  idealism,  in  short  against 
that  Platonizing  Kantism  which  is  most  conspicuously  represented 
and  most  appreciatively  supported  by  the  Marburg  school  (Cohen 


AN  APPENDIX  ON  PRAGMATISM.  123 

and  Natorp),  under  the  names  Natural  Philosophy,  Energetics, 
Psychologism,  Positivism,  Phenomenalism,  Friesian  Empiricism, 
and  Relativism." 

Here  the  onesidedness  of  Professor  Stein's  classification  ap- 
pears most  pronounced.  From  the  point  of  view  of  my  own  philos- 
ophy I  would  be  at  a  loss  in  what  manner  to  dispose  of  it.  I  am 
decidedly  opposed  to  the  subjectivism  of  Professor  James,  I  most 
emphatically  uphold  the  objective  significance  of  truth,  and  yet  I 
reject  the  idea  of  the  thing-in-itself  and  all  metaphysics  based  upon 
it.  My  solution  of  the  problem21  briefly  stated  runs  thus :  There  are 
not  things-in-themselves  but  there  are  forms-in-themselves.  Pro- 
fessor Stein  declares: 

"For  many  years  together  with  certain  ones  of  my  pupils  I  have 
defended  the  thesis  that  Kant  did  not  refute  Hume.  In  my  book 
"The  Social  Optimism"  (Der  soziale  Optimismus,  Jena,  Costenoble, 
1905)  I  demonstrate  that  Hume  is  not  a  skeptic  but  the  leader  of 
positivism  and  that  Kant  has  not  refuted  him  in  any  point.  The  case 
is  not  yet  at  an  end." 

I  have  not  seen  Professor  Stein's  exposition  of  his  views  on 
Kant  and  Hume,  but  I  am  inclined  to  believe  that  I  would  agree 
with  him.  However,  I  trust  that  in  the  books  referred  to  I  have 
pointed  out  the  weak  point  of  Kant's  position ;  but  on  the  basis  of 
the  Kantian  conception  of  the  contrast  between  matter  and  form, 
the  a  posteriori  and  the  a  priori,  sensation  and  pure  Anschauung 
with  all  that  it  involves,  I  hope  to  have  answered  Hume's  question 
and  thus  laid  a  foundation  for  a  system  in  which  the  old  contrasts 
will  find  a  just  reconciliation. 

PROFESSOR  STEIN  ON  PRAGMATISM. 

Here  are  some  paragraphs  of  Professor  Stein's  critique  of  prag- 
matism : 

"A  criticism  of  pragmatism  must  proceed  from  the  inside  out- 
ward ;  that  is,  from  its  own  hypotheses,  and  not  from  the  standpoint 
of  idealism,  as  Miinsterberg  attempts.  There  are  two  different  tem- 
peraments as  James  has  rightly  said,  but  temperaments  are  not  to 
be  opposed.  The  inscription,  'As  I  see  it,'  stands  written  upon  every 
temple,  not  only  the  pantheon  of  art  but  also  the  severe  cathedral  of 
science.  To  see  in  one's  own  way  can  never  be  criticised.  The 
question  is  only  whether  a  man  has  seen  rightly  from  his  own  stand- 

B  For  details  see  my  criticism  of  Kant  in  my  little  book  Kant's  Prolegom- 
ena ;  and  also  my  exposition  of  the  problem  in  my  Surd  of  Metaphysics  in  the 
chapter  "Are  There  Things-in-Themselves  ?" 


124  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

point,  and  right  here  is  the  starting-point  of  our  own  objection  to 
pragmatism .... 

"In  place  of  the  two  criteria  of  truth  represented  by  Plato 
(Aristotle  too)  and  Kant,  namely  necessity  and  universal  validity, 
we  have  here  the  hedonistic  utilitarian  criteria  of  truth,  individual 
utility  and  general  practicability.  The  true  and  the  good  agree 
with  each  other;  this  is  the  demand  of  the  biologic-teleological 
foundation  of  logic  as  pragmatism  states  it.  In  addition,  it  is  true, 
to  earlier  tendencies  of  thought,  but  still  with  a  strongly  emphasized 
personal  note. 

"Against  this  biological  logic  a  series  of  considerations  arise  in 
the  meantime  even  under  the  foundation  of  the  pragmatic  point  of 
departure  wherefore  I  expressly  affirm  that  I  will  not  repeat  the 
arguments  which  Husserl  in  his  fundamental  'Logical  Investigations' 
and  Miinsterberg  in  his  'Philosophy  of  Values'  (Philosophic  der 
Werte,  Leipsic,  Barth,  1908)  have  arranged  in  imposing  conclusive- 
ness  against  all  psychologism.  I  do  not  propose  to  refer  here  to  even 
the  purely  polemical  literature  of  the  English,  French  and  Italians 
against  pragmatism.22  It  is  much  more  important  for  me  to  con- 
sider the  difficulties  of  thought  which  in  spite  of  my  sympathetic 
position  towards  the  fundamental  demands  of  pragmatism  I  can 
not  suppress.  If  Messrs.  James  and  Schiller  will  take  the  trouble 
to  look  through  my  'The  End  of  the  Century'  (Wende  des  Jahr- 
hunderts,  Tubingen,  Mohr,  1899),  'The  Sense  of  Existence'  (Der 
Sinn  des  Daseins,  ibid.,  1904)  and  'The  Social  Optimism'  (Der  so- 
ziale  Optimismus,  Jena,  Costenoble,  1905),  they  will  discover  now 
and  again  almost  verbal  correspondences  in  that  which  I  call  evolu- 
tionary criticism  and  the  optimism  of  energetics.  In  case  James 
and  Schiller  would  attempt  to  claim  me  as  well  as  Wilhelm  Jerusa- 
lem in  the  ranks  of  pragmatism,  I  shall  have  to  point  out  my  opin- 
ions against  methods  and  results .... 

"Pragmatism  with  its  genetic  theory  of  truth  is  only  new  in  that 
it  discloses  itself  as  logical  evolution.  Truth  is  placed  in  the  stream 
of  practical  development.  As  once  the  followers  of  the  Heraclitean 
Cratylos,  the  teacher  of  Plato  to  whom  he  had  dedicated  his  dialogue 
of  the  same  name,  are  jokingly  called  the  'flowing  ones,'23  prag- 
matists  recognize  only  one  developing  truth  which  will  gradually 
approach  the  absolute  truth  or  its  ideal  heights." 

**  Among  the  last  G.  Vailati  is  of  a  special  importance.  See  "De  quelques 
caracteres  du  mouvement  philosophique  contemporain  en  Italic,"  Revue  de 
mois,  1907. 

*  of  'pfovTft,  i.  e.,  those  that  are  in  a  constant  flux. 


AN  APPENDIX  ON  PRAGMATISM.  125 

Professor  Stein  takes  the  underlying  principles  of  pragmatism 
and  systematizes  them — in  spite  of  Professor  James.  The  latter  may 
not  take  the  consequences  but  Professor  Stein  seems  to  argue  that  if 
pragmatism  were  consistent  Professor  James  ought  to  hold  the  views 
to  be  derived  from  its  maxims.  We  doubt  very  much  whether  Pro- 
fessor James  would  be  prepared  to  regard  the  ego  as  "  a  mere  prac- 
tical unit  for  a  preliminary  provisional  consideration"  (p.  182). 
Stein  says : 

"Mach's  definition  of  the  ego  as  unity  of  purpose  and  James's 
theory  of  concepts  or  classes  as  teleological  instruments,  arise  from 
the  common  fundamental  conviction  that  all  spiritual  life  is  teleo- 
logical. The  teleological  unity  of  the  ego  according  to  Mach  rests 
upon  an  unanalysed  constant.  The  ego  is  accordingly  a  practical 
unit  for  a  preliminary  provisional  consideration.  The  same  is  the 
case  with  concepts  of  substance,  being,  doing,  matter,  spirit.  They 
are  abbreviated  symbols  for  the  purpose  of  an  easier  orientation  in 
the  surrounding  world.  All  science  thus  shrinks  into  one  impres- 
sion as  all  deduction  according  to  Mill  is  only  an  abbreviation  and 
inverted  induction,  a  memorandum  for  thought- 

"Here  we  have  the  proton  pseudos™  as  well  of  pragmatism  as 
of  Hume's  positivism  and  all  related  tendencies.  Quite  apart  from 
the  fact  that  the  biological  method  which  James  and  his  school 
would  apply  to  logic  is  already  shattered  on  the  fact  that  biology 
itself  is  still  to-day  in  the  condition  of  fermentation  and  insecurity 
and  accordingly  possesses  no  suitability  for  a  foundation  of  the  most 
certain  of  all  sciences,  formal  logic,  pragmatism  takes  the  same 
course  which  Hume  was  not  able  to  escape.  Hume  refers  substance 
and  causality  to  habits  of  thought  and  laws  of  association ;  but  how 
have  laws  of  association  found  entrance  into  the  human  brain  ?  Why 
have  all  men  and  animals  the  same  laws  of  association  by  contiguity 
or  innate  similarity?  Hume  concludes  the  validity  of  the  laws  of 
association  by  means  of  the  laws  of  association  already  in  effect .... 

"It  is  quite  clear,  however,  that  pragmatism  too  has  it  a  priori, 
that  is  the  telos,  and  if  we  jest  about  the  logism  of  Kant,  that  in 
spite  of  us  man  comes  into  the  world  with  a  completed  table  of 
categories,  so  let  us  not  forget  to  consider  the  beam  in  our  own 
eye.  We  are  all  a  priori  sinners.  Or,  does  it  matter  so  much  if  man 
comes  into  the  world  according  to  Kant  with  a  table  of  categories, 
according  to  Hume  with  completed  laws  of  association,  according 
to  Avenarius  and  Mach  with  an  automatically  functioning  economy 


126  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

of  thought,  and  finally  according  to  James  and  Schiller  with  an 
apparatus  of  utility  and  selection  like  an  innate  scale  of  values? 
Let  us  first  of  all  be  honest  with  ourselves.  Pragmatism  accom- 
plishes nothing  but  to  set  up  a  teleology  of  consciousness  in  the  place 
of  a  mechanics  of  consciousness  such  as  Hobbes,  Spinoza,  Hartley, 
Priestley,  Hume,  the  naturalists,  materialists,  and  psychologists  of 
association  have  offered  us." 

CRITICS  OF  PRAGMATISM  REBUKED.1 

Pragmatism  is  still  agitating  the  philosophical  world,  and  Prof. 
William  James  fought  the  good  fight  dealing  blows  right  and  left. 
There  is  a  change  only  in  so  far  as  pragmatism  does  not  seem  to 
spread  further,  and  its  ingenious  leader  began  more  and  more  to  as- 
sume the  defensive.  His  main  weapon  consisted  in  the  declaration 
that  his  antagonists  had  misunderstood  him.  They  are  accused  of 
distorting  his  views  into  silly  absurdities  which  he  did  not  mean  to 
say,  and  they  are  put  down  with  such  phrases  as,  "this  is  the  usual 
slander"  (p.  274). 

In  my  criticisms  I  have  always  been  careful  to  quote  the  mas- 
ter's ipsissima  verba,  and  so  I  feel  that  his  complaint  is  not  applicable 
in  my  case. 

The  latest  book  of  Professor  James  bears  the  title  The  Mean- 
ing of  Truth,  but  the  author  does  not  betray  the  secret  in  its  pages. 
He  talks  about  truth  but  nowhere  solves  the  problem  of  its  meaning, 
and  his  statements  are  by  no  means  always  consistent.  He  resem- 
bles in  this  respect  a  dear  old  German  friend  of  mine  who  always 
had  the  last  word  and  was  never  at  a  loss  to  give  an  answer.  When 
once  his  own  authority  was  quoted  against  him  and  he  seemed  hope- 
lessly vanquished  he  calmly  said,  Ich  bin  nicht  immer  meiner  Mei- 
nung, — "I  am  not  always  of  my  own  opinion." 

But  pragmatism  is  so  subtile  that  no  one  appears  to  be  able  to 
appreciate  it  unless  he  enters  into  its  spirit  with  enthusiasm.  Pro- 
fessor James  says  (pp.  183-184)  : 

"The  pragmatist  question  is  not  only  so  subtile  as  to  have  escaped  atten- 
tion hitherto,  but  even  so  subtile,  it  would  seem,  that  when  openly  broached 
now,  dogmatists  and  sceptics  alike  fail  to  apprehend  it,  and  deem  the  prag- 
matist to  be  treating  of  something  wholly  different." 

The  difficulty  of  understanding  pragmatism  is  greatly  increased 
to  outsiders,  to  intellectualists  as  they  are  called,  to  rationalists,  to 

1 A  review  of  The  Meaning  of  Truth,  A  Sequel  to  Pragmatism,  by  William 
James,  New  York:  Longmans  Green  &  Co.  Price  $1.25  net.  Republished 
from  The  Monist,  Jan.,  1910. 


AN  APPENDIX  ON  PRAGMATISM.  127 

monists,  and  to  the  whole  crowd  of  anti-pragmatists,  by  the  brilliant 
dicta  of  Professor  James,  who  in  his  zeal  sometimes  makes  state- 
ments which  he  does  not  mean  and  which  he  offers  only  as  an  olive 
branch  to  please  antagonists  or  to  gain  their  good  will.  Professor 
James  says  in  the  preface: 

"One  of  the  accusations  which  I  oftenest  have  had  to  meet  is  that  of 
making  the  truth  of  our  religious  beliefs  consist  in  their  'feeling  good'  to  us, 
and  in  nothing  else.  I  regret  to  have  given  some  excuse  for  this  charge,  by 
the  unguarded  language  in  which,  in  the  book  Pragmatism,  I  spoke  of  the 
truth  of  the  belief  of  certain  philosophers  in  the  absolute.  Explaining  why 
I  do  not  believe  in  the  absolute  myself  (page  78),  yet  finding  that  it  may 
secure  'moral  holidays'  to  those  who  need  them,  and  is  true  in  so  far  forth 
(if  to  gain  moral  holidays  be  a  good),  I  offered  this  as  a  conciliatory  olive- 
branch  to  my  enemies.  But  they,  as  is  only  too  common  with  such  offerings, 
trampled  the  gift  under  foot  and  turned  and  rent  the  giver.  I  had  counted 
too  much  on  their  good  will — oh  for  the  rarity  of  Christian  charity  under  the 
sun !  Oh  for  the  rarity  of  ordinary  secular  intelligence  also !" 

Professor  James  complains  about  "the  rarity  of  Christian  char- 
ity" and  "the  rarity  of  ordinary  secular  intelligence."  But  is  he 
not  guilty  of  the  same  fault  when  he  misconstrues  what  other 
thinkers  have  said  before  him ;  when  he  censures  them  in  sweeping 
assertions  for  mistakes  of  which  only  some  of  them  are  guilty; 
when  for  instance  he  declares  (p.  192)  that  "throughout  the  his- 
tory of  philosophy  the  subject  and  its  object  have  been  treated  as 
absolutely  discontinuous  entities"  (p.  136)  ;  while  we  know  that 
almost  every  philosopher  has  considered  the  two  as  correlates?  If 
our  pragmatists  were  more  familiar  with  the  history  of  philosophy 
they  would  probably  not  boast  so  loudly  of  the  originality  of  the 
movement,  the  leading  ideas  of  which  are  old  errors. 

We  do  not  doubt  that  Professor  James  has  been  frequently 
misunderstood,  and  he  confesses  himself  that  he  did  not  always 
mean  what  he  said,  but  it  appears  that  the  main  reason  that  he  is 
so  much  misunderstood  is  his  own  carelessness.  On  page  272  Pro- 
fessor James  says  with  reference  to  the  criticism  of  Professor 
Bertrand  Russell: 

"When,  for  instance,  we  say  that  a  true  proposition  is  one  the  conse- 
quences of  believing  which  are  good,  he  assumes  us  to  mean  that  any  one 
who  believes  a  proposition  to  be  true  must  first  have  made  out  clearly  that 
its  consequences  are  good,  and  that  his  belief  must  primarily  be  in  that  fact, 
— an  obvious  absurdity,  for  that  fact  is  the  deliverance  of  a  new  proposition, 
quite  different  from  the  first  one  and  is,  moreover,  a  fact  usually  very  hard 
to  verify,  it  being  'far  easier/  as  Mr.  Russell  justly  says,  'to  settle  the  plain 
question  of  fact:  "Have  popes  always  been  infallible?"  than  to  settle  the 


128  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

question  whether  the  effects  of  thinking  them  infallible  are  on  the  whole 
good.'    We  affirm  nothing  as  silly  as  Mr.  Russell  supposes." 

I  am  glad  to  know  that  Professor  James  does  not  mean  to 
make  the  pragmatic  result  of  a  belief  the  test  of  its  truth;  but  I 
can  not  help  thinking  that  his  explanations  of  the  meaning  of  prag- 
matism go  pretty  far  to  justify  Professor  Russell  in  thinking  so. 

SCIENCE  SUPERSEDED. 

When  I  refuse  to  accept  pragmatism  I  may  be  under  a  mis- 
apprehension;  but  if  words  mean  what  they  say,  Professor  James 
believes  that  science  is  not  possible,  or  at  least  that  what  is  called 
science  is  not  reliable,  that  new  fangled  theories  have  replaced  the 
old  orthodox  conceptions,  that  Euclid  is  antiquated  because  Bolyai 
and  Lobatchevsky  have  excogitated  other  geometrical  systems,  and 
that  truth  and  its  exponent  science  have  neither  stability  nor  ob- 
jective significance.  We  may  misunderstand  Professor  James,  but 
this  is  what  he  says  on  page  57: 

"As  I  understand  the  pragmatist  way  of  seeing  things,  it  owes  its  being 
to  the  break-down  which  the  last  fifty  years  have  brought  about  in  the  older 
motions  of  scientific  truth.  'God  geometrizes/  it  used  to  be  said;  and  it  was 
believed  that  Euclid's  elements  literally  reproduced  his  geometrizing.  There 
is  an  eternal  and  unchangeable  'reason' ;  and  its  voice  was  supposed  to  re- 
verberate in  Barbara  and  Celarent.  So  also  of  the  'laws  of  nature,'  physical 
and  chemical,  so  of  natural  history  classifications — all  were  supposed  to  be 
exact  and  exclusive  duplicates  of  pre-human  archetypes  buried  in  the  struc- 
ture of  things,  to  which  the  spark  of  divinity  hidden  in  our  intellect  enables 
us  to  penetrate.  The  anatomy  of  the  world  is  logical,  and  its  logic  is  that 
of  a  university  professor,  it  was  thought  Up  to  about  1850  almost  every  one 
believed  that  sciences  expressed  truths  that  were  exact  copies  of  a  definite 
code  of  non-human  realities." 

Now  we  deny  that  geometricians  ever  believed  that  Euclid's 
Elements  "literally  reproduced  God's  geometrizing" ;  or,  what  means 
the  same,  that  geometry  is  a  direct  description  of  objective  space- 
conditions.  All  mathematical  propositions  are  purely  mental  con- 
structions by  the  aid  of  which  we  can  calculate  the  relations  that 
obtain  in  space,  or  other  conditions,  proportions,  probabilities,  etc., 
and  mutatis  mutandis  the  same  is  true  of  logical  syllogisms  and  of 
the  laws  of  nature.  None  of  them  are  copies  or  duplicates,  or  arche- 
types, but  they  are  formulas  by  which  we  comprehend  reality  and 
which  serve  us  to  adjust  our  conduct.  Here  Professor  James  is 
guilty  of  an  obvious  misunderstanding  of  the  import  of  science, 
and  he  misconstrues  the  meaning  of  former  thinkers. 


AN  APPENDIX  ON  PRAGMATISM.  129 

While  to  some  extent  the  pragmatist  fights  windmills  which  he 
takes  for  giant  errors,  he  takes  new  fads  seriously  or  exaggerates 
the  importance  of  new  theories,  making  out  that  they  upset  and 
antiquate  all  previous  science.  Professor  James  continues:2 

"The  enormously  rapid  multiplication  of  theories  in  these  latter  days  has 
well-nigh  upset  the  notion  of  any  one  of  them  being  a  more  literally  objective 
kind  of  thing  than  another.  There  are  so  many  geometries,  so  many  logics, 
so  many  physical  and  chemical  hypotheses,  so  many  classifications,  each  one 
of  them  good  for  so  much  and  yet  not  good  for  everything,  that  the  notion 
that  even  the  truest  formula  may  be  a  human  device  and  not  a  literal  tran- 
script has  dawned  upon  us." 

The  subjectivity  of  geometry  is  also  insisted  upon  on  pp.  83  ff. 
On  page  85  we  read  a  sentence  which  reminds  us  of  Kant.  Here 
Professor  James  says:  "The  whole  fabric  of  the  a  priori  sciences 
can  thus  be  treated  as  a  man-made  product" ;  though  Kant  would  say 
that  space  is  "ideal,"  which  means  belonging  to  the  domain  of  ideas, 
and  we  would  prefer  to  say,  that  the  a  priori  is  "mental  or  a  mind- 
made  product."  How  ideal  or  purely  mental  constructions  can 
possess  objective  values  I  have  set  forth  in  my  book  on  Kant's  Pro- 
legomena. 

But  in  the  pragmatist  conception  everything  dwindles  down  to 
"purely  human  habits"  (p.  29). 

A  genuine  scientific  truth  is  a  formula  which  describes  the 
essential  features  of  a  group  of  facts.  A  scientific  theory  is  a 
tentative  explanation  of  facts.  Everybody  knows  that  theories  and 
hypotheses  are  preliminary  and  we  must  always  be  prepared  to  sur- 
render them.  No  scientist  will  regard  the  change  of  a  theory  as  a 
"breakdown"  of  the  notions  of  scientific  truth,  be  they  old  or  new, 
but  while  theories  change,  truths  remain  forever.  Those  features 
of  facts  which  remain,  the  "uniformities  of  nature"  as  Clifford 
called  them,  those  eternalities  of  existence  which  make  science  pos- 
sible, are  not  subject  to  change.  They  are  the  raison  d'etre  on  the 
one  hand  of  the  cosmic  order,  and  on  the  other  hand  of  man's 
rationality. 

OFTEN  WRONG  BUT  NEVER  DULL. 

Professor  James  calls  his  new  book  "The  Meaning  of  Truth," 
but  the  reader,  with  the  exception  of  his  most  ardent  admirers,  will 
not  know  more  about  what  truth  in  pragmatism  means  after  having 
read  these  latest  explanations.  Professor  James  even  admits  that 
the  very  "name  'pragmatism'  with  its  suggestions  of  action,  has  been 


I3O  TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 

an  unfortunate  choice"  (p.  184),  and  I  at  any  rate  must  confess 
that  I  am  more  bewildered  than  helped.  Professor  James  himself 
says  (p.  215)  : 

"As  I  look  back  over  what  I  have  written,  much  of  it  gives  me  a  queer 
impression,  as  if  the  obvious  were  set  forth  so  condescendingly  that  readers 
might  well  laugh  at  my  pomposity.  It  may  be,  however,  that  concreteness  as 
radical  as  ours  is  not  so  obvious.  The  whole  originality  of  pragmatism,  the 
whole  point  in  it,  is  its  use  of  the  concrete  way  of  seeing.  It  begins  with  con- 
creteness, and  returns  and  ends  with  it." 

Other  philosophers  too  have  proposed  to  begin  with  concrete- 
ness  and  to  end  with  concreteness,  but  the  worth  of  a  philosophy 
consists  in  the  method  of  dealing  with  the  concreteness  of  existence ; 
yet  this  portion  is  missing  in  pragmatism. 

Professor  James  overestimates  the  significance  of  sentiment  and 
underrates  the  importance  of  the  intellect.  His  world-conception 
might  be  characterized  as  a  philosophy  of  mood,  of  temper,  of  feel- 
ing, of  subjectivity,  in  rebellion  against  the  rigid  demands  of  in- 
tellect, of  science,  of  consistency  of  system.  He  dislikes  theory  and 
system,  prefers  pluralism  to  monism,  clings  to  the  concrete,  and  ab- 
hors the  abstract.  Such  is  the  poet's  and  artist's  temperament, 
which  is  desirable  in  literature,  in  lyric  effusions,  in  paintings,  espe- 
cially in  Stimmungsbildern,  but  out  of  place  in  science  and  in  a 
scientific  philosophy.  Such  temperamental  expressions  are  perfectly 
legitimate,  and  we  enjoy  the  writings  of  Professor  James  as  such, 
but  we  must  demur  when  he  parades  his  subjectivism  as  philosophy, 
indeed  as  the  one  philosophy  to  the  exclusion  of  an  objective  or  a 
scientific  philosophy. 

Here  is  a  sample  of  pragmatic  epistemology : 

"A  feeling  feels  as  a  gun  shoots.  If  there  be  nothing  to  be  felt  or  hit, 
they  discharge  themselves  ins  Blaue  hinein.  If,  however,  something  starts  up 
opposite  them,  they  no  longer  simply  shoot  or  feel,  they  hit  and  know. 

"But  with  this  arises  a  worse  objection  than  any  yet  made.  We  the  critics 
look  on  and  see  a  real  q  [quality]  and  a  feeling  of  q ;  and  because  the  two  re- 
semble each  other,  we  say  the  one  knows  the  other.  But  what  right  have  we 
to  say  this  until  we  know  that  the  feeling  of  q  means  to  stand  for  or  represent 
just  that  same  other  q?  Suppose,  instead  of  one  q,  a  number  of  real  q's  in 
the  field.  If  the  gun  shoots  and  hits,  we  can  easily  see  which  one  of  them  it 
hits.  But  how  can  we  distinguish  which  one  the  feeling  knows?  It  knows 
the  one  it  stands  for.  But  which  one  does  it  stand  for?  It  declares  no  in- 
tention in  this  respect.  It  merely  resembles;  it  resembles  all  indifferently; 
and  resembling,  per  se,  is  not  necessarily  representing  or  standing-for  at  all. 
Eggs  resemble  each  other,  but  do  not  on  that  account  represent,  stand  for, 
or  know  each  other.  And  if  you  say  this  is  because  neither  of  them  is  a 


AN  APPENDIX  ON  PRAGMATISM. 

feeling,  then  imagine  the  world  to  consist  of  nothing  but  toothaches,  which 
are  feelings,  feelings  resembling  each  other  exactly, — would  they  know  each 
other  the  better  for  all  that?" 

Rambling  but  witty,  full  of  misconceptions  but  entertaining, 
and  disposing  of  the  problem  with  a  joke, — such  is  the  style  of  the 
leader  of  the  pragmatic  movement. 

The  book  talks  about  truth,  but  never  and  nowhere  does  it  clinch 
the  problem.  We  grant  that  it  combats  many  errors,  although  we 
must  add  that  frequently  what  it  combats  are  but  straw  men  of  the 
author's  own  making.  But  whatever  errors  pragmatism  may  be 
guilty  of,  Professor  James  was  a  man  of  great  vigor  and  ingenuity. 
Though  we  would  say  that  Professor  James  made  serious  blunders 
and  was  sometimes  unfair  to  his  antagonists,  though  he  misconstrued 
the  philosophies  of  the  past,  though  he  lacked  clearness  of  thought, 
the  first  requisite  for  a  philosopher,  his  writings  possess  a  charm 
that  is  unrivaled.  He  may  have  been  wrong  in  all  his  contentions, 
but  he  was  never  dull. 


INDEX. 


Absolute  in  truth,  27. 

Abstraction,  Man  rules  nature  through 
the  power  of,  67-68. 

Abstractions  significant,  40. 

Actuality  and  reality,  103. 

Adaptation  and  right  thinking,  10. 

Admirers  of  W.  James,  129. 

After-images  are  true  sensations,  99. 

Agreement,  between  atheist  and  the- 
ist,  35 ;  of  critics  regarding  James's 
pragmatism,  53,  114,  115;  of  opin- 
ion regarding  the  nature  of  truth, 
96;  of  truths,  the  ideal  of  science, 

12. 

Allegory  and  truth,  35. 

American,  The  "smart,"  121. 

Anecdote  of  inconsistency,  An,  126. 

Anschauungen,  and  sensation,  123;  and 
truth,  92 ;  of  Kant,  19. 

Answer,  Peace  of  the  conclusive,  122. 

Apocrypha,  Truth  in  O.  T.,  86. 

Approximation  and  the  progress  of 
science,  29. 

A  priori,  and  truth,  125 ;  in  the  Kant- 
ian sense,  74. 

Aquinas,  Thomas,  90,  96. 

Archetypes,  Mathematical  formulas 
not,  128. 

Artist  temperament  of  W.  James,  130. 

Aristotle,  and  Euclid,  30;  and  the 
definition  of  truth,  88;  contrasted 
with  Plato,  122. 

Astronomy,  and  the  personal  equa- 
tion, 49;  Pragmatic  attitude  in,  41, 
42. 

Atheist  and  theist,  Ground  for  agree- 
ment between,  35. 

Augustine,  St.,  Truth  and  existence 
according  to,  89. 

Avenarius,  125. 

Averroes,  90. 

Bacon,  Roger,  120. 

Bayle,  Pierre,  and  the  doctrine  of 
twofold  truth,  91. 

"Beliefs,  as  rules  for  action,"  an  ex- 
planation but  not  a  principle,  5; 
framed  for  a  practical  intent,  35. 


Bentham,  6. 

Birth  of  truth,  98. 

Bismarck's  pragmatic  politics,  5. 

Blondel,  Maurice,  116. 

Boodin,  John  E.,  40. 

Business  interests  and  pragmatism,  47. 

Cash  value  of  ideas,  8;  of  truth,  9. 

Categories  fulminated  and  categories 
forming,  36. 

Causation,  an  aspect  of  conservation 
of  matter  and  energy,  71 ;  and  the 
metaphysical  entity  behind  phenom- 
ena, 70. 

Cause,  a  motion,  71. 

Chance  (Tyche),  Doctrine  of,  36. 

Change,  All  things,  2. 

Charvakas,  the  materialist  school  of 
India,  89. 

Chinese  character  for  truth,  83,  84. 

Christianity's  doctrine  of  truth,  89. 

Clifford,  129. 

Cognition  and  the  scientific  method, 
95 ;  Stoic's  emphasis  of  the  theory 
of,  88. 

Comet,  Pragmatism  like  a,  44. 

Conflict  between  scientific  and  relig- 
ious truth,  90. 

Consciousness,  102 ;  Teleology  vs.  the 
mechanics  of,  126. 

Consequences,  the  viewpoints  of  prag- 
matists,  115. 

Conservation  of  energy  and  matter, 
Causation  an  aspect  of,  71. 

Consistency,  Man's  hankering  for,  22 ; 
not  required  in  philosophy  (Bood- 
in), 40;  produces  harmony,  i.  e., 
lawdom,  75. 

Constitution  of  the  world  complete 
from  all  eternity,  16. 

Conviction,  the  truth  of  the  pre-scien- 
tific  man,  48. 

Coordination  of  facts  and  their  re- 
presentations, II. 

Copernicus,  Ptolemy  and,  28. 

Correlates,  Subject  and  object  as,  127. 

Correspondence  between  ideas  and 
facts,  39. 


134 


TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 


Corridor  of  theories,  Pragmatism  a, 

27. 
Critics  agree  in  misinterpreting  Wm. 

James's  pragmatism,  53;  114,  115. 
Curved  reason  and  two-dimensional 

time,  15. 

Cynic's  Calendar,  7. 
Cyrenaics  or  hedonists,  115. 

Data  of  truth  furnished  by  the  senses, 

60-6 1. 
"Denouncers"  of  pragmatism  rebuked, 

55- 

Description,  Law  of  causation  not  re- 
placed by,  70. 

Development  of  science,  Failures  in- 
cidental to,  not  part  of  science,  66 ; 
no  less  subject  to  law  than  the 
growth  of  nature,  66. 

Domain  of  truth,  includes  the  noetic 
and  the  teleological,  48;  Place  of 
sense  impressions  in,  96. 

"Dooley  on  Philosophy,"  61-62. 

Doubt  and  the  "fixation  of  belief,"  58. 

Dungeons  and  fagots,  The  drastic 
arguments  of,  61. 

Ego  as  "a  practical  unit  for  prelim- 
inary consideration,"  125. 

Enthusiasm  a  prerequisite  for  modern 
pragmatism,  126. 

Epicurus,  88,  89. 

Epistemology,  i.  e.,  kenlore,  88. 

Error,  a  failure  to  attain  the  truth,  99 ; 
and  windmills,  129. 

Esoteric  and  exoteric  truth,  90. 

Etymology  of  the  word  truth,  78  ff. 

Eucken,  R.,  118. 

Euclid  and  Aristotle,  30;  not  anti- 
quated by  modern  science,  128. 

Eudoxus,  28. 

Evidence  by  accumulated  details  is 
not  truth,  74. 

Exactness  is  not  pedantry,  43. 

Expedient,  Truth  as  an,  28. 

Experience  protests  against  errors,  92. 

Facts,  are  real  and  their  representa- 
tions are  true,  1 1 ;  particular,  and 
truths  universal,  61 ;  with  ideas, 
Correspondence  of,  39. 

"Fad"  philosophy,  43. 

Failures  incidental  to  the  development 
of  science  are  not  part  of  science 
itself,  66. 

Faith  often  replaces  logic,  50. 

"Feeling,  The  chief  component  of 
mind  is,"  (Duns  Scotus),  120. 

"Fixation  of  belief,"  58. 

"Flowing  ones,"  The,  124. 

Form,  Philosophy  of,  74  f. 

Formal  science,  Key  to  nature  in,  73. 


Forms-in-themselves,  123. 

Fraud  and  error  in  awe  of  truth,  93. 

Fulminated  categories,  36. 

Gefuhl  ist  A  lies,  38. 

Germany  and  the  conflict  in  philos- 
ophy, 122. 

General  and  special  truths,  93. 

Genetic  psychology  and  personality, 49. 

Geometry,  Subjectivity  of,  129. 

Gesetzmassigkeit,  i.  e.,  lawdom,  75. 

God  and  geometry,  128;  as  creator, 
106;  can  be  defined  in  terms  of  ex- 
perience, 35;  Gauge  of  man  to  be 
found  in,  I ;  the  oneness  of  all  the 
verities  of  existence,  108. 

Good  and  evil,  Stoic  definition  of,  114. 

Harmony  of  all  truths  predetermined. 

12 ;  produced  by  consistency,  75. 
Hebert,  Marcel,  53. 
Hedonists,  115. 
Heraclitus,  87. 
Herrmann,  Conrad,  116. 
Historiography,  Pragmatic,  4. 
Horizon,  Intellectual,  44. 
Humanity  the  product  of  reason,  19. 
Hume,  75,  92,  125. 

Ideal,  of  philosophy,  to  trace  the  unity 
of  our  world-conception,  66 ;  of  sci- 
ence, the  ultimate  agreement  of  all 
truths,  12. 

Ideals,  Efficiency  of,  i ;  guardian  an- 
gels, 2. 

Ideas,  and  facts,  Correspondence  be- 
tween, 39;  in  use  compared  to 
money  in  circulation,  9. 

Idiosyncrasies  and  the  "will  to  be- 
lieve," 23. 

Incarnation  of  the  deity,  The  ideal 
man  an,  2. 

Inconsistency,  Anecdote  of,  126;  in 
definition,  53 ;  not  detrimental  in 
philosophy  (Boodin),  40. 

"Innate"  ideas,  105. 

Inspiration  and  the  personal  equa- 
tion, 43. 

Instability  of  natural  law,  Theory  of 
the,  36. 

Intellect,  a  revelation  of  God,  52; 
and  the  personal  equation,  48;  Su- 
premacy of,  52. 

Intellectual,  horizon,  44;  struggles 
not  quibbles,  35. 

Inventions  not  happy  coincidences,  51. 

James,  William,  5,  42  ff . ;  accepts  the 
consequences  of  his  own  definition, 
7;  Admirers  of,  129;  an  empiricist, 
26;  and  mystical  phenomena,  20, 
119;  apologizes  for  title  of  book, 


INDEX. 


135 


The  Will  to  Believe,  23;  artist 
temperament  of,  130 ;  as  a  pluralist, 
58;  Attractive  personality  and 
charm  of,  44-45 ;  averse  to  argu- 
ment, 34-35 ;  Brilliant  dicta  of,  127 ; 
Critics  agree  in  misinterpreting 
pragmatism  of,  53,  114,  115;  his 
definitions  of  truth,  54,  68;  his 
vagaries  fascinating  to  the  young 
generation,  42 ;  Literary  style  of,  13 ; 
Naturalism  and,  32;  often  wrong 
but  never  dull,  129;  paints  with  a 
full  brush,  31;  Spiritualism  of,  32; 
Tribute  to,  130. 

Kant  not  antiquated  by  pragmatism, 
37,  49,  92,  120. 

Kelvin's  interview  with  a  reporter, 
Lord,  69. 

Kenlore,  new  term  for  epistemology 
or  theory  of  cognition,  88. 

Kepler,  30. 

Kernel  of  pragmatic  method,  115,  117. 

Key  to,  nature  in  the  formal  sciences, 
73 ;  riddles  of  the  world,  106. 

Kirchhoff's  use  of  the  word  "descrip- 
tion," 70. 

Language,  Origin  of,  84. 

Lateran  Council  and  the  twofold 
truth,  92. 

Lawdom,  the  condition  which  makes 
truth  possible,  100;  the  harmony 
produced  by  consistency,  75. 

Laws  of  nature,  not  blind,  32;  proto- 
types of  our  truths,  106;  systematic 
descriptions  of  groups  of  facts,  39. 

Leibnitz,  105 ;  concedes  true  existence 
only  to  that  which  works,  118;  his 
use  of  the  term  "monad,"  116. 

Lies,  considered  pragmatically,  56-57; 
Useful,  7. 

Logic,  analogous  to  perception,  97; 
most  certain  of  all  sciences,  125 ; 
often  replaced  by  faith,  50;  Plural- 
istic, 15;  vs.  temperament,  24! 

Loose  method  of  philosophizing,  Dan- 
gers of  a,  42. 

Ma'at,  the  goddess  of  truth  and  right, 
81-83. 

Mach,  Ernst,  70,  125. 

Maimonides,  90. 

Man  an  incarnation  of  the  deity,  The 
ideal,  2. 

Marburg  School,  The,  123. 

Materialism  and  spiritualism,  31. 

Materialist  school  of  India,  Charva- 
kas,  89. 

Mathematical  formulas  not  arche- 
types, 128. 


Matter,  a  problem  not  ripe  for  solu- 
tion, 68,  70;  and  energy  represent 
the  "that"  of  existence,  not  the 
why  and  wherefore,  104;  Man's 
soul  not  molded  by,  32;  now  con- 
sidered as  subject  to  origin  and 
destruction,  Ponderable,  71 ;  or  God 
a  supererogatory  discussion,  34. 

Maywald,  M.  90. 

Mechanical  necessity  the  foundation 
of  truth,  100. 

Mechanics  of  consciousness,  Teleology 
vs.  the,  126. 

Memory  and  truth,  97. 

Mendel jeff  series,  The,  72. 

Mental  constructions  have  pragmatic 
value,  17,  18;  mistakes,  Sense  illu- 
sions are,  99-100. 

Merz,  John  Theodor,  94. 

Metageometry,  Space  conception  of, 
15.  See  also  "Non-Euclidean  ge- 
ometries." 

Metaphysical  essence,  102. 

Metaphysics  and  causation,  70-71. 

Methodology,  51 ;  Classical  and  mod- 
ern, 95. 

Microcosm,  Man  a,  i. 

Mill,  J.  S.,  125. 

Mind,  a  proof  of  the  cosmic  system, 
loo ;  and  truth,  96 ;  Consistency  and 
the  human,  15 ;  embodiment  of  the 
world-order,  105;  Origin  of,  II. 

Misconstructions  and  false  criticism, 
127-128. 

Monad,  Leibnitz's  use  of  the  term, 
lid 

Monism,  and  the  principle  of  oneness, 
14;  and  the  unity  of  all  truths,  104- 
105. 

Moods,  Legitimate  place  of,  41. 

Moral  holidays  and  the  inconsisten- 
cies of  pragmatism,  22. 

Motion,  Cause  a,  71 ;  Point  of  refer- 
ence the  first  essential  condition  for 
describing  a,  72. 

Multiple  personality,  53. 

Munsterberg,  Hugo,  124. 

Mysticism  and  the  purely  formal,  103 ; 
Love  of  facts  and,  19  ff. 


Naturalism,  W.  James  and,  32. 

Nature's  key  in  the  formal  sciences, 
73 ;  laws  not  blind,  32 ;  laws  proto- 
types of  our  truths,  106;  laws  sys- 
tematic descriptions  of  groups  of 
facts,  39. 

Necessity  and  universal  validity,  124. 

New  truth  is  pseudo  truth,  iio-m. 

Newton  on  the  ultimate  constitution 
of  matter,  69. 

Nietzsche,  R,  93-94. 


136 


TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 


Noetic  domain  of  truth,  No  separate 

48. 
Non-Euclidean  geometries,  30.     See 

also  "Metageometry." 

Objective  significance  of  truth,  II  ff. 

Objectivity  of  science,  51. 

Occam,  William,  120. 

Occult  phenomena  believed  in  by  W. 
James,  119. 

Old  truths  and  their  wider  interpre- 
tations, 30. 

One  and  the  many,  The,  13. 

Oneness  of  all  truths,  104. 

Order  not  the  cause  but  the  product 
of  evolution  (Peirce),  36. 

Palagyi,  Melchior,  119. 

Paradoxes  of  pragmatism,  21. 

Parmenides,  Plato  greatly  influenced 
by,  87. 

Pathological  reasoning,  47. 

Peace  of  the  conclusive  answer,  122. 

Peirce,  Benjamin,  37. 

Peirce,  Charles  S.,  5 ;  A  suggestion 
for,  15 ;  the  real  founder  of  prag- 
matism, 114;  Tychism  of,  36. 

Personal  equation,  a  vitiating  factor 
in  a  consideration  of  truth,  50,  51 ; 
and  astronomy,  49;  and  intellect, 
48;  and  "plastic  truth,"  26-27;  In- 
accuracy of  the,  46,  47. 

Personality,  Disintegrated,  49,  53; 
Genetic  psychology  and,  49. 

Philosophy,  as  a  science  not  deter- 
mined by  the  personal  equation,  26 ; 
Ideal  of,  to  trace  the  unity  of  our 
world  conception,  66;  not  the  sub- 
jective expression  of  idiosyncrasies, 
41 ;  of  tolerance,  40 ;  tested  by  its 
practical  application,  10. 

Piper,  Mrs.,  43. 

Plasticity  in  astronomy,  41 ;  in  phi- 
losophy, 40;  of  truth,  27. 

Plato,  87;  and  Aristotle,  122. 

Plotinus,  87. 

Pluralistic  view  of  science,  65. 

Poetic  not  always  the  exact,  The,  37. 

Poincare,  Henri,  72. 

Politics,  Pragmatic,  4-5. 

Polybius,  116. 

Pope's  infallibility  and  pragmatism, 
The,  127. 

Pragmatic,  All  philosophies  are,  10; 
aspect  of  philosophy  its  most  im- 
portant part,  64;  epistemology, 
Sample  of,  130;  History  of  the 
word,  4;  method,  a  card  catalogue, 
121,  method,  Kernel  of,  115,  117. 

Pragmaticism  and  pragmatism,  36. 

Pragmatism,  a  psychological  method 
rather  than  a  new  philosophy,  63; 


an  artistic  movement,  43 ;  and  the 
Inquisition,  7;  and  utilitarianism, 
6;  applied  to  time  and  space,  18; 
as  a  philosophical  movement,  4; 
Critics  of,  23;  date  when  stamped 
as  a  philosophical  term,  116;  de- 
fined by  W.  James,  5 ;  denies  veri- 
ties (objectivity  of  truth),  107; 
History  of  the  word  and  the  method, 
113;  in  business  interests,  47;  in  the 
religious  field,  8 ;  introduced  into 
philosophy  by  C.  S.  Peirce  in  1878, 
5 ;  its  denouncers  rebuked,  55 ;  its 
test  of  truth  and  place  in  religion, 
33;  new  wine  in  old  bottles,  119;  on 
the  defensive,  126;  Pathological 
element  in,  25 ;  Peirce  the  real 
founder  of,  114;  Pre-scientific,  48; 
Prophecies  of  ,  44;  pugnacious 
towards  its  critics,  37. 

Predetermined,  Solutions  of  scientific 
problems  are,  n. 

Pre-scientific,  age  of  culture,  Char- 
acteristics of  the,  50;  man's  idea  of 
truth,  48. 

Prince,  Dr.  Morton,  49. 

Problems,  Only  one  right  solution  of 
scientific,  11. 

Promise,  Spiritualism  the  doctrine  of, 

34- 

Prophecy  of  pragmatism,  The,  44. 

Protagoras  redivivus,  118. 

Psychic  phenomena,  The  attractive 
vagueness  of,  43 ;  believed  in  by 
James,  119. 

Psychology,  Genetic,  49. 

Ptolemy  and  truth,  28. 

Pugnacious  pragmatism,  37. 

Purely  formal,  i.e.,  reason,  60;  Norms 
of,  the  backbone  of  system  in  sci- 
ence, 14,  67;  Mysticism  and,  103. 

Quibbling  and  confusion  of  thought, 
73;  vs.  argument,  29,  35. 

Radium  and  the  final  dissolubility  of 
atoms,  72. 

Rationality  first  expressed  in  the  idea 
of  God,  75. 

Real  and  true,  n. 

Reality,  and  actuality,  103;  Ready- 
made,  17. 

Reason,  a  unity,  14,  16 ;  Humanity  the 
product  of,  19. 

Reference,   Points  of,  72  ff. 

Reformation  and  pragmatism,  The,  7. 

Religion,  an  instinctive  formulation  of 
a  trust  in  the  world-order,  75; 
Place  of  pragmatism  in,  33. 

Revelation  of  truth,  Special,  90. 

Riddles  of  the  world,  Key  to,  106. 


INDEX. 


137 


Rock  of  ages,  65  ff. ;  in  that  the  truth 
of  yesterday  will  be  truth  to-mor- 
row, 28 ;  in  world-order  founded  on 
philosophy  of  form,  75. 

Romantic  temperament  introduced 
into  theology  by  W.  James,  32. 

Rothschild  and  pragmatic  methods  in 
finance,  56-57. 

Russell,  Bertrand,  127. 


Schiller,  F.  C.  R.,  59;  as  a  humanist, 
118. 

Schopenhauer,  A.,  92;  Four  kinds  of 
truth  according  to,  93. 

Science,  a  consistent  principle  of  ar- 
ranging facts  in  related  order,  65 ; 
Heroes  of,  95 ;  Ideal  of,  the  agree- 
ment of  truths,  12;  not  an  aggre- 
gate of  mere  probabilities  but  a 
method  of  determining  truth,  68; 
not  impossible  because  the  masses 
are  unscientific,  51 ;  objectivity  of, 
51;  Pluralistic  view  of,  65;  super- 
seded, 128;  Truth  the  basis  of,  7. 

Scotus,  Duns,  120. 

Sensation  and  pure  Anschauung,  123. 

Sensations  as  ultimate  realities 
(Mach),  119. 

Sense  impressions,  analogous  to  log- 
ical syllogisms,  97;  Place  of,  in  the 
domain  of  truth,  96. 

"Sentiment,  is  everything,"  119;  Sig- 
nificance of,  130. 

Simmel,  Georg,  118. 

Sophists,  Philosophy  of  the,  44. 

Spasms,  Thought-,  10. 

Speech  is  representative,  85. 

Spencer,  Herbert,  72. 

Spinoza,  92. 

Spiritual  origin  of  force,  B.  Peirce's 
theory  of  the,  37. 

Spiritualism  of  W.  James,  32. 

Spirituality  impossible  without  truth, 
in. 

Stability  of  truth,  73. 

Stein,  Ludwig,  113,  123-124. 

Stoics  on  truth  and  the  theory  of 
cognition,  88;  their  definition  of 
good  and  evil,  114. 

"Straw  men"  in  philosophy,  39. 

Subject  and  object  as  correlates,  127. 

Subjective,  conception  of  truth,  54; 
element,  Elimination  of  the,  49. 

Subjectivity  develops  from  purely 
physical  conditions  into  the  think- 
ing subject,  103;  of  geometry,  129. 

Syllogisms,  and  sensations  as  criteria 
of  truth,  88;  and  sense  perceptions, 

97- 

Symbols  for  orientation,  125. 
System  is  the  backbone  of  science,  74. 


Tausch,  Edwin,  49. 

Teleological,  in  truth,  The,  48;  unity 
of  ego,  125;  view  of  pragmatism, 
US- 

Teleology  vs.  the  mechanics  of  con- 
sciousness, 126. 

Temperament  vs.  logical  argument, 
24,  25. 

Terminology  in  philosophy,   51. 

Theology  and  truth,  90-91. 

Theory,  Truth  and  fact  in,  70. 

Things-in-themselves,  92,   109. 

Thucydides,  116. 

Time  and  space,  17  f. 

Tolerance  in  philosophy,  40. 

Transformation,  Law  of,  71. 

Trendelenburg,  A.,  121. 

Trinity,  Verities,  truths  and  ideals 
constitute  an  analogy  to  the  theo- 
logical, 106,  107. 

Truth,  a  formulation  of  the  essential 
features  of  a  set  of  facts,  61 ;  and 
allegory,  35 ;  and  Anschauung,  92 ; 
and  existence,  Difference  between, 
96 ;  and  the  a  priori,  125 ;  as  an  ex- 
pedient, 28;  Cash  value  of,  not  de- 
termined by  activity,  8,  10;  Chris- 
tianity's doctrine  of,  89;  defined, 
85 ;  defined  by  James,  54 ;  Doctrine 
of  the  twofold,  89,  91 ;  Domain  of, 
includes  noetic  and  teleological,  48; 
Egyptian  emblems  of,  81  ff. ;  Ety- 
mology of  the  word,  78;  Evidence 
is  not,  74;  exists  only  in  thought, 
96 ;  in  the  singular  and  in  the  plural, 
13 ;  its  ideal  the  solution  of  every 
scientific  problem,  1 1 ;  its  predeter- 
mined character  in  the  agreement 
between  idea  and  reality,  n;  man's 
guide  and  safeguard,  3 ;  Mechanical 
necessity  the  foundation  of,  100; 
Nature  and  function  of,  according 
to  modern  scientists,  94;  never  in- 
ert, 39 ;  not  affected  by  failures  and 
breakdowns  in  theories,  66,  129 ; 
not  of  the  senses  but  of  the  mind, 
61 ;  not  tested  by  logic  or  psychol- 
ogy, 12 ;  offspring  of  the  One  and 
All,  in;  Plasticity  of,  27;  Prag- 
matic conception  of,  5 ;  reality,  1 1 ; 
reflects  and  reveals  the  eternal,  112; 
Stability  of,  73 ;  the  eternal  and  the 
transient,  2;  the  most  significant 
presence  in  the  world,  12;  Utility 
as  criterion  of,  117;  Variability  of, 
28;  Verifiable,  the  basis  of  science, 

Truths,  are  objective  correlates  of 
subjective  thoughts,  104;  are  uni- 
versal, facts  particular,  61 ;  Gen- 
eral and  special,  93;  may  contrast 
but  never  contradict  each  other, 


138 


TRUTH  ON  TRIAL. 


104;  of  to-day  never  the  falsehoods 
of  to-morrow,  30;  Oneness  of  all, 
104. 

Twins,  Truth  and  mind,  98. 

Twofold  truth,  89,  91. 

Tychism,  Charles  S.  Peirce's,  36. 

Ueberweg,  97. 

"Uniformities  of  Nature,"  (Clifford), 
129. 

Unity,  is  qualitatively  different  from 
its  parts,  109 ;  not  a  mere  aggregate, 
108;  not  a  thing  but  a  relation  of 
parts,  I ;  of  our  world  conception, 
Ideal  of  philosophy  to  trace,  66;  of 
reason  and  of  the  world,  15. 

Universals,  Truths  are,  61 ;  Two  con- 
tradictory views  of  the  nature  of, 

IOI-IO2. 

Universe,  Mind  of  the,  15  f. 


Utilitarianism,  No  true  principle  in,  6. 

Verities,  as  events  (James),  8;  as 
eternal  truths,  13 ;  correspond  to 
first  person  of  the  Trinity,  106. 

Warren,  Mrs.  Fiske,  65. 

Waterloo,  56. 

Will,  Supremacy  of  the,  119. 

Will  to  believe,  Idiosyncrasies  and 
the,  23 ;  James  apologizes  for  the 
title  of  his  book,  23 ;  less  influential 
in  determining  religious  conviction, 
48. 

Windmills  and  giant  errors,  129. 

Words,  spoken  symbols  of  things  and 
of  abstractions,  67-68. 

World-stuff,  Primordial,  72. 

Your  truth,  vs.  my  truth,  51. 


A     000  341  043     8 


DEPARTMENT  OF  PHILOSOPHY 


